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THESIS ABSTRACT 
Climate change is one of our major contemporary challenges, and public support for 
climate change mitigation policies is essential to tackle this issue. It is generally 
agreed that public support for mitigation policies is driven by individuals’ beliefs in 
adverse impacts of climate change and their anthropogenic causes. However, there 
have been instances where strong beliefs in these two factors have not yielded full 
public support for mitigation policies, especially tough initiatives, such has been the 
case with Australia’s carbon tax. Exploring missing determinants of public support 
for mitigation policies remains a challenge for both policymakers and scholars. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that communications about climate change issues are 
nonlinear leading to information distortion when transferred from climate scientists 
to lay audiences thereby widening the attitudinal gaps between the two groups. 
Identifying theses gaps is important in order to more effectively communicate 
climate change information and therefore enhance mitigation efforts. 
This thesis focuses on four constructs of perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change, perceived anthropogenic causes of climate change; perceived policy 
effectiveness, and feasibility to explain Australian public support for mitigation 
policies. The study draws from major theories in the field such as the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour, Risk Perception Theory, the Extended Parallel Process Model, 
and Social Dilemma literature. Examining field-surveyed samples of 1,476 general 
public participants, and 140 climate scientist participants, the study reports important 
findings to enhance understanding of factors that lead to policy support.  
This thesis found that perceived policy effectiveness plays a critical and complex 
role than previously thought and moderates the influence of perceived adverse 
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impacts of climate change on supportive behaviour. Participants are unlikely to 
support a mitigation policy just because they are aware of possible adverse impacts 
of climate change, they would also consider policy effectiveness as the key factor in 
deciding whether they should sacrifice their immediate self-interests to mitigate 
climate change. It was also found that over-communicating adverse impacts of 
climate change may reduce the positive impact of perceived policy effectiveness on 
public support.  
Moreover, the study found many significant differences in perceptions of the adverse 
impacts of climate change, and in evaluations of mitigation policies when contrasting 
the general public with climate scientist. These gaps were argued to be linked to 
differences between the two groups in their mitigation policy preferences. Moreover, 
data from the sample of climate scientists, who are assumed personal and/or political 
interests bias-free, endorses the dominant role of perceived policy effectiveness. 
They also have a preference for mandatory initiatives to mitigate prolonged and 
implicit impacts of climate change, such as sea-level rises.  
In conclusion, this thesis suggests that perceived policy effectiveness is the key to 
public support for climate change mitigation policies, although common drivers such 
as perceived adverse impacts of climate change should not be ignored. Future 
research in the field of pro-environmental behaviour, and climate change 
communication campaigns should place more considerations to the construct of 
perceived policy effectiveness.  
Keywords: Climate Change Mitigation Policy; Policy Support; Perceived Policy 
Effectiveness; Perceived Adverse Impacts of Climate Change; Australia  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Climate Change and Australia 
Climate change is predicted to have significant impacts on Australia. Warnings about 
these impacts were raised by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation’s (CSIRO) as early as the 1980s with presentations of a number of 
climate change scenarios and their adverse impacts on society, the economy and the 
biosphere (Burgmann & Baer 2012). More recently, in their report ‘Climate Change: 
Science and Solutions for Australia’, the CSIRO confirmed that climate change will 
have dramatic impacts on many important areas, including Australia’s water supply, 
coastal development, biosphere, and human health (Hennessy 2011). This conclusion 
is important because the public’s perception of the adverse impacts of climate change 
is shaped by such reports which are key drivers of their willingness to engage in 
mitigation actions (Bostrom et al. 2012; O’Connor et al. 2002; O’Connor, Bord & 
Fisher 1999; Sibley & Kurz 2013). The following section therefore briefly details 
some of the adverse impacts of climate change reported in the scientific media and 
general press in Australia. 
In term of water supply, Hennessy (2011) claims that the water supply in Australia’s 
southern and eastern regions will decrease if atmospheric temperature continues to 
increase at the current rate. This will not only affect water supply to households in 
Australia’s two most populous states, New South Wales and Victoria, but also 
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adversely impact the agricultural sector (Parry 2007). This is critical because 
agriculture is among the most water-intensive production sectors in Australia 
accounting for 59% of Australia’s total water consumption in 2011 and 2012 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013). Moreover, agricultural products are among 
the top 20 Australian export commodities and related services (Department of 
Foreign Affair 2012). Therefore, climate change related water supply reductions 
have the potential to harm livelihoods and the nation’s agricultural output and 
revenue. 
Sea-level rises are another major concern, and will heavily impact Australia’s low 
lying coastal areas and islands. The Department of Climate Change (2009) predicted 
that 22% to 34.8% of 711,000 coastal residential buildings nationwide will be at risk 
should sea-levels rise by 1.1 m, with an estimated financial loss between $41 to $63 
billion. The report stated that sea-level rises would also impact future economic and 
infrastructure development of coastal areas.  
The adverse impacts of climate change on biodiversity are the result of increases in 
atmospheric temperatures and sea levels. The associated consequences are predicted 
to eliminate several unique Australian species and habitats (Hennessy 2011). Coastal 
ecosystems, such as coral reefs, are important biodiversity reservations and are 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change.  Should the atmospheric 
temperature rise by two degrees Celsius by 2100, the Great Barrier Reef will change 
its profile from a coral-dominant to algal-dominant habitat, significantly reducing 
biodiversity (Department of the Environment and Heritage 2003, p. 19). The 
damaging impact of increases in sea temperatures to the Great Barrier Reef was 
already seen in 2002, with more than half of the area effected by “coral bleaching” 
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which reduces coral growth and reproduction (Department of the Environment and 
Heritage 2003, p. 16; Marshall & Schuttenberg 2006). In economic terms, the $5 
billion-a-year tourism industry generated by coral reef tourism is also at risk from 
this degradation (Hennessy 2011). 
Finally, it is the impact of climate change on health that possibly attracts the most 
community attention. Direct adverse impacts are caused by heat waves, floods, fires 
and storms and indirect impacts are the result of changes to biological and ecological 
systems (Hennessy 2011). Several diseases and medical conditions are assumed to be 
associated with climate change, such as heat stroke, heart attack and infectious 
diseases. In 2003, McMichael et al. predicted that should the temperature increase by 
two degrees Celsius by 2050, the risk of heart-related deaths for over-65 years olds 
in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane would increase between 57% and 164% 
compared to what was in 1999. Similarly it is predicted that epidemics of infectious 
diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, and diarrhoea would be experienced on a 
national scale due to climatic shifts (McMichael et al. 2003). 
In summary, there is enough evidence to suggest that climate change will harm 
Australia’s economy, biodiversity and the wellbeing of the community. These 
important aspects of the nation’s development are at threat when faced with an 
atmospheric temperature increase of two degrees Celsius by 2050. Australia’s 
coastal-oriented development and dry weather amplifies the adverse impacts of 
climate change.  It is also argued that climate change will seriously harm human 
health. Many factors required to maintain human wellbeing, such as water and food 
security, will be adversely affected and it is likely that heat stroke and infectious 
disease epidemics will occur. Therefore, there is a need for adaptation strategies to 
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assist the community to adjust to these conditions. However, adaptation strategies are 
insufficient in the long-term unless climate change mitigation policies, such as for 
greenhouse gases emission reductions, are also put in place (Agrawala et al. 2014). 
 
1.2 Public Opinion on Climate Change and the Political Climate Actions in 
Australia 
The Australian public has engaged with scientific evidence of human-induced 
climate change and its adverse impacts. Research in the early 1990’s showed that 
90% of Australians were aware of the significance of environmental issues, including 
climate change (Burgmann & Baer 2012). Later public surveys confirm that the 
majority of citizens perceive climate change as a critical threat. For example, the 
Lowy Institute survey of 1,000 Australians in 2007 found that 86% of participants 
ranked climate change as the most critical threat, ahead of international terrorism and 
nuclear weapons (Gyngell 2007). Similarly, the latest report from the Climate 
Institute confirms that 70% of Australians are “climate change believers” who 
‘accept that climate change is occurring’, that 84% agree that human activity is a 
partial cause of climate change, and 89% of “climate change believers” think that the 
country is suffering its adverse impacts (Stefanova 2014, p. 3). 
High public awareness of climate change is likely to be linked with a desire for 
timely action from government. Burgmann and Baer (2012) cited a 1989 Saulwick 
poll that recorded nine out of ten Australians demanding urgent action from the 
government on global environmental issues. Annual studies from the Lowy Institute 
suggest that Australians have recognised the global importance of climate change 
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actions, have been willing to undertake cost-induced actions, and want their 
government to take leadership on this issue, regardless of international consensus 
(Cook 2006; Hanson 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011; Oliver 2013, 2014). Similarly, the 
Climate Institute in 2008 found that 76% of the public expected the Australian 
government to be a leader in climate change actions (Stefanova 2014). 
Public support is essential for climate change policy development, especially in the 
context of democratic countries such as Australia (Moser 2010b). It can be argued 
that this public support led to the Australian Government’s 1990 adoption of the 
Toronto Target to reduce carbon emissions by 20% by 2005, the establishment of the 
National Greenhouse Response Strategy in 1992, and Australia’s ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2007, which set a target to reduce carbon emissions by 60% on 
2000 levels by 2050 (Anita, Simeon & Kate 2013). Burgmann and Baer (2012) argue 
that it was the public’ awareness of climate change that lead to the change of 
government during “The World’s First Climate Change Election” in Australia in 
2007. The Liberal/National Coalition led by Prime Minister John Howard lost 
government to the Labor Party (ALP), lead by Kevin Rudd, due in part to the 
Australian public’s rising awareness of climate change issues at the time (Burgmann 
& Baer 2012). According to Burgmann and Baer (2012), the ALP was perceived as 
being more committed to climate change intervention than the Coalition. More 
generally, Australia’s pioneering climate change policy ‘has been a polarising and 
highly political issue’ (Anita, Simeon & Kate 2013, p. 1), and a result of the 
contradiction between the general public’s demand for climate change action and 
neoliberalism (Andrew, Kaidonis & Andrew 2010; Burgmann & Baer 2012; Spash & 
Lo 2012).  
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One of the recent climate change issues in Australia is the abolition of the carbon tax 
under the current Liberal/National Coalition Government lead by Prime Minister 
Tony Abbott. In the 2013 Federal Election, the carbon tax was a policy battleground, 
with the Coalition government establishing a policy position of abolishing carbon 
pricing. However, the abolition of the carbon tax seems to have not been central to 
the election success of the Coalition. An Exit Poll Report released by the Climate 
Institute in September 2013 demonstrated that only three per cent of Australians 
considered the abolition of the carbon tax as influencing votes but instead, that 
effective economic policies were more persuasive. Moreover, the Exit Poll Report 
suggested that 63% of the voting public believed in the existence of climate change 
and nearly half expected the new government to maintain carbon pricing (Connor & 
Stefanova 2013). It could be argued, therefore, that the abolition of the carbon tax 
does not necessarily mean that the Australian public are less likely to believe in the 
effects of climate change, or that they rejected mitigation policies. Indeed, according 
to 2014 research, only 41% of the public believed they were negatively affected by 
carbon pricing (Climate Institute 2014). What constrains the public’s full support for 
the carbon tax, perhaps then, is the way that the previous Australian government 
designed and implemented that initiative and other carbon trading schemes. 
According to Spash and Lo (2012), the government had been spending taxpayer’s 
money on ‘buying-off the coal generators or other polluters’ (p 67), which is less 
likely to curb carbon emissions effectively. This may have also impacted on the 
public’s willingness to make the financial sacrifices that carbon pricing requires. 
However, there have been fluctuations in Australians’ support for climate change 
action. According to the Lowy Institute annual polls, in 2006, 68% of Australians 
were willing to accept increased financial costs to mitigate climate change, but by 
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2009 that number had dropped to 48% and in 2014, only 45% of the public supported 
mitigating actions (Oliver 2014). The Climate Institute reported similar patterns 
between 2008 and 2014. In 2008, 76% of participants supported Australia’s leading 
role in combating climate change globally, however, by 2010, the number had 
decreased to 55%, and further declined to 52% in 2012. Although the Australian 
public’s support for climate change action then increased to 61% in 2014, it is still 
below the 2008 (76%) record (Stefanova 2014).  
The increases and decreases in public support for climate change actions are the 
result of many factors. Although the public expects government to respond to a 
complex and diverse range of issues, such as the national economy, job creation, 
welfare, national security, immigration, refugee and asylum seekers and nuclear 
risks, climate change has remained an ongoing concern (Cook 2006; Gyngell 2007; 
Hanson 2008). However, changes in international and domestic circumstances affect 
the ranking of climate change issues and accordingly, impacts on public support for 
climate change related policies. Furthermore, this thesis proposes that an important 
influence on public support for climate change mitigation policies is the 
effectiveness of these policies in reducing carbon emissions, and therefore their 
effectiveness in climate change mitigation. 
Burgmann and Baer (2012) argue that public support for ALP’s policy to reduce 
carbon emissions was the platform upon which it won the 2007 Federal Election. The 
Lowy Institute recorded that in 2006, 68% of Australians supported climate change 
mitigation action even with significant personal costs. However, the willingness of 
the public to support climate change actions was likely to decrease after the Rudd 
Government proposed the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS). The CRPS 
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proposed a modest carbon emission reduction target of between five and fifteen per 
cent of 2000 levels by 2020, which was perceived as inadequate to mitigate harmful 
impacts of climate change (ABC News 2008; Australian Science Media Centre 
2008). By 2010, after the CPRS was rejected twice in 2009, only 48% of the public 
supported climate change mitigation action (Australian Government 2010; Cook 
2006; Hanson 2010). Thereafter, Julia Gillard seceded Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister 
and introduced the Clean Energy Plan (CEP) which paved the way for a carbon tax 
in 2011 (Gillard 2011). Again, the CEP and Carbon Tax were criticised for their low 
effectiveness in carbon emission reductions. The way these initiatives were designed 
and implemented was unlikely to encourage industries, especially electric producers, 
to reduce their carbon footprints. Big polluters were freely allocated carbon permits 
and were allowed to sell unused emission permits at a fixed price (Spash & Lo 
2012). This violates the economic basis of carbon pricing tools, which suggests that 
carbon emissions should be traded at market-based prices (Garnaut 2008). Free 
carbon permits, and the fixed-price trading scheme actually gave incentives to big 
polluters to not reduce carbon emissions, and to transfer the carbon tax-induced costs 
to consumers (Burgmann & Baer 2012; Spash & Lo 2012). The Australian public in 
fact expressed their disfavour towards the CEP and the carbon tax, with only 36% of 
Australians prepared to accept personal financial costs to support climate change 
actions (Hanson 2012). In 2012, the lowest community support for climate change 
mitigation policies and Australia’s global climate change leadership was recorded 
(Stefanova 2014).  
In summary, it is predicted that climate change will have significant impacts on 
Australia’s development. The underlying factors driving Australians’ support for 
government actions are the general public’s high awareness regarding the adverse 
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impacts of climate change. Unfortunately, beliefs in the existence of human-induced 
climate change, and in its adverse impacts, seem to be insufficient to maintain the 
Australian public’s support for tough mitigation policies, such as the carbon tax. It 
was also observed that the public’s support for mitigation actions varied with the 
introduction of the nation’s carbon emission reduction programs such as Rudd’s 
CPRS, and Gillard’s CEP and the carbon tax. Moreover, these policies were 
criticised by many experts for their low effectiveness in carbon emission reductions 
as these policies either aimed for inadequate carbon reduction targets (CPRS), or 
were watered-down (CEP).  
In fact, according to recent report from the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP 2014), Australia is unlikely to reach its Kyoto Protocol pledge, which was to 
reduce carbon emissions by five per cent of 2000 levels by 2020. In addition, the 
Climate Change Authority (2014) has argued that the five-per-cent reduction target is 
inadequate to ensure Australia’s fair contribution to the international agreement of 
limiting global warming below two degrees Celsius, and that a target of at least 15% 
below 2000 levels would be better. The Authority also argued that further delay in 
actions on curbing carbon emissions will place heavier burdens on the next 
generations of Australians, given the nation’s international commitment to climate 
change issues. However, in order to take stronger actions on climate change issues, 
policymakers would face the challenge of garnering public support. This is critical in 
any democratic context, although one may observe that climate change issues in 
Australia have been ‘highly political’ (Anita, Simeon & Kate 2013, p. 1).   
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1.3 This Thesis  
Climate change is among one of our most challenging contemporary issues and 
requires immediate actions on a global scale (Stern 2006). Accordingly, many 
nations have actively undertaken mitigation actions (Edenhofer et al. 2014), the 
success of which has relied on public support for climate change mitigation policies. 
Consequently, studying the drivers of public support for climate change mitigation 
policies is necessary in both a theoretical and practical context. The focus of this 
thesis therefore is to investigate public support behaviour towards climate change 
mitigation policies. 
Australia provides a good context for this study because it is amongst the highest 
emitters of carbon pollution per capita, compared to other OECD countries and the 
world average (Garnaut 2008), and the nation because of its geographic position, 
faces significant risk from climate change. Furthermore, a majority of Australians are 
climate change believers who are likely to accept the existence of human-induced 
climate change and of its adverse impacts (Hine et al. 2013; Leviston, Walker & 
Malkin 2013). The literature suggests that these two beliefs are among significant 
drivers of public support for mitigation initiatives (Bostrom et al. 2012; O’Connor et 
al. 2002; O’Connor, Bord & Fisher 1999; Sibley & Kurz 2013). Unfortunately, 
Australian governments have struggled to transform the general public’s high 
awareness of climate change issues into support for tough mitigation initiatives. The 
carbon tax, for instance, was introduced in Australia in 2012 and expected to be a 
vehicle for attaining the nation’s ambitious carbon emissions reduction target. Yet it 
received inadequate public support and was recently abolished (Connor & Stefanova 
2013). 
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 There has been much discussion in the scientific community and the general press 
on this policy reversal with many experts criticising the initiative for its low 
effectiveness in curbing carbon emissions (Australian Science Media Centre 2008; 
Burgmann & Baer 2012; Climate Change Authority 2014; Lo & Spash 2012; Spash 
& Lo 2012; see more expert opinions at ABC News 2008).  These discussions, it can 
be argued may have had significant effects on the general public perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the carbon tax as a way of curbing climate change as scientists are 
considered as the most trusted source of climate change information (Buys et al. 
2012; Leviston & Walker 2011b). Consequently, even though the general public’s 
opinions regarding climate change issues may be clouded by media reporting, 
political campaigns, and business sector (Weingart, Engels & Pansegrau 2000), their 
perceptions of mitigation policy effectiveness will also be influenced by expert 
opinions. That is, to some extent, the general public may be able to judge the actual 
effectiveness of the governments’ mitigation policies. This assumption, the history of 
Australian climate change movements, and the importance of perceived policy 
effectiveness to individuals’ opinions regarding public policies (see Lubell 2003; 
Wan & Shen 2013), make it possible to hypothesise that perceived policy 
effectiveness may be an important missing piece in the puzzle of stimulating public 
support for mitigation policies. Despite this, the literature describing pro-
environmental behaviours barely examines this promising determinant of support 
behaviour towards mitigation initiatives. 
This thesis therefore centres around two determinants: perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change, and mitigation policy effectiveness. This thesis aims to utilise these 
two determinants, together with other important factors such as perceived 
anthropogenic causes of climate change, and perceived policy feasibility, to explain 
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public support for climate change mitigation policies. The study also investigates 
attitudinal gaps between the general public and climate scientists. In particular, it 
focuses on differences in the lay and scientific communities’ perceptions of climate 
change, climate change mitigation policies, and support levels for those policies, to 
identify evidence of  nonlinearity in climate change communication (Stoutenborough 
& Vedlitz 2014; Weingart, Engels & Pansegrau 2000). It is suggested that this may 
contribute to our understanding of the public’s reluctance to support climate change 
mitigation policies.  
In order to fulfil the above research objectives, this thesis proposes the following five 
research questions: 
 Research Question One:  
What drives public support for climate change mitigation policies? 
 Research Question Two: 
Compared to perceived adverse impacts of climate change, what role does 
perceived policy effectiveness play in driving mitigation policy support 
behaviour? 
 Research Question Three: 
To what extent do the determinants of the support behaviour influence each 
other when explaining the identified behaviour? 
 Research Question Four:  
What are the differences between the general public and climate scientists in 
attitudes towards climate change, evaluation of climate change mitigation 
policies, and support for them? 
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 Research Question Five:  
What drives climate scientists’ support for climate change mitigation 
policies? 
The next five chapters investigate the above research questions. They are titled as 
follows: 
 Chapter Two 
Explaining public support for climate change mitigation policies – An 
 analytical framework 
 Chapter Three 
 What drives public support for climate change mitigation policies? – 
 Empirical evidence from the Australian general public 
 Chapter Four 
Explaining public support for climate change mitigation policies – 
Identifying the “gatekeeper” and why “less is more only when more is too 
much” 
 Chapter Five 
 Putting experts into lay people’s shoes – What drives climate scientists’ 
 support for climate change mitigation policies? 
 Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
Chapter Two synthesises the relevant literature on pro-environmental behaviours and 
proposes an analytical framework. This chapter helps theoretically identify the 
 16  
determinants that generate public support behaviour towards climate change 
mitigation policies, and the mechanisms by which these drivers explain behaviour 
(Research question one). The analytical framework proposed in Chapter Two is then 
empirically tested through a field-survey sample of the Australian general public, as 
described in Chapter Three and Chapter Four. Chapter Three focuses on the direct 
influences of the identified determinants of public support for climate change 
mitigation policies (Research question two). Chapter Four investigates mediating and 
moderating mechanisms through which the determinants explain the support 
behaviour (Research question three). Chapter Five then contrasts the general public 
group with a sample of Australian climate change scientists to identify some 
attitudinal gaps (Research question four). This Chapter also tests the analytical 
framework developed in Chapter Two on the assumed bias-free sample of climate 
scientists (Research question five). This enabled the development of an enhanced 
model for stimulating support for climate change mitigation initiatives. Chapter Six 
describes and discusses the findings and validates the thesis’ research questions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EXPLAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION POLICIES – AN ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Overview 
The literature has identified many important drivers of climate change mitigation 
policy support behaviour (PS), such as perceived adverse impacts of climate change 
(PI) and perceived policy effectiveness (PE). Although the role of the former has 
been well-examined, the literature has largely ignored the mechanism by which PE 
drives PS. In addition, even though the literature warns against the over-use of PI in 
climate change communication, commonly known as the “fear appeal” approach, an 
explaining theoretical framework is seldom provided. Moreover, the literature also 
neglects the extent to which the fundamental characteristics of mitigation initiatives 
affect policy preferences. This limitation derives from inadequate examination of the 
nature of the policies, as well as the deeper factorial structures of the behaviour’s 
determinants. Synchronising the Social Dilemma literature with major theories in the 
field such as the Theory of Planned Behaviour, the Risk Perception Theory, the 
Extended Parallel Process Model, and the Risk Perception Attitude framework, this 
chapter proposes an analytical framework that helps explain the variation in PS 
across climate change policies’ characteristics. The framework also suggests a 
mediating mechanism through which PE drives PS, and a moderating perspective, 
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which may help theoretically verify the “fear appeal” caution. Finally, this study 
suggests that in addition to effectiveness, perceived policy feasibility should be 
included as an important aspect of individuals’ policy evaluation to explain PS. 
Discussions and further research suggestions are also offered. 
 
2.2 Introduction 
Australian’s national science agency, the CSIRO have predicted that climate change 
will significantly impact Australia’s economic and biophysical environment (Cleugh 
et al. 2011). These adverse predictions have prompted the government to take a wide 
range of mitigation actions to reduce factors believed to contribute to climate change. 
One such initiative was to set a target of a reduction in carbon emissions by 15% 
below the 2000 level by 2020 (Australian Government 2008). To achieve this goal 
the government introduced the carbon tax at 23 AUD per tonne of carbon emissions, 
effective from 1st July 2012 (Gillard 2011). In addition, education and incentive 
programs such as the “Clean Energy Future” have been implemented to help 
households and businesses reduce their power consumption and provide financial 
incentives to buffer them against higher power bills emanating from introduction of 
the carbon tax. 
Despite these comprehensive government actions, there is still controversy around 
what the appropriate policies are to mitigate climate change impacts. Taking the 
carbon tax for instance, the general public support for the policy has been limited. 
One month following implementation of the carbon tax and financial support 
packages, only 36% of Australian public were found to support the carbon tax while 
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59% opposed it. (Nielsen 2012). The carbon tax was abolished in July 2014. A 
similar trend was also found in the US where consumers opposed energy taxes 
(Leiserowitz 2006). Nevertheless, the public’s engagement in climate change 
mitigation is important as they contribute to two of the largest sources of carbon 
emissions, either directly by fossil fuel combustion or indirectly by electricity usage 
(Australian Government 2008; Stern 2006). The lack of support from this important 
stakeholder in combating climate change is therefore problematic and consequently, 
the topic of explaining consumer support for climate change mitigation policies is 
relevant to both policy and academic research.  
This research topic, which belongs to a more general area of pro-environmental 
behaviours (PEBs), has attracted researchers from many areas, including psychology 
(Aguilar-Luzón et al. 2012; Gifford 2011; Kaiser, Hübner & Bogner 2005; Stern et 
al. 1995), sociology (Bostrom et al. 1994, 2012; Moser 2010a; O’Connor et al. 2002; 
O’Connor, Bord & Fisher 1999; Stern 2000), as well as marketing (Berger & Corbin 
1992; Hutton & Ahtola 1991; Moser 2010a; Press & Arnould 2009; Prothero et al. 
2011; Wiener & Doescher 1991). There is a general agreement in the literature that 
the level of public support for climate change mitigation policies is influenced by the 
public’s perceptions of the adverse impacts of climate change on their and other 
society members’ quality of life, as well as on the biosphere (Bostrom et al. 2012; 
Fransson & Gärling 1999; O’Connor et al. 2002; O’Connor, Bord & Fisher 1999). 
However, the literature has largely ignored the underlying structure which forms the 
basis of the general public’s perceived adverse impacts of climate change and its 
relation to their support of specific climate change mitigation policies. 
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The perception of policy effectiveness is considered another important factor when 
examining individuals’ support for public policies in general (Lubell 2003). 
Consequently, many works in the field of environmental psychology have 
investigated the concept of perceived policy effectiveness, especially in the context 
of transportation and energy policies (see Steg, Dreijerink & Abrahamse 2006; Steg 
& Vlek 2009). In fact, perceived policy effectiveness and policy acceptability (i.e., 
policy support) seem to go hand-in-hand in research on public opinion of 
transportation policies (Stead 2008). However, according to Steg and Vlek (2009), 
most of the studies investigating perceived policy effectiveness aim to explain 
factors which help establish that aspect of policy evaluation. For instance, Steg et al. 
(2006) investigated the role of individual attitude and preferences, characteristics of 
energy use policies in determining the policies’ perceived effectiveness. There is, 
however, limited study on the link between perceived policy effectiveness and 
intentional or behavioural change. Indeed recently, Wan and Shen (2013) urged for 
greater attention to be paid to the concept of perceived policy effectiveness as an 
important component driving PEBs. Wan et al. (2014) found empirical evidence 
suggesting that the construct positively drives recycling behaviour when examining a 
sample of 198 Hong Kong residents. Moreover, perceived policy effectiveness was 
also found to moderate the effects of common attitudinal determinants on PEBs, such 
as subjective norms (Wan, Shen & Yu 2014a). However, in the context of mitigation 
policy support behaviour, there is only limited empirical evidence highlighting the 
role of perceived policy effectiveness. Furthermore, the literature rarely is able to 
clarify the mechanism through which policy effectiveness drives the support 
behaviour (e.g., Bostrom et al. 2012). 
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In addition, we know little about the influence of perceived policy effectiveness on 
other key drivers of climate change policy support, such as the perceived adverse 
impacts of climate change. Addressing this gap will provide insights into cases of 
failed climate change policies, such as the Australian carbon tax. Many surveys 
indicate that a substantial portion of Australians are concerned about the damaging 
impacts of climate change on their livelihood and the country’s economy (Leviston 
& Walker 2011a, 2011b; Leviston, Walker & Malkin 2013). However, the carbon tax 
was still scrapped partially due to low perceptions of the effectiveness of the policy 
in reducing carbon emissions (Hannam 2014). It is possible that the low perceived 
policy effectiveness restrains the stimulating effect of perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change on policy support. Therefore, it is suspected that perceived policy 
effectiveness, and other key determinants of public support for mitigation policies, 
may not independently explain their dependent variable. 
The aim of this chapter therefore is to address these gaps in the literature by 
proposing a model to explain the general public’s support for climate change 
mitigation policies. The chapter draws upon three diverse theories of movement 
support, the Theory of Risk Perception, the Theory of Planned Behaviour and the 
Social Dilemma literature, to identify key constructs that are relevant to the problem 
of gaining public support for climate change mitigation policies. Moreover, this 
chapter employs the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) and the Risk 
Perception Attitude (RPA) framework to propose a mediating and moderating 
perspective in explaining mitigation policy support. The chapter starts by first 
defining the PS construct and exploring its available measures. Next the chapter 
introduces an integrated model of policy support and describes its theoretical 
foundation, followed by a set of propositions that arise from the model. Finally the 
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chapter suggests an enhanced model by taking into consideration factorial structures 
of the constructs in question. 
 
2.3 Literature Review 
2.3.1 Definition of climate change mitigation policy support behaviour (PS) 
Rarely has a formal definition of PS been provided in the literature. Instead, PS often 
borrows the definition of environmental policy support behaviour suggested by Stern 
et al. (1999) and Stern (2000). In these seminal works, the behaviour of 
environmental policy support is profiled as one of the four possible aspects of pro-
environmental behaviours (PEBs) (Stern 2000; Stern et al. 1999). Individuals who 
support environmental policies, which includes climate change mitigation policies, 
are characterised as “non-activist” environmentalists who are willing to sacrifice 
their own interests for the sake of the natural environment (Stern 1999, 2000; Stern 
et al. 1999). Nevertheless, the complexity in the nature of climate change mitigation 
policies makes this general definition of environmental support behaviour difficult to 
apply in this context, as not all climate change mitigation policies require followers 
to sacrifice their interest. Government subsidises for solar energy systems that aim to 
encourage consumers to switch to non-fossil energy sources is one such example.  
This study defines PS as the voting behaviour and voting intention of the general 
public towards the government’s stance on climate change mitigation. This definition 
distinguishes climate change mitigation policies from general environmental policies 
by defining them as policies that aim to mitigate the impact of climate change as 
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communicated or promised by the government (O’Connor, Bord & Fisher 1999). As 
climate change mitigation policies may consist of current policies, for example the 
carbon tax in case of Australia, and those policies that are still under development, 
this study does not distinguish between actual behaviour (for already-employed 
policies) from behavioural intention (for policies in development) when examining 
the PS construct. The close positive linkage between actual behaviour and 
behavioural intention, as postulated by the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 
1991), provides the rationale for this assumption.  
2.3.2 Limitations of current available measures of PS 
Compared to other aspects of PEBs, the research on environmental policy support 
and measures of PS in particular is limited. This section reviews some available 
measures of the PS construct to indicate possible gaps in the literature in measuring 
this important construct.  
If PS is positioned in the bigger picture of general environmental policy support 
behaviour, it is possible to employ current available measures of general 
environmental policy support behaviour to measure the PS construct. The research 
done by Stern et al. (1999) looks closely at environmental policy support behaviour 
of the general public. The authors measured environmental policy support, which 
was labelled as “Policy Support” in their VBN model, by the following three items: 
 ‘I would be willing to pay much higher taxes in order to protect the 
environment’ 
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 ‘I would be willing to accept cuts in my standard of living to protect the 
environment’ 
 ‘I would be willing to pay much higher prices in order to protect the 
environment’ 
It could be argued that these three items might be measuring individual “willingness 
to sacrifice” or “willingness to pay” for protecting the environment - a function of a 
person’s financial situation, rather than her willingness to support an environmental 
policy. Furthermore, Stern et al. (1999) did not examine any specific set of actual 
policies in operationalising their “Policy Support” construct. This affects the content 
validity of the construct, as it attempts to measure the policy support behaviour of the 
general public using the concept of “willingness to pay” without any specific 
economic cost. For instance, individuals might be willing to pay higher taxes to 
mitigate climate change effects, however, they may not support the carbon tax if they 
face a specific increased cost in their electricity bills.  
Apart from the construct validity issues with the measure suggested by Stern and his 
colleagues, this measure of general environmental policy support, indeed the general 
“willingness to sacrifice” for the sake of the environment, might not be suitable for 
measuring the PS construct for other reasons. First, the measurement of a 
“willingness to sacrifice” in relation to general actions, rather than a specific set of 
policies, might not explain cases where the general public support some specific 
policies while oppose others. Second, climate change mitigation policy cannot be 
generalised from general environmental policy in instances where the policy does not 
necessarily require followers to sacrifice in order to support the government climate 
change mitigation program. 
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There are some studies that explicitly measure the PS construct, such as the research 
of O’Connor et al. (2002). This study looked at particular climate change mitigation 
policies. The authors operationalised PS as the participant’s level of voting intention 
for four hypothesised carbon reduction policies. In contrast to the general statements 
of “willingness to sacrifice” in the work of Stern et al. (1999), O’Connor and his 
colleagues attached to the policies in question very specific amounts of extra money 
that would need to be paid if the participant chose to comply. This approach can help 
overcome the possible content validity issues identified in the Stern et al. (1999) 
study, however, the study is still limited to examining policies which mostly require 
the followers to sacrifice, that is, to pay money to reduce carbon emissions. This 
distinction is relevant because climate change mitigation policies can instead 
encourage the general public to voluntarily reduce carbon emissions, such as by 
subscribing to the solar energy system subsidy policy. This focus on “willingness to 
sacrifice” thus provides inadequate insight into explaining the variance in the support 
of the general public for different sets of climate change mitigation policies.  
Public opinion surveys suggest that the general public might not equally support each 
of a government’s climate change mitigation polices, even if they support climate 
change policies in general (O’Connor, Bord & Fisher 1999). For instance, in 
Hanson’s (2012) survey, although 81% of the Australian public agreed that Australia 
should support actions to tackle climate change, only 36% supported the specific 
carbon tax policy (Hanson 2012; Nielsen 2012). This complexity in the public 
support for mitigation policies deserves a closer look. This study argues that the 
variance in the nature of climate change mitigation policies dictates that a multiple 
factorial structure would better capture the PS construct, rather than the current 
conceptualisation that treats PS as a single factor. The recent work of Bostrom et al. 
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(2012) lends support to this claim, and is one of the most up-to-date studies that 
investigate PS. The objective of that study was to conduct a comparison across six 
countries of causal thinking of climate change and its effect on PS. Similar to 
O’Connor et al.’s (1999) study, Bostrom et al. (2012) focused on the role of 
perceived adverse impacts of climate change in explaining PS. However this is the 
first study that highlighted the multiple factorial pattern of the PS construct.  
From factor analysis results, Bostrom et al. (2012) grouped the studied policies into 
“Green policies”, “Carbon policies” and “Engineering”. The “Carbon policies” set 
ranged from carbon taxes to international carbon trading schemes, however the other 
policy sets included policies which were not only impractical but also stretched 
assumptions about the participants’ ability to give a meaningful responses. Solutions 
such as ‘Putting more dust in the atmosphere’ or ‘Reducing air pollution from toxic 
chemicals’ are not relevant to climate change mitigation goals1. In addition, the 
three-factor pattern was actually found when the authors examined the perceived 
effectiveness of mitigation policies, not the main dependent construct, PS. The 
structure of the construct policy support did not reveal the three factors of “Green 
policies”, “Carbon policies” and “Engineering”, and only one factor was found. 
However, for ease of interpretation, the authors grouped the studied policies into 
these three groups. Although Bostrom et al.’s study did not successfully find a 
statistical valid multiple factorial structure for the PS construct, it demonstrated that 
the complexity of the PS construct is worthy of research attention. Moreover, the 
                                                 
1 This was criticised as a misconception when conceptualising climate change as pollution (Kempton 
1993). Thus, this item is not valid to measure the PS construct and should be removed. 
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study confirmed a positive correlation between the perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change and PS. 
In conclusion, the measures of PS in the studies discussed above share a common 
limitation. First, the psychometric properties of the PS construct have not been 
thoroughly investigated. Past studies have failed to detect a multiple factorial pattern 
for the PS construct with the policies they investigated. This limits the potential for 
further examination of the variance of general public support for different climate 
change mitigation policies. Even in cases where a pattern was found, the studies 
failed to provide a theoretical rationale to support the pattern. The premise therefore 
of this study is that a PS construct with a multiple factorial structure would better 
capture the complexity of this important construct. Furthermore, this study argues 
that this multiple factorial structure should be supported by theoretical reasoning, 
rather derived solely from empirical results. 
In the following section, this chapter proposes a simple model to explain the climate 
change mitigation policy support behaviour. The model stands on five pillars 
provided by popular theories in the field: the Theory of Planned Behaviour, the Risk 
Perception theory, the literature on social dilemmas, the Extended Parallel Process 
Model (EPPM), and the Risk Perception Attitude (RPA) framework. 
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2.4 A General Model to Explain Climate Change Mitigation Policy Support 
Behaviour 
Several theories and models have been employed in the substantial body of literature 
examining PEBs in general and PS in particular. Amongst these theories, the Risk 
Perception theory (Slovic 1987), Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen 1991) 
and the Social Dilemma literature (e.g., Wiener & Doescher 1991), and lately the 
Extended Parallel Process Model (Witte 1992) have received considerable attention. 
Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002), and Gifford et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive 
review of these theories, identify their strengths and limitations, and conclude that 
given the vast variation in human experience of climate change, no single theory can 
successfully explain this important behaviour (Kollmuss & Agyeman 2002, Wolf & 
Moser 2011). Therefore, an integrated approach might be preferable in explaining 
PS.  
This study limits its interest to three main theories to explore possible determinants 
of PS, with particular emphasis on four constructs hypothesised to explain PS: 
perceived adverse impacts of climate change (PI), perceived anthropogenic causes of 
climate change (PA), perceived effectiveness of climate change mitigation policies 
(PE), and perceived feasibility of climate change mitigation policies (PF). The 
hypothesised interrelationships between these three variables are depicted in Figure 
1.  
PI is shown to have a direct influence on PS (hypothesis H1). The support for this 
comes from the Risk Perception theory(Slovic 1987). That is, individuals will try to 
ameliorate possible perceived harm that might arise through their risk assessment of 
particular hazards. This correlation is repeatedly confirmed by many studies in the 
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risk perception literature, including the studies of O’Connor et al. (1999) and 
Bostrom et al. (2012) discussed earlier. 
Figure 1: A general model for explaining public support for climate change 
mitigation policies 
 
The direct effect of PE on PS (hypothesis H2), an aspect of the general public’s 
attitude toward climate change mitigation policies, is supported by tenets from the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1991) and the Social Dilemma literature (e.g., 
Wiener & Doescher 1991). This link has not been empirically and theoretically 
explored as acknowledged by Bostrom et al. (2012). In their call for future research 
they stated: ‘We do not know the sequence of the reasoning process, though we 
speculate that perceptions that such actions (i.e., climate change mitigation policies) 
would be effective may be driving support for them’ (Bostrom et al. 2012). Thus, the 
explanatory role of this important construct in PS deserves further investigation.  
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Through the model detailed at Figure 1, this study aims to not only explore this direct 
link, but also proposes that PE plays a mediating role in the influence of PI on PS 
(hypothesis H6.1). Moreover, PI is postulated to be a moderator of the link between 
PE and PS (hypothesis H5.1). The moderating and mediating hypotheses are drawn 
upon the Extended Parallel (Witte 1992) Process Model, and the Risk Perception 
Attitude framework (Rimal & Real 2003).  
Finally, this study suggests that in addition to PE, the general public will also 
evaluate climate change mitigation policies in term of feasibility of the proposed 
climate change policies or PF. As PF is yet another aspect of the general public’s 
evaluation of climate change mitigation policies, it is proposed that it will act in a 
manner similar to PE. That is, in addition to having a direct influence on PS 
(hypothesis H3), PF will also mediate the linkage between PI and PS (hypothesis 
H6.2), while PI also moderates the relationship between PF and PS (hypothesis 
H5.2). 
The above hypotheses form the general model that is illustrated in the Figure 1. In 
the next section, this chapter provides definitions of the above independent variables, 
as well as further theoretical explanations for the proposed linkages.  
2.4.1 The roles of perceived adverse impacts of climate change (PI) 
This study defines PI as the general public’s perception of adverse consequences 
resulting from climate change. The effects of such perceptions on attitude and 
behaviour change are well rooted within the risk perception literature. This stream of 
literature examines individuals risk assessment and their corresponding behaviour 
when dealing with potential hazards. The employment of risk perception is therefore 
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apt in explaining general public support for government policies toward mitigating 
potential harms (Slovic 1987). That is, individuals will try to ameliorate possible 
perceived harm that might arise through their risk assessment of hazards.  
Applied to the climate change context, the risk perception literature examines the 
linkage between the risk perception of climate change or PI, and ameliorating actions 
such as climate change mitigation policy support (PS). The common hypothesis 
examined in such studies is that the more that individuals perceive adverse impacts 
from climate change, the more likely they are to engage in climate change tackling 
behaviours (Bostrom et al. 2012; O’Connor, Bord & Fisher 1999). Several empirical 
studies confirm this hypothesis including Baldassare and Katz (1992), Fransson and 
Gärling (1999), O’Connor et al. (1999, 2002), and Bostrom et al. (2012). Based on 
this general consensus, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
[H1] The more severe the general public perceive adverse impacts of climate change 
(PI) are, the more they support climate change mitigation policies (PS) 
2.4.2 The roles of perceived effectiveness of climate change mitigation 
policies (PE)  
2.4.2.1 Definition of PE 
This study draws on Lubell (2003) to define PE as the general public’s belief about 
the effectiveness of the proposed climate change mitigation policies in achieving a 
set of positive outcomes. The PE construct is not that dissimilar from the attitude 
construct defined in the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) as ‘the degree to which 
a person has favourable or unfavourable evaluation or appraisal of the behaviour in 
question’ (Ajzen 1991, p. 188). It could be argued that the attitude construct 
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measures the individual belief in an outcome of the behaviour, or effectiveness, if the 
planned behaviour is actually acted upon. In the context of support behaviour 
towards climate change mitigation policies, PE could be simply treated as an attitude 
construct that measures an individual’s perceptions of effectiveness of the policies in 
mitigating climate change, if those policies were implemented.  
2.4.2.2 Direct linkages of PE to PS 
Support from The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1991) TPB postulates that 
perceived behavioural control, individual’s attitudes, and subjective norms determine 
behavioural intention, while behavioural intention correlates with planned behaviour. 
Based on this theoretical reasoning it could be argued that an individual’s evaluation 
of climate change mitigation policies in terms of their effectiveness, or PE, has a 
major influence on their intention to support or oppose the policies in question. This 
study therefore includes the construct of perceived effectiveness of climate change 
mitigation policy (PE) as one of the determinants of PS in its proposed model. 
Support from the Social Dilemma literature In addition to TPB, the Social Dilemma 
literature also provides further clues as to the role of PE in explaining PS. Social 
dilemmas exist when individuals refrain from sacrificing for the good of the 
community. That is, if they pursue self-interests that, for example, maximise their 
utility of common goods, even if they recognise their sacrifice would contribute to 
the common good (Dawes 1980). This is because of the nature of common goods, 
which allows every member in the community free access to enjoy the equally 
shared utilities. However, not all members in the society perform pro-environmental 
behaviours, such as reducing private car usage to reduce air pollution. If one 
sacrifices their freedom of using a car, all members of the community will enjoy the 
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better air quality (although marginal) but only the individual, who sacrifices, bears 
the inconvenience of not driving. Thus, this negative “benefit-cost” may not 
encourage individuals to engage in pro-environmental behaviours if they pursue self-
interest (Wiener & Doescher 1991). 
Dawes (1980) characterises social dilemmas as situations in which: (i) the social 
payoff to each individual for defecting behaviour is higher than the payoff for 
cooperative behaviour, regardless of what other society members do, and yet, (ii) all 
individuals in society receive a lower payoff if all defect rather than cooperate. 
Viewing this study’s proposed model from this perspective, it can be seen that 
climate change affects the biophysical environment, which is considered a common 
good on a global scale. For instance anyone can access and enjoy the ecological 
benefits of a well maintained biophysical environment, however failing to mitigate 
climate change, which may incur a personal cost, will worsen the environment for 
every individual (Stern 2006).  
Many barriers may occur in solving a social dilemma case. One of them is the 
“Sucker avoid” barrier which describes a process where individuals refrain from 
cooperating to save the common good because they do not believe the common good 
will be saved despite their voluntary action (Wiener & Doescher 1991). Weiner and 
Doescher (1991) suggest that to overcome this barrier policymakers should 
emphasise the achievability of the goals that their proposed policies pursue. As the 
effectiveness of climate change mitigation policies might be an aspect which reflects 
the achievability of climate change mitigation through implementation of the 
proposed policies, it can be hypothesised that the more the general public perceive 
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the climate change mitigation policies to be effective, the more likely they are to 
support these policies. This study therefore proposes. 
[H2] The more effective the general public perceive the climate change mitigation 
policies are, the more they support the policies 
2.4.3 The roles of perceived feasibility of climate change mitigation policies 
(PF)  
2.4.3.1 Definition of PF 
In addition to individual attitudes, the TPB also postulates that one’s perceived 
behavioural control, which measures the object’s perception regarding the level of 
difficulty to perform the interested behaviour, influences the likelihood of the actual 
act of the planned behaviour. Applying this construct in the context of PS, an 
individual’s perception of the difficulty or feasibility of implementing a particular 
policy would dictate their support for a particular climate change mitigation policy. 
Thus, this research defines PF simply as an individual’s overall belief of how 
difficult it would be to implement the policies in question. However this is a complex 
construct, as individuals might differ in terms of what factors they consider would 
affect the feasibility of a policy. For instance, some might be concerned about 
technical feasibility while others might be concerned about political feasibility. 
However, as one of the first studies of this construct, the study limits its scope by 
employing PF to gauge the general feasibility of the policies in question. 
Conceptually, PF is a distinct construct from PE, in the same way as TPB’s attitude 
and behavioural control are.  
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2.4.3.2 Direct linkages of PE to PS 
As suggested by the linkages between TPB’s individual behavioural control, and 
both behavioural intention and actual behaviour, this study’s proposed model 
suggests that individuals might consider the feasibility of their interested climate 
change mitigation policies. This linkage also draws support from the Social Dilemma 
literature in the same way as the linkage between PE and PS does. That is, 
perceptions of feasibility of a policy would also be an aspect that reflects the 
achievability of climate change mitigation policies. If individuals believe policies are 
feasible in achieving their climate change mitigation goals, they would be 
encouraged to take behavioural actions or PS, as it helps individual overcome the 
barrier of “sucker avoid” in solving the social dilemma of climate change mitigation. 
This study would therefore expect a positive relationship between PF and PS. 
[H3] The more feasible the general public perceive the climate change mitigation 
policies are, the more they support the policies 
2.4.4 Perceived anthropogenic causes of climate change (PA) 
One might argue that unless climate change is perceived to be caused by human 
activities, the public would not support any policies to mitigate its impacts. This 
argument has been well examined. Several studies have reported that the belief in 
anthropogenic causes of climate change varies with the level of individual 
engagement in climate change mitigation activities, including climate change 
mitigation policy support behaviour (O’Connor, Bord & Fisher 1999; Aitken, 
Chapman & McClure 2011; Sibley & Kurz 2013). In line with this view, this study 
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also includes perceived anthropogenic causes of climate change as a determinant of 
PS. 
[H4] The more anthropogenic the general public perceive the causes of climate 
change to be, the more they support climate change mitigation policies 
2.4.5 Mediating roles of PE and PF, and moderating roles of PI from the 
perspective of Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) and the Risk 
Perception Attitude (RPA) framework  
In addition to the direct effect of PE and PF on PS, it is likely that these constructs 
may also mediate the linkage between PI and PS. PI is also proposed as moderators 
of the links PE – PS and PF – PS. Support for these propositions are drawn from the 
Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) and the Risk Perception Attitude (RPA) 
framework. 
2.4.5.1 The Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) 
The EPPM was introduce by Witte (1992) as a means of advancing the parallel 
process model of (Leventhal 1970) and the Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers 
1975, 1983), to explain why the common “fear appeal” approach fails. Although the 
EPPM is popular in the field of health communication (e.g., Barnett et al. 2014; Goei 
et al. 2010; McMahan, Witte & Meyer 1998; Smith et al. 2008; So 2013), it is 
applicable in the context of climate change mitigation policy (Linden & Sander 
2014). In fact, there have been calls for the combination of the EPPM with public 
policy research to enhance the effectiveness of climate change communication (Hart 
& Feldman 2014). 
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This study and EPPM cover conceptually similar constructs. The three main 
components of the EPPM are perceived responsive efficacy, perceived threat, and 
responsive intention or behaviour. The construct of perceived responsive efficacy 
measures the degree to which individuals believe that the proposed solution will 
effectively resolve the issue in question. The concept of perceived threat is measured 
by two aspects: perceived severity and perceived susceptibility. Through this concept 
an individual’s beliefs in the severity of threat and in the likelihood the threat in 
question will be experienced, can be determined (Rimal & Real 2003; Witte 1992). 
Therefore, the EPPM’s perceived responsive efficacy, perceived threat, and 
responsive behaviour are a close match to this study’s constructs of PE, PI and PS, 
respectively.  
According to the EPPM, communicating risks without also addressing the 
effectiveness of the proposed risk ameliorating solution will not trigger behavioural 
changes. Risks are functional, as they stimulate individuals’ attention to a particular 
behavioural change. However, the EPPM postulates that when individuals perceive 
threats from an issue in question, their trigger is to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
proposed responsive solutions before considering behaviour change. Only when the 
individuals perceive that the proposed solutions will be effective, that is, the 
perceived responsive efficacy is high enough, will they engage in behavioural or 
intentional change. Conversely, if the responsive efficacy is determined to be 
insufficient, behavioural change will not be triggered even though individuals 
perceive threats. This implies that the EPPM treats responsive efficacy as a mediator 
between perceived threat and responsive behaviour.  
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The EPPM also claims the degree to which responsive efficacy influences the 
likelihood of behavioural change is conditioned by the individuals’ perception of the 
threat. In other words, perceived threat moderates the link between responsive 
efficacy and behavioural change engagement. That is, if the perceived threat is low, 
individuals will not proceed to the state of evaluating the responsive efficacy of 
proposed threat ameliorating solutions. Thus any increase of responsive efficacy 
does not lead to increased engagement in behavioural change. However, if the 
perceived threat is high enough, individuals will evaluate the effectiveness of the 
proposed ameliorating solutions. Two scenarios will therefore eventuate depending 
on the level of perceived responsive efficacy. If the perceived responsive efficacy of 
the solutions is high, the individuals will support the proposed solutions, and hence 
behavioural intention or behavioural change will occur. This is labelled the “threat 
control process”. Conversely, low levels of perceived responsive efficacy will 
activate the “fear control process” which demotivates individuals to engage in the 
responsive intention/behaviour to cope with the “high” perceived threat (Witte 
1992). Consequently, in either the “fear control process” or the “threat control 
process”, high levels of perceived threats better amplify the impact of responsive 
efficacy on behavioural change in comparison to low levels of perceived threat, 
according to the EPPM. 
2.4.5.2 The Risk Perception Attitude (RPA) framework 
While the PE construct of this study is similar to the EPPM’s concept of responsive 
efficacy, it is still unclear the extent to which the PI construct is conceptually similar 
to the EPPM’s perceived threat. In fact, they are differently measured. In the health 
communication context in which the EPPM is commonly applied, perceived threat is 
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measured after the participant is presented a passage, picture or type of media (e.g., 
Barnett et al. 2014; Goei et al. 2010; McMahan, Witte & Meyer 1998; Smith et al. 
2008; So 2013). In other words, perceived threat is artificially controlled by the 
researchers (Rimal & Real 2003). The participant may or may not perceive the 
communicated threat before being exposed to the media. On the other hand, 
perceived risk is commonly measured “as-it-is” where there is no artificial 
interference. Participants form their perception of risk towards a particular hazard in 
question through their daily interactions with media (e.g., television, newspapers, 
radio) and/or face-to-face conversations. To apply the EPPM in this study’s context, 
one should take into account the difference between “perceived threat” (as proposed 
by the model) and “perceived risk” (as measured in this study). The Risk Perception 
Attitude (RPA) framework is employed to indicate this difference. 
The Risk Perception Attitude (RPA) framework (Rimal & Real 2003) can help 
resolve the issue of the difference between perceived threat and perceived risk. The 
RPA framework postulates that these two constructs are interchangeable, and 
therefore perceived risk can play the same role as perceived threat to predict 
responsive behavioural change. The RPA framework ‘conceptualizes risk perception 
as a property not of the message but rather of the individual’ (Rimal & Real 2003, p. 
372). This assumption together with EPPM’s propositions form the Risk Perception 
Attitude (RPA) framework (Rimal & Real 2003).  
Heavily influenced by the EPPM, the RPA framework’s main propositions are 
similar to those of the EPPM model. That is, the RPA framework postulates that the 
difference in the likelihood of behavioural change engagement between individuals 
who perceived low risk and low responsive efficacy (“indifference” group), and 
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those who perceived low risk and high responsive efficacy (“proactive” group) is not 
identical. Furthermore, individuals who perceive high risk and high responsive 
efficacy (“responsive” group) are more likely to engage in behavioural change 
compared to those who perceive high risk but low responsive efficacy (Rimal & Real 
2003). This is similar to the EPPM’s assumed moderating effect of perceived threat 
on the link between perceived responsive efficacy and behavioural change 
engagement. Moreover, the RPA also places responsive efficacy as a mediator 
between perceived risks and responsive behavioural engagement. 
Applying the RPA framework to study the use of sun screen to avoid skin cancer, 
Rimal and Real (2003) found that those who believed they had a high risk of skin 
cancer, and believed that sunscreen had high effectiveness in preventing the disease 
(the “responsive” group) were more likely to engage in the behaviour than 
individuals who perceived the same degree of risk but had less confidence in the 
effectiveness of the behaviour (the “avoidance” group). This result is analogous to 
what the EPPM postulates. However, the authors came to a conclusion that 
responsive efficacy is more influential in low-risk groups than it is in the high-risk 
groups, which conflicts with the EPPM’s propositions (Rimal & Real 2003). The 
authors clarify this assertion by stating that perceived risk is formulated by a high 
degree of perceived threat. 
It can be concluded that the EPPM together with the RPA framework provide 
general theoretical support for the assertion that responsive efficacy is a mediator to 
the link between perceived risk and responsive behavioural change. Consequently, 
this study postulates that perceived policy effectiveness could mediate the link 
between perceived adverse impacts of climate change and policy support. 
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Considering PF as another aspect of individuals’ evaluation of the policies, this study 
also hypothesises that PF is a mediator of the link between PI and PS.  
[H5.1] PE mediates the relationship between PI and PS  
[H5.2] PF mediates the relationship of PI and PS 
Moreover, drawing on the EPPM and the RPA framework, this study postulates that 
perceived adverse impacts of climate change moderates the link between perceived 
policy effectiveness and policy support. However, it is unsure to what extent PI 
moderates these two links. According to the EPPM, perceived threat would 
positively moderate the link between perceived responsive efficacy and responsive 
behaviour engagement. Nevertheless, considering the interchangeability between the 
EPPM’s perceived threats and the RPA framework’s perceived risks, the evidence of 
this positive moderating effect is mixed (Rimal & Juon 2010; Rimal & Real 2003). 
Therefore, this study at this stage still cannot conclude the extent to which PI 
moderates the PE – PS and PF – PS links, but postulates that: 
[H6.1] PI moderates the relationship of PE and PS 
[H6.2] PI moderates the relationship of PF and PS 
 
2.5 Refinement of the General Model 
The previous section proposed a general model that employed PI, PE, PF, and PA to 
explain the dependent construct – PS. The aim of this section is to combine the 
general model with multiple-factorial structures of the examined constructs. This is 
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to propose a more detailed theoretical model to help better capture the complexity of 
the behaviour of climate change mitigation policy support. 
 
2.5.1 A theoretical factorial structure of PS as suggested by the Social 
Dilemma literature 
As discussed earlier, the PS construct has not been well understood. Studies have 
either found too simplistic a factorial structure, for example a sole factorial structure, 
or failed to give theoretical support to the found factorial pattern. Those limitations 
constrain valuable implications as the literature may fail, for example, to explain why 
the general public might vote for some policies but oppose others. PS is explained by 
its determinants such as PI, PE and PF, however, this study argues that the nature of 
climate change mitigation policies also matters to the general public voting 
behaviour.  
Considering climate change as a social dilemma case, climate change mitigation 
policies can be seen as solutions that resolve that dilemma. Therefore, the policies 
could be profiled into structural and behavioural solutions, as suggested by the Social 
Dilemma literature (Messick & Brewer 1983), as could the PS construct. More 
specifically, climate change mitigation policies could be grouped into two categories: 
structural policies and behavioural policies. Structural policies aim to reduce the two 
properties of a social dilemma by putting constraints on an individual’s freedom. 
Meanwhile, the behavioural policies encourages individuals to behave voluntarily for 
the sake of the cooperation itself (Messick & Brewer 1983). Among climate change 
mitigation policies, carbon taxes are structural policies as they limit consumers’ 
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choices, for example of fossil fuel use. Meanwhile, tax rebate policies for energy 
efficient household equipment are behavioural policies, as they for instance, 
encourage consumers to choose a “greener” fridge. Therefore, PS could also be 
profiled into two factors as described by the proposition below. 
[P1] The PS construct can be measured in two categories: support for (i) Structural 
Policies (PS-STR) and (ii) Behavioural Policies (PS-BEH). 
Figure 2: A theoretical factorial structure of the “Climate change mitigation 
policy support” construct 
 
2.5.2 A theoretical factorial structure of perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change (PI) 
2.5.2.1 Possible reflection of the ‘Value’ domain into the PI construct – Inputs from 
the Value – Belief – Norm model 
The Value – Belief – Norm (VBN) model developed by Stern et al. (1999) has 
attracted much attention in the pro-environmental behaviour (PEB) literature in 
general and in studies of PS behaviours in particular. The VBN model defines three 
different value positions: altruistic, egoistic and biospheric. The model suggests what 
value position an individual holds will influence their environmental belief domain, 
which includes an ecological worldview (NEP), adverse consequences for valued 
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objects (AC) and perceived ability to reduce threat (AR). The environmental belief 
domain in turn has a causal linkage to the pro-environmental personal norm construct 
that directly influences the PEBs construct. Moreover, as noted by Stern et al. 
(1999), elements in the chain might have direct impacts on any of the other elements 
down the chain. For instance, the altruistic value can have significant power in 
directly explaining climate change policy support behaviour (Shwom et al. 2010). 
Being positioned at the first link of the chain, the value component would play a 
significant role in the VBN model.  
As postulated by the VBN model, depending on the value an individual holds, s/he 
might perceive adverse consequences from an environmental problem, that is, the 
risk perception of an environmental issue, to most impact either the personal domain 
(egoistic value), other members of the society (altruistic value) or the biosphere 
(biospheric value). Therefore, it can be theoretically assumed that the value domain 
would be well reflected in the adverse consequences (AC) construct. Moreover, it 
can be seen that the AC construct to some degree captures the idea of environmental 
risk perception and therefore the PI construct. Thus, the general public risk 
perception of environmental issues would also reveal a three-factor structure of 
egoistical impact, altruistic impact and biospherical impact. However, does this 
reflection stand true in the context of climate change? The discussion below will 
explore the possibility of measuring the PI construct through these three aspects: 
altruistic, egoistic and biospheric. 
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2.5.2.2 Asymmetric reflection of the ‘Value’ domain into the PI construct – 
Empirical evidence from the literature 
When using very similar items to measure perceived adverse impacts from climate 
change, O’Connor et al. (1999) found only one factor, while Bostrom et al. (2012) 
found two factors, personal and societal perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change. These findings suggest that the reflection of the value domain to the PI 
construct might be asymmetric. 
Unlike other environmental problems such as water pollution, climate change has 
long-term accumulated and geographically large-scale impacts which may be hard to 
recognise for the general public. Climate change is a ‘global, complex, invisible 
problem’ (Moser 2010a, p. 35). This important differentiation might limit the 
reflection of the value domain to the risk perception of climate change. In a research 
by Bostrom et al. (2012), the item ‘Increased rates of serious disease all over the 
world’ has a relatively high factor loading (0.63) to the “Societal consequences” 
factor. However this item also has a moderate factor loading of 0.53 to the other 
factor of “Personal consequences”. This suggests a possible mix of the egoistic and 
altruistic value when being reflected in the PI construct. 
Similarly, the complexity and invisibility of causes and impacts of climate change 
might confuse the general public when they perceive climate change risks to the 
biosphere even if the individuals hold the “biospheric value”. Bostrom et al. (2012) 
found the item ‘Massive species extinctions’, was the only item that measured 
perceived biospheric adverse impacts of climate change, and cross-loaded onto the 
“Societal consequences” factor. Therefore, it could be concluded that the biospheric 
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value is also mixed with the altruistic value when individuals reflect their value 
domain in the PI construct. 
The evidence from Bostrom et al.’s (2012) study also suggests an asymmetric 
reflection of the value domain in the PI construct. Thus, this current study argues that 
due to the complexity in causes and impacts of climate change, the value domains of 
altruistic, egoistic and biospheric values as suggested by the VBN model might not 
offer an appropriate theoretical factorial structure for the PI construct. 
2.5.2.3 Factorial structure of PI construct: perceived high-critical and low-critical 
adverse impacts of climate change 
It is worth noting that this study does not contradict the role of the value domain in 
building risk perception in the context of climate change. Instead, it argues that the 
value domain is still the root of risk perception, although the visible pattern of risk 
perception might not reflect the value domain. The complexity and invisibility in 
causes and effects of climate change would make the general public simplify their 
perceived climate change risks.  
The outcome of the simplification process is that the general public, as laypersons, 
might profile their perceived climate change risks according to the likelihood that 
these risks affect their livelihood. Consequently, this study asserts that the perceived 
adverse impacts of climate change may be categorised into two domains: high-
critical and low-critical adverse impacts. High-critical adverse impacts would refer to 
perceived obvious and highly possible damage to human (including the individual 
and the other members in the society) basic needs such as food or health. Meanwhile, 
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low-critical adverse impacts include long-term or implicit risks of climate change 
that might impact human wellbeing indirectly.  
It is argued then that altruistic, egoistic and biospheric value domains, as defined by 
the VBN model, may be combined into these two simplified categories of perceived 
risks. For instance, if an urban resident categorises the impact of climate change on 
farmers as a high-critical risk, it does not necessarily imply that s/he holds an 
altruistic value as s/he might be showing concerns about resultant food shortages 
which may affect both the individual and the famers or other individuals. That is, the 
border between egoistic and altruistic values is blurred when considering a high-
critical risk of food shortage caused by climate change. 
In addition, possible adverse impacts to the biosphere or non-human species, such as 
biodiversity reduction, might be categorised as a low-critical perceived risk. The 
rationale for this argument is that from a lay perspective, it may be hard to 
distinguish the impact of climate change on the natural biosphere, or on themselves 
or other members of the society, at least in the short-term. Once again, the 
complexity and invisibility of climate change’s cause and effect could be attributed 
for this simplification of perceived climate change risk. 
It is also important to note that perceptions of high-critical and low-critical climate 
change adverse impacts might vary depending on contextual factors. For instance, 
residents in a coastal area might perceive that a rise in sea-level is a high-critical 
impact caused by climate change. However, residents who are living in a 
mountainous area might perceive that it is a low-critical risk.   
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 [P2] The PI construct can be measured in two categories: (i) Perceived low-critical 
adverse impacts (PI-LOCR) and (ii) Perceived high-critical adverse impacts (PI-
HICR). 
Figure 3: A factorial structure of the “Perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change” construct 
 
2.5.3 A refined model explaining public support for climate change 
mitigation policies 
As explained above, this study suggests that PS could be captured in two categories: 
support for structural (PS-STR) and behavioural (PS-BEH) climate change 
mitigation policies (P1 - Figure 2). Accordingly, this study also examines the PE and 
PF constructs on these two dimensions: perceived effectiveness of structural 
mitigation policies (PE-STR), perceived effectiveness of behavioural mitigation 
policies (PE-BEH), perceived feasibility of structural mitigation policies (PF-STR), 
and perceived feasibility of behavioural mitigation policies (PF-BEH). 
As discussed in the previous section, the PI construct is hypothesised as able to be 
measured in two categories: (i) perceived high-critical (PI-HICR) and (ii) perceived 
low-critical adverse impacts of climate change (PI-LOCR) (P2 - Figure 3). By 
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integrating the general model (Figure 1) with propositions P1 and P2, a more refined 
model is suggested as illustrated in the Figure 4. 
In particular, PS-STR and PS-BEH are explained by PI-HICR and PI-LOCR (H1); 
PE-STR and PE-BEH (H2); PF-STR and PF-BEH (H3); and PA (H4). Regarding the 
proposed moderating effects, PI is hypothesised to moderate the links between PE 
and PS (H5.1); and to moderate the links between PF and PS (H5.2). Besides their 
direct influences on PS, PE and PF are hypothesised to have mediating effects on the 
relationship between PI and PS (H6.1, H6.2) (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: A refined model explaining the general public’s climate change 
mitigation policy support 
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2.6 Discussion 
This study focuses on an important but relatively unexplored aspect of pro-
environmental behaviour in the context of climate change viz. the general public’s 
support for climate change mitigation policies (PS). This study proposes a general 
model employing four broad constructs based on dominant theories and models in 
the literature. The constructs explored are perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change (PI), perceived anthropogenic causes of climate change (PA), perceived 
effectiveness (PE) and feasibility (PF) of climate change mitigation policies to 
explain PS.  
In addition to the direct impacts of PI, PA, PE to PS, which have been repeatedly 
confirmed in the literature (Baldassare & Katz 1992; Fransson & Gärling 1999; 
O’Connor et al. 1999,2002, Bostrom et al. 2012), the proposed model contributes to 
the literature by proposing the effect of PF, which is proposed as another aspect of 
the general public’s evaluation of climate change mitigation policies, to the PS 
construct. Highlighting the mediating roles of PE and PF, this study contributes to 
the literature by suggesting another possible mechanism through which PE and PF 
might impact the level of the general public support of climate change mitigation 
policies. The proposed moderating effects of PI on the links of PE – PS and PF – PS 
suggest potential interactive effects of the key determinants of PS. 
The proposed direct as well as moderating effects of the two important, yet not fully 
investigated, constructs PE and PF would help better explain regulatory support 
behaviour in the context of climate change, and therefore benefit policymakers. The 
Social Dilemma literature suggests that in order to improve the general public 
support for climate change mitigation policies, the effectiveness and feasibility of the 
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policies in question should be well communicated. Addressing the moderating 
effects would help utilise the commonly employed factor of perceived adverse 
impacts of climate change, and the newly explored perceived policy effectiveness 
and feasibility, to maximise public support for climate change mitigation policies. 
Another contribution of this chapter is that it examines deeper structures of the PS 
construct and the proposed determinants by attempting to provide theoretical 
multiple-factorial structures to the constructs. Integrating the general model with the 
suggested propositions of theoretical factorial structures of PI, PS, PE and PF 
constructs, a more refined model is proposed (Figure 4). This model helps compare 
the influence of climate change impacts according to differing degrees of criticalness 
to the climate change mitigation regulatory support behaviour. In addition, this 
model is among the first attempts to look at the deeper meaning of climate change 
mitigation policy support behaviour by taking into account the nature of the policies 
in question. Empirical evidence produced through the application of this model 
would help provide insight into the variations of climate change mitigation policy 
support behaviour of the general public. This would in turn help policymakers better 
understand public support for climate change mitigation policies. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
WHAT DRIVES PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION POLICIES? – EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE FROM THE AUSTRALIAN GENERAL PUBLIC 
 
3.1 Overview 
Chapter Two proposed an analytical framework which employs four determinants to 
explain public support for climate change mitigation policies (PS): perceived adverse 
impacts of climate change (PI), perceived mitigation policy effectiveness (PE), 
perceived mitigation policy feasibility (PF), and perceived anthropogenic causes of 
climate change (PA). The framework postulates that the four determinants directly 
drive policy support behaviour. Chapter Three tests the assertion with a field-
surveyed sample of 1,476 Australian general public participants. Exploratory factor 
analysis results support the proposed multiple-factorial structures of PI and policy-
related constructs: PS, PE and PF. This paves the way for incorporating mitigation 
policies’ fundamental characteristics into examining the policy support behaviour. 
Regression results show that in most of the examined cases, the four determinants are 
statistically significant in explaining PS. The results also help expand the 
understanding of the role of PI by demonstrating that different aspects of this 
construct affect policy preferences. Furthermore, the data suggest that the PE 
 53  
construct is a salient driver of mitigation policy support behaviour. The theoretical 
and practical contributions are also discussed. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
Gaining public support for climate change mitigation policies requires effort. 
Policymakers need to inform the public about the basic facts of climate change, 
including its possible adverse impacts and anthropogenic causes. Informing the 
public about the adverse effects of climate change is a popular strategy for enlisting 
support for mitigation policies (Linden & Sander 2014). However it is also essential 
to convey the effectiveness and feasibility of proposed climate change mitigation 
policies. Lack of public support could result if policies are not perceived as 
sufficiently effective and feasible, even if the community agrees that climate change 
will have severe adverse impacts, and that human activity is responsible. 
The carbon tax in Australia is an example of this situation. Public support for this 
policy was limited irrespective of how many surveys demonstrated public awareness 
of climate change impacts and support for the Labor government’s general 
mitigating actions (Nielsen 2012; The Climate Institute 2013). The carbon tax was 
seen as ineffective in reducing carbon emissions which probably explains its lack of 
public support to the extent that it was abolished (Hannam 2014; Lo & Spash 2012). 
Moreover its lack of success implies that fear tactics, for example, providing 
descriptive information about the damages of climate change without also providing 
details of substantive remedies, is not effective in gaining community support for 
policies (Linden & Sander 2014; Shome, Debika et al. 2009). Instead, the public 
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needs to be convinced that the proposed policies are effective. However, the 
influence of the public’s perception of climate change mitigation policy effectiveness 
on public support for the policies has been inadequately addressed.  
This chapter describes empirical tests of the analytical framework proposed in 
Chapter Two with a field-survey sample of the Australian general public. 
Specifically, this chapter examines the direct impacts of four determinants on climate 
change mitigation policy support behaviour. These determinants are: perceived 
adverse impacts of climate change (PI); perceived mitigation policy effectiveness 
(PE); perceived mitigation policy feasibility (PF); and perceived anthropogenic 
causes of climate change (PA). The direct impacts mentioned above are backed up 
by major theories that include the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1991), the 
Risk Perception Theory (Slovic 1992), and Social Dilemma literature (e.g., Wiener 
& Doescher 1991). 
This chapter’s objectives are twofold. First, it aims to verify the propositions of 
multiple-factorial structures of the policy-related constructs: PE, PF, and PS, and the 
PI variable (P1 and P2, see Chapter Two). Empirical tests will take into account the 
fundamental characteristics of climate change mitigation policies as described in 
Social Dilemma literature and more thoroughly examines the mentioned direct 
influences (Wiener & Doescher 1991). Second, the chapter aims to compare the 
influences on PS of two drivers: PE and PI. Although the latter is a well-documented 
determinant of PS, the former is inadequately examined. Further understanding the 
role of PE might help gain insights into cases such as Australia’s carbon tax, which 
was abolished partially due to perceptions of low effectiveness in reducing carbon 
emissions (Hannam 2014; Lo & Spash 2012). This knowledge will assist 
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policymakers to better utilise the examined drivers in their communication regarding 
climate change mitigation policies, and consequently build public support. 
The following section briefly summarises the analytical framework, and re-states the 
hypotheses tested in this chapter. The survey instrument, data, and methodology are 
then described. 
 
3.3 Analytical Framework and Hypotheses 
The direct influences of the four determinants on public support for mitigation 
policies are illustrated in Figure 5 below. This figure is adapted from the analytical 
framework outlined in Chapter Two (Figure 4). 
The four determinants PI, PE, PF, and PA are hypothesised to have direct influences 
on mitigation policy support (PS). Specifically, this study hypothesises: 
[H1] The more severe the general public perceive adverse impacts of climate change 
(PI) are, the more they support climate change mitigation policies (PS) 
[H2] The more effective the general public perceive the climate change mitigation 
policies (PE) are, the more they support the policies (PS) 
[H3] The more feasible the general public perceive the climate change mitigation 
policies (PF) are, the more they support the policies (PS) 
[H4] The more anthropogenic the general public perceive the causes of climate 
change (PA) to be, the more they support climate change mitigation policies (PS) 
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Figure 5: Direct influences of the determinants on climate change mitigation 
policy support  
 
The construct of perceived adverse impacts of climate change (PI) used in this study 
is rooted in the Risk Perception Theory (Slovic 1987, 1992). According to this 
theory, individuals are likely to seek ameliorating solutions to cope with their 
perceived risks. Considering mitigation policies are solutions to resolve the risks of 
adverse impacts of climate change, this study therefore asserts that PI drives PS.  
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen 1991) provides support for [H2] and 
[H3] linkages. It is postulated that the constructs of perceived policy effectiveness 
(PE), and policy feasibility (PF) capture the TPB’s attitude and behavioural control 
concepts respectively. According to the TPB, attitude and behavioural control 
determine behavioural intention, and thereafter behavioural change. Consequently, 
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PE and PF are hypothesised to have direct impacts on mitigation policy support 
behaviour. Social Dilemma literature also provides support for this linkage. It is 
recommended that to encourage individuals to cooperate, the aspects of effectiveness 
and feasibility of proposed actions should be empathised (Wiener & Doescher 1991).  
The linkage [H6] is backed by empirical evidence. The literature has reported that 
the belief in anthropogenic causes of climate change varies with the level of 
individual engagement in climate change mitigation activities, including climate 
change mitigation policy support behaviour (O’Connor, Bord & Fisher 1999; Aitken, 
Chapman & McClure 2011; Sibley & Kurz 2013). 
This chapter will test these hypotheses with a consideration of deeper structures of 
PI, PE, PF, and PS constructs (Figure 5). In order to do so, this chapter first 
investigates the propositions regarding the multiple-factorial structures. These 
propositions are: 
[P1] The PS construct can be measured in two categories: supports for (i) Structural 
Policies (PS-STR) and (ii) Behavioural Policies (PS-BEH) 
[P2] The PI construct can be measured in two categories: (i) Perceived low-critical 
adverse impacts (PI-LOCR) and (ii) Perceived high-critical adverse impacts (PI-
HICR) 
This section summaries the model anticipating the direct influences of the four 
determinants on public support for mitigation policies. The hypotheses and 
propositions tested in this chapter are also presented. For more details regarding the 
theoretical perspective and the extent to which the above hypotheses and 
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propositions are built, please prefer to Chapter Two. The following section 
introduces the data and analytical methods. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Participants 
The data was collected using web-based surveys in 2012. A link to the web-based 
questionnaire was distributed to a panel of Australian adult participants by a 
professional market research firm (see Appendix 5 for the questionnaire’s content). 
The sample was screened to include only climate change believers who answered 
‘YES’ to the questions ‘Do you think that global climate change is occurring at 
present?’, and ‘Do you think that global climate change is likely to occur over the 
next five years?’ (73.7% of the total responses). The rationale for this approach is 
that according to Hine et al. (2013), Australian climate change non-believers (about 
21% of the authors’ sample) were most likely to reject climate change information 
and disfavour mitigation actions. This study therefore assumed that little information 
could be extracted from these participants and it focused only on the sample of 
climate change believers. The data was further screened to remove inconsistent and 
incomplete responses, resulting in an effective sample of 1,476 participants. Among 
them 40% were female, 25.8% were under 30 years old, 62.7% were from 30 to 69 
years old, 28.8% were above 70 years old, 49.5% employed, 44% university 
graduates, and 88% from urban areas (see Appendix 3).  
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3.4.2 Measures 
This study measured the perceived adverse impacts of climate change using a set of 
nine items in two time frames: the last and the next five years. The items were 
adopted from previous research including Bostrom et al. (2012), and O’Connor et al. 
(1999, 2000). The items were subsequently modified to make them relevant to the 
Australian context (e.g., Kevin, 2011; Preston & Jones, 2006) (see Table 1). The 
perceived anthropogenic causes of climate change were measured by a single item 
following the example of Aitken et al. (2011) and Sibley et al. (2013).  
The survey asked the participants to rate ten climate change mitigation policies in 
terms of effectiveness and feasibility (see Table 2 and Table 3). Among these 
policies were those that had been implemented, and some that were hypothetical (see 
Table 4). The study sought to gauge general public support for these policies (see 
Table 4), using a five-point Likert scale for all questions. 
To simplify the structure of multiple-item scales, factor analyses using SPSS 
statistical software version 21 was used. The factor analyses were based on principle 
component analysis with the Varimax rotation method. Cross-loading item(s) from 
the scales was/were removed. From the results of the factor analyses, sub-scales were 
obtained by retaining only high-loaded items on each of the derived factors. All the 
factor analyses passed Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO ranged from .86 to .94) and 
Bartlett’s tests (p <.01) (Hair 2010, p. 105). 
The Cronbach’s Alphas was used to examine reliability of full-scales and sub-scales. 
A value above .70 indicates sufficient scale reliability even though the .60 threshold 
is acceptable (Hair 2010). The validated sub-scales were subsequently aggregated to 
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form an index for each of the sub-scales. Thereafter direct effects of PI, PA, PE, and 
PF on PS were tested using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression method. 
3.4.2.1 Perceived adverse impacts of climate change (PI) 
The survey asked participants to rate a set of possible adverse impacts of climate 
change in the last five years and over the next five years (Table 1). The wording was: 
‘To what extent do you think climate change has been a cause of the following 
possible outcomes over the past five years?’ and ‘Given current trends, to what 
extent do you think that climate change will be a cause of any of the following 
possible outcomes over the next five years?’ The rating was based on a five-point 
Likert scale: 1 = ‘Not at all’, 3 = ‘Moderately’ and 5 = ‘Totally’.  
The factor analysis revealed two factors based on larger than 1.0 of the Eigen value. 
Scree-plot analysis also supports the two-factor result. Factor one included items that 
captured perceived adverse consequences such as weather pattern changes, 
biodiversity decreases, and sea level rises (factor loadings are in bold, Table 1). 
Meanwhile, Factor two summarised adverse consequences of climate change to 
human wellbeing, such as food production, community health, and personal income 
reduction. 
Compared to the impacts of Factor one, Factor two touched on more critical and 
explicit damages. Although impacts such as weather pattern changes and biodiversity 
losses will ultimately affect individuals, those effects may be only recognised in the 
long-term. Therefore Factor one captures a lower level of personal worry or concern 
than Factor two. Consequently, this study interprets Factor one as low-critical 
perceived adverse impacts of climate change (PI-LOCR) and Factor two as high-
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critical impacts (PI-HICR). There is a consistent pattern for both the perceived 
adverse impacts of climate change in the last five years and those five years into the 
future. The two sub-scales (factors) indicate high reliability as Cronbach’s Alphas 
were larger than .90. This supports the study’s proposition P2. The item ‘Reduced 
availability of fresh water for drinking and farming’ cross-loaded to both factors and 
was therefore excluded from further analysis.  
3.4.2.2 Perceived anthropogenic causes of climate change (PA) 
This study employed a single-item to gauge the degree to which the participants 
believe that climate change is caused by human activities or natural causes. The 
wording was: ‘To what extent do you think the climate change that occurred over the 
past five years has been induced by human activities, and to what extent is it a factor 
of natural causes?’ The anchors of the five-point Likert scale were labelled as 1 = 
‘Exclusively due to natural causes’, 3 = ‘Fairly equal combination of both’ and 5 = 
‘Exclusively due to human activities’. 
3.4.2.3 Perceived effectiveness of climate change mitigation policies (PE) 
Table 2 consists of ten actual and hypothetical climate change mitigation policies 
that the participants were asked to rate in term of effectiveness. The wording was: 
‘How effective do you think that the actions and policies below could be in helping 
to prevent global climate change?’ A five-point Likert scale was employed and the 
endpoints were labelled as 1 = ‘Not at all effective’, the midpoints as 3 = 
‘Moderately effective’ and the highest score as 5 = ‘Totally effective’. 
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Table 1: Exploratory Factor Analysis Results – Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change (PI) (The general public sample) 
   
PCA factor loadings
 
Items (n=1,476)
 
Mean
 
Std. Err
 
Low critical
 
High critical
 
Perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change in the past five years     
1. Changing weather patterns 3.45 0.03 .83 .25 
2. Floods 3.36 0.03 .84 .32 
3. Drought 3.31 0.03 .83 .32 
4. Biodiversity decreases 3.19 0.03 .67 .44 
5. Community health problems 2.74 0.03 .43 .75 
6. Reduced personal income 2.43 0.03 .18 .87 
7. Reduced food production 2.95 0.03 .49 .69 
8. Rise in sea levels 3.26 0.03 .70 .44 
9. Reduced availability of fresh water for 
drinking and farming 
2.99 0.03 .57 .62 
Perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change in the next five years 
    
1. Changing weather patterns 3.41 0.03 .84 .33 
2. Floods 3.29 0.03 .84 .41 
3. Drought 3.27 0.03 .83 .41 
4. Biodiversity decreases 3.13 0.03 .65 .55 
5. Community health problems 2.79 0.03 .46 .79 
6. Reduced personal income 2.64 0.03 .29 .86 
7. Reduced food production 3.04 0.03 .56 .69 
8. Rise in sea levels 3.23 0.03 .72 .46 
9. Reduced availability of fresh water for 
drinking and farming 
3.06 0.03 .64 .61 
Cronbach’s Alpha – Full-scale .97   
Cronbach’s Alpha – Sub-scale   .97 .94 
% of variance explained – each factor   69.81% 7.27 % 
% of variance explained – all factors 77.09%   
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) .94  
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity p < .001(df = 153) 
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Table 2: Exploratory Factor Analysis Results – Perceived effectiveness of 
climate change mitigation policies (PE) (The general public sample) 
   
PCA factor loadings
 
Items (n=1,476)
 
Mean
 
Std. Err
 
Behavioural 
policies
 
Structural  
policies
 
1. Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient household equipment 
2.98 0.03 .71 .47 
2. Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient business equipment 
3.08 0.03 .72 .46 
3. Government support for a Cap and 
Trade or Emissions Trading Scheme 
2.79 0.03 .44 .79 
4. Increased investment in renewable 
energy  
3.57 0.03 .83 .29 
5. International standards for more energy 
efficient products 
3.42 0.03 .82 .32 
6. Introduction of a carbon tax 2.37 0.03 .16 .86 
7. Education about actions to reduce 
climate change 
3.34 0.03 .73 .39 
8. A self-regulatory carbon usage scheme 
managed by business groups 
2.43 0.03 .32 .62 
9. Improvements in public transport 3.29 0.03 .82 .25 
10. Investment in fuel efficient vehicles 3.48 0.03 .86 .20 
Cronbach’s Alpha – Full-scale .93   
Cronbach’s Alpha – Sub-scale   .94 .77 
% of variance explained – each factor   63.34% 9.19% 
% of variance explained – all factors 72.53%   
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) .91  
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity p < .001(df = 45) 
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The factor analyses yielded a two-factor result. The two factors together explain 
more than 72% of the variance. Factor one explains 63.34% and Factor two explains 
9.19%. Factor one summarises policies that encourage voluntary actions to mitigate 
climate change. Factor two consists of carbon-related policies that would force 
individuals and businesses to reduce their carbon footprint. Considering climate 
change mitigation as a social dilemma case, and the policies as solutions for 
resolving it (see Wiener & Doescher, 1991), Factor one was interpreted as perceived 
effectiveness of Behavioural policies (PE-BEH) that encourage members of society 
to act voluntarily to mitigate climate change. Factor two results pertain to the 
perceived effectiveness of Structural policies (PE-STR), such as those reducing 
individuals’ freedom of choice (e.g., reducing consumption of fossil fuel) (Messick 
and Brewer 1983). The two sub-scales achieved adequate reliability as their 
Cronbach’s Alphas ranged from .77 to .94.  
3.4.2.4 Perceived feasibility of climate change mitigation policies (PF) 
The participants were also asked to rate the feasibility of the ten policies. The 
wording was: ‘How difficult do you think it would be to get action undertaken on 
each of the following possible activities?’. A five-point Likert scale was used in 
which 1 = ‘Not at all difficult’, 3 = ‘Moderately difficult’ and 5 = ‘Totally difficult’.  
The factor analysis of the PE construct revealed two factors. The two factors 
explained around 63% of the variance. Applying the same logic categorising the PE 
construct, the ten-item scale of PE was reduced to two sub-scales: perceived 
feasibility of Behavioural policies (PF-BEH) and of Structural policies (PF-STR). 
The two factors were reliable as their Cronbach’s Alphas were .61 and .91. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that proposition P1 is supported. 
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Table 3: Exploratory Factor Analysis Results – Perceived feasibility of climate 
change mitigation policies (PF) (The general public sample) 
   
PCA factor loadings
 
Items (n=1,476)
 
Mean
 
Std. Err
 
Behavioural 
policies
 
Structural  
policies
 
1. Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient household equipment 
3.24 0.03  .83 .13 
2. Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient business equipment 
3.16 0.03 .83 .15 
3. Government support for a Cap and 
Trade or Emissions Trading Scheme 
3.01 0.03 .45 .63 
4. Increased investment in renewable 
energy  
3.13 0.03 .83 .21 
5. International standards for more energy 
efficient products 
2.72 0.03 .69 .28 
6. Introduction of a carbon tax 3.27 0.03 -.05 .89 
7. Education about actions to reduce 
climate change 
3.59 0.03 .65 .28 
8. A self-regulatory carbon usage scheme 
managed by business groups 
2.83 0.03 .40 .54 
9. Improvements in public transport 3.04 0.03 .79 .15 
10. Investment in fuel efficient vehicles 3.12 0.03 .80 .16 
Cronbach’s Alpha – Full-scale .89   
Cronbach’s Alpha – Sub-scale   .91 .61 
% of variance explained – each factor   51.19% 11.42 % 
% of variance explained – all factors 63.62%   
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) .86 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity p < .001(df = 45) 
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Table 4: Exploratory Factor Analysis Results – Support for climate change 
mitigation policies (PS) (The general public sample) 
   
PCA factor loadings
 
Items (n=1,476)
 
Mean
 
Std. Err
 
Behavioural 
policies
 
Structural  
policies
 
1. Government subsidies for more 
energy efficient household 
equipment 
4.38 0.02 .80 .20 
2. Government subsidies for more 
energy efficient business equipment 
4.27 0.02 .75 .23 
3. Government support for a Cap and 
Trade or Emissions Trading Scheme 
3.69 0.03 .30 .81 
4. Increased investment in renewable 
energy  
4.51 0.02 .82 .13 
5. International standards for more 
energy efficient products 
4.40 0.02 .79 .22 
6. Introduction of a carbon tax 2.84 0.04 .02 .79 
7. Education about actions to reduce 
climate change 
4.43 0.02 .72 .28 
8. A self-regulatory carbon usage 
scheme managed by business 
groups 
3.37 0.03 .14 .61 
9. Improvements in public transport 4.58 0.02 .80 .02 
10. Investment in fuel efficient vehicles 4.51 0.02 .81 .07 
Cronbach’s Alpha – Full-scale .83   
Cronbach’s Alpha – Sub-scale   .91 .62 
% of variance explained – each factor   49.10% 13.90% 
% of variance explained – all factors 63.00%   
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) .87  
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity p < .001(df = 45) 
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3.4.2.5 Climate change mitigation policy support (PS) 
Finally, participants were asked to rate their level of support for the set of ten climate 
change mitigation policies (Table 4). The wording was: ‘We are interested in your 
level of support for possible actions proposed to combat climate change. To what 
extent do you support the following activities?’ The rating was based on a five-point 
Likert scale designed as 1 = ‘Totally oppose’ to 5 = ‘Totally support’. The pattern 
found in the PE and PF constructs was again confirmed by the factor analysis of the 
PS construct. The factor analysis also revealed a two-factor result. The two factors 
explained 63% of the variance and had Cronbach’s Alphas of .62 and .91 that 
showed sufficient reliability of the two sub-scales. Similar to the interpretation of the 
factor analysis results of PE and PF constructs, it was concluded that the participants 
rated their level of support for two sets of policies: Behavioural (PS-BEH) and 
Structural (PS-STR) policies (proposition P1 is supported). 
 
3.5  Demographics 
The literature has controlled demographics such as gender, age, income and 
education when examining PS. However, their influences on PS are mixed. In 
particular, females perceived climate change as having a greater impact than males 
(Leiserowitz 2006). Consumers with higher education levels (Leiserowitz 2006; 
O’Connor et al. 2002), and females (Leiserowitz 2006) were more likely to support 
tax policies for climate change mitigation. Meanwhile, Bostrom et al. (2012) found 
climate change policy supporters were not profiled by gender. Shwom et al. (2010) 
found that age, gender and education were not predictors of policy support, while 
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income was. Even though the results are mixed it is important to include 
demographics in the examination of pro-environmental behaviour (Wells, Ponting, 
and Peattie 2011). Therefore, this study also controls for demographics such as age, 
gender, education, income and employment as well as political affiliation. 
 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Understanding public support for Behavioural policies 
As can be seen in Table 5, Model 1 includes only two independent variables of the 
perceived low-critical and high-critical adverse impacts of climate change. It shows 
that the perceived low-critical adverse impacts of climate change positively predict 
the level of support for behavioural policies. The perceived high-critical impacts 
negatively predict the level of support for the policies. This implies that individuals 
are likely to support behavioural policies if they perceive the impact of climate 
change is low-critical. However, individuals are less likely to support behavioural 
policies once they perceive high-critical impacts such as those to personal income or 
community health. This only partially supports the H1 hypothesis. 
Model 2 includes perceived anthropogenic causes of climate change into the 
equation. The model confirms the results of Model 1. Moreover it indicates that 
individuals are likely to support behavioural policies if they perceive climate change 
is caused by human activities. This result therefore supports the hypothesis H4. 
As the variables of perceived effectiveness and perceived feasibility of both 
behavioural and structural policies are included, Model 3 better explains the sample 
 69  
variance as R-square reaches around 23%. The model highlights that the perceived 
effectiveness of behavioural policies is the main driving force for individuals 
supporting them. In contrast, behavioural policies are less likely to gain support from 
individuals who believe in the effectiveness of structural policies. Therefore, the 
hypothesis H2 is only partially supported. Moreover, the result shows that the 
perceived feasibility of policies does not significantly explain the dependent variable. 
Thus, the H3 hypothesis is not supported.  
The strength of the perceived effectiveness variable also weakens the explanatory 
strength of the variables that were presented in Model 2. However, the perceived 
effectiveness of behavioural policies strengthens the negative predictive impacts of 
the perceived high-critical climate change impact of the dependent variable. The 
demographics as shown in Model 4 do not significantly affect the strength of the 
independent variables that result from Model 3, although they slightly increase the 
explained variances to 29%. However, when controlling for demographic variables, 
the feasibility of behavioural policies become statically significant. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the H3 hypothesis is partially supported when controlling for 
demographic variables. 
Among the controlled demographic variables, only age, employment, and political 
affiliation statistically explain the dependent variable PS-BEH. More specifically, 
age and support for the Greens political party increase the level of support for 
behavioural climate change mitigation policies. However, part-time employees are 
likely to oppose those policies. 
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Table 5: Main effect results – Dependent variable: Support for Behavioural 
policies (The general public sample) 
 
Dependent variable:  
Support for Behavioural policies (PS-BEH)
 
 
Model 1 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
Model 2 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
Model 3 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
Model 4 
Betaa, b (S.E.) 
 
(Constant)      
Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change –Low-critical  
(PI-LOCR) .35 *** (.03) .31*** (.03) .19*** (.03) .16*** (.03) 
Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change – High-critical 
 (PI-HICR) -.135** (.02) -.15** (.02) -.19*** (.02) 
-.15*** 
(.02) 
Perceived anthropogenic causes of 
climate change (PA)  .10*** (.02) .04 (.01) .05 (.01) 
Perceived Effectiveness –  
Behavioural policies (PE-BEH)   .51*** (.02) .50*** (.02) 
Perceived Feasibility –  
Behavioural policies (PF-BEH)   .05 (.02) .06* (.02) 
Perceived Effectiveness –  
Structural policies (PE-STR)   -.12*** (.02) 
-.14*** 
(.02) 
Perceived Feasibility –     
Structural policies (PF-STR)   .04 (.02) .03 (.02) 
Demographics
     
 Gender (female=1)    -.02 (.02) 
 Age    .23*** (.01) 
 Education    .04 (.01) 
 Income    -.04 (.01) 
 Full-time    -.07 (.05) 
 Part-time    -.09* (.05) 
 Unpaid jobs    -.04 (.05) 
 Retired      -.08 (.05) 
 Labour Party    .06 (.04) 
 Liberal Party    -.04 (.04) 
 National Party    -.03 (.08) 
 Green Party    .07* (.05) 
 Independent Party    .01 (.05) 
F (df) 52.32*** 
(1475) 
39.54*** 
(1475) 
64.27*** 
(1475) 
31.25*** 
(1475) 
R-square .07 .07 .23 .30 
Adjusted R-square .07 .07 .23 .29 
Change statistics 
     
 R-square change .07 .01 .16 .07 
 F change (df1, df2) 52.32*** 
(2,1473) 
13.11*** 
(1,1472) 
76.72*** 
(4,1468) 
10.54*** 
(13,1455) 
a Standardised coefficients  
b *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, all are two-tailed tests, n = 1,476 
S.E. = Standard Error 
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3.6.2 Understanding public support for Structural policies 
As shown in Table 6, the variable of perceived low-critical adverse impacts of 
climate change positively predicts the level of support for structural policies as it 
does in the case of behavioural policies (Model 5). Interestingly, individuals that 
perceived high-critical adverse impacts of climate change are only likely to support 
structural policies, and not behavioural policies (Model 5, Model 6). In addition, it 
was found that individuals who believe humans cause climate change are also likely 
to support structural policies. Therefore the hypothesis H4 is supported in the case of 
structural policies. 
Model 7 and 8 reveal a pattern where perceived effectiveness of policies impacts the 
dependent variable PS-STR in the same way that it explains behavioural policies 
(PS-BEH). Individuals are likely to support structural policies once they believe in 
their effectiveness. To the contrary, those who believe in the effectiveness of 
behavioural policies are likely to oppose structural policies. 
The role of the variable of perceived policy effectiveness in the models that explain 
structural policy support is stronger than in the case of behavioural policies. That is, 
the introduction of this variable makes perceived adverse impacts of climate change 
statistically insignificant in explaining the support for structural policies. Noticeably, 
the variable of perceived policy feasibility becomes statistically significant in 
explaining structural policy support behaviour, yet it is not in explaining behavioural 
policy support (Model 7, 8). Therefore, the hypothesis H3 is partially supported 
when examining structural policies.  
 72 
Among controlled demographics, only gender and employment are statistically 
significant. Specifically, females and retired individuals are more likely to support 
structural climate change mitigation policies.  
In summary, regression results for both structural and behavioural mitigation policies 
show that although H1 hypothesis is partially supported when examining the roles of 
the perceived adverse impacts of climate change construct alone, it is no longer 
supported when introducing perceived policy effectiveness and feasibility variables 
into the model. Individuals tend to support one domain of mitigation policies and 
oppose the other if they perceive the former effective and feasible, and vice versa. 
For instance, participants are be likely to support behavioural and oppose structural 
policies if they perceive that behavioural policies are effective in climate change 
mitigation, and feasibly be implemented. Therefore the H2 and H3 hypotheses are 
only partially supported. The variable of perceived anthropogenic causes of climate 
change is statistically significant when examining the two domains of mitigation 
policies, therefore H4 hypothesis is fully supported. Nevertheless, it is noted that the 
influences of perceived policy effectiveness on policy support behaviour are weak in 
the cases of both behavioural and structural policies (Model 4, 8). 
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Table 6: Main effect results – Dependent variable: Support for Structural 
policies (The general public sample) 
 
Dependent variable:  
Support for Structural policies (PS-STR)
 
 
Model 5 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
Model 6 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
Model 7 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
Model 8 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
(Constant)     
Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change – Low-critical  
(PI-LOCR) .31*** (.04) .25*** (.04) .04 (.03) .03 (.03) 
Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change – High-critical 
 (PI-HICR) .17*** (.03) .15*** (.03) .03 (.03) .04 (.02) 
Perceived anthropogenic causes of 
climate change (PA)  .17*** (.02) .09*** (.02) .09*** (.02) 
Perceived Effectiveness –  
Behavioural policies (PE-BEH)   -.20*** (.02) -.20*** (.02) 
Perceived Feasibility –  
Behavioural policies (PF-BEH)   .02 (.02) .02 (.02) 
Perceived Effectiveness –  
Structural policies (PE-STR)   .82*** (.02) .77*** (.02) 
Perceived Feasibility –     
Structural policies (PF-STR)   .06** (.02) .05** (.02) 
Demographics 
    .02 (.03) 
 Gender (female=1)    .08*** (.01) 
 Age    .03 (.01) 
 Education    -.03 (.01) 
 Income    .01 (.05) 
 Full-time    -.02 (.06) 
 Part-time    .00 (.06) 
 Unpaid jobs    .00 (.06) 
 Retired      .10*** (.04) 
 Labour Party    -.04 (.04) 
 Liberal Party    -.02 (.09) 
 National Party    .06 (.06) 
 Green Party    .00 (.06) 
 Independent Party    .03 (.03) 
F (df) 194.82*** 
(1475) 
147.94*** 
(1475) 
303.03*** 
(1475) 
115.86*** 
(1475) 
R-square .21 .23 .59 .61 
Adjusted R-square .21 .23 .59 .61 
Change statistics
     
 R-square change .21 .02 .36 .02 
 F change (df1, df2) 194.82*** 
(2,1473) 
43.05*** 
(1,1472) 
322.43*** 
(4,1468) 
6.76*** 
(13,1455) 
a Standardised coefficients  
b *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, all are two-tailed tests, n = 1,476; S.E. = Standard Error 
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3.7 Discussion 
3.7.1 Expanding the understanding of the role of PI rather than confirming it 
The results of the factor analysis of the PI construct suggest that emotional factors 
such as worry or concern could shape individuals’ perceptions of climate change 
adverse impacts. This demonstrates ways that emotional aspects influence cognitive 
ones when forming risk perceptions in complex and uncertain circumstances such as 
climate change (Linden & Sander 2014; Slovic et al. 2004). If one argues that 
individuals perceive the adverse impacts of climate change through cognitive 
processes, emotional factors may be embedded in that rationalising processes. In this 
case, emotional factors may offer a base to differentiate adverse impacts of perceived 
climate change.  
The literature suggests that PI positively predicts PS. However, by reanalysing the 
factorial structure of both the independent variable PI, and the dependent variable 
PS, this study furthers the understanding of the role of PI in explaining the likelihood 
of support for climate change mitigation policies, rather than only confirming it. 
Specifically, a perception of low-critical adverse impacts of climate change is 
associated with support for both behavioural and structural mitigation policies. On 
the contrary, individuals with a perception of high-critical adverse impact response 
are likely to oppose behavioural policies and support structural ones.  
The difference between structural and behavioural solutions, as suggested by the 
social dilemma theory, could explain this variation. Structural solutions are 
mandatory for every society member, and would help solve the barrier of “free-
riding” in solving social dilemmas (Wiener and Doescher 1991). A high-critical 
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perception possibly leads to a belief that every society member should cooperate to 
resolve the risks presented by climate change. Moreover, the high-critical nature of 
perceived adverse impacts of climate change, such as potential damage to personal 
income and the community health, may encourage individuals to sacrifice by 
obeying mandatory policies to ameliorate the impacts. This would furthermore 
explain why believers in high-critical adverse impacts do not believe society should 
rely on voluntary actions or behavioural solutions, to resolve climate change issues. 
It is necessary to state that the previously discussed role of PI would be maintained 
only when examining the unique effect of the construct on the dependent variable. 
As shown in the results, the dominance of variables such as PE would make PI 
statistically insignificant. 
3.7.2 The salience of perceived policy effectiveness in explaining mitigation 
policy support 
The results support the proposition that perceived policy effectiveness is important in 
explaining the level of support for mitigation policies (e.g., Bostrom et al. 2012). The 
extent to which individuals believe in the effectiveness of policies influences the 
likelihood of supporting or opposing them. In fact, PE is dominant over other well-
established determinants of PS such as PI and PA when this study included all the 
variables in one model. Moreover, examining the influences of PE on PS across two 
different aspects of mitigation policies, behavioural and structural, reveals a more 
complex pattern. That is, those who believe in the effectiveness of behavioural 
policies would support those policies and oppose structural policies, and vice versa. 
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The difference between structural and behavioural policies, as discussed earlier, 
could explain this contradiction. 
This chapter’s findings imply that a combination of the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB) and the literature on Social Dilemma better explains the specific behaviour of 
support for climate change mitigation policies. Individuals’ attitudes toward 
behaviour, in terms of the behaviour’s effectiveness in resolving the targeted 
problems, might influence the likelihood of them actually performing the behaviour, 
as postulated by the Theory of Planned Behaviour. However, the TPB may not 
explain the variation in public support towards different types of policies if their 
nature is not considered. The Social Dilemma literature can provide a theoretical 
rationale for such classification. The combination of the TPB and Social Dilemma 
literature therefore helps understand the effect of individuals’ beliefs in policy 
effectiveness on their preference for different types of policies. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EXPLAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION POLICIES – IDENTIFYING THE 
“GATEKEEPER” AND WHY “LESS IS MORE ONLY 
WHEN MORE IS TOO MUCH” 
 
4.1 Overview 
Chapter Three found that perceived adverse impacts of climate change and policy 
effectiveness are key drivers of public support for mitigation policies. Despite this, a 
question that remains unanswered is: how does low perceived policy effectiveness 
(PE) dampen public support (PS) when the public is aware of the adverse impacts of 
climate change (PI)? This question is in fact rooted from our limited understanding 
regarding the mechanism through which PE drives PS. Moreover, it has been warned 
that communicating risks (e.g., PI) without emphasising the effectiveness of risk 
ameliorating solutions (e.g., PE) may be ineffective. The rationale behind this 
suggestion is that two constructs PE and PI may interact each other when they 
explain PS. Does this happen in the context of climate change mitigation policy 
support behaviour? This chapter endeavours to address these questions drawing on 
the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) and the Risk Perception Attitude 
(RPA) framework. The hypothesis is that PE mediates the link between PI and PS. PI 
is also hypothesised to be a moderator of the PE – PS link. Examining data from a 
 78 
sample of 1,476 Australians collected through an online survey, it was found that PE 
both fully and partially mediates the PI–PS linkage. However, the data also suggest 
that PI weakens the PE – PS relationship and thus contradicts predictions of the 
EPPM. The study suggests opportunities for application of the EPPM to this new 
area: climate change mitigation policy support behaviour. Marketing implications to 
stimulate public support for mitigation policies are also offered. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
Chapter Three found that perceived policy effectiveness (PE) is dominant in 
explaining mitigation policy support (PS), and that the different aspects of perceived 
adverse impacts of climate change (PI) affect individuals support for either 
behavioural or structural climate change mitigation policies. However, many 
questions are left unanswered. For instance, through which mechanism does PE 
affect PS (Bostrom et al. 2012)? Moreover, one may argue that if PE is such a 
dominant driver of PS, then policymakers should eliminate PI out of their climate 
change communication. Nevertheless, the literature shows that the strategy of 
communicating risks to encourage policy support is common, yet it may be 
unsuccessful if an effective solution to adverse risks is not conveyed (Linden & 
Sander 2014; Witte 1992). Furthermore, it is unclear the extent to which PI and PE 
independently explain PS. This leads to the question of if PE and PI affect each other 
in explaining PS, or in other words, is there an interaction effect from PI and PE? 
Answering these questions is important if one wishes to focus on the two concepts in 
communicating climate change mitigation policies. 
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Chapter Four therefore examines the mechanism by which PE affects PS. It also 
investigates the interaction effect of PI and PE as the two constructs explain PS. The 
examination of these two research questions are drawn upon support from the 
Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) (Witte 1992), and the Risk Perception 
Attitude framework (Rimal & Real 2003). Among theories and models in the 
literature, those two models offer the most appropriate theoretical rationales to 
examine the two questions. This is because the models include the main concepts of 
this study: risk perception (PI), responsive efficacy (PE), and behavioural change 
(PS). For more details regarding the operational opportunity those models into this 
study’s context, please refer to Chapter Two.  
It is noted that the analytical framework proposed in Chapter Two included 
perceived policy feasibility (PF) into the moderating and mediating hypotheses. 
However, due to the inconsistent and weak influences of the construct on the 
dependent variable of policy support behaviour that were found in Chapter Three, 
this chapter excludes the construct from further analysis. Therefore the hypotheses 
examined in this chapter are: 
[H4] PE mediates the link between PI and PS, that is, PI influences PS through PE 
[H5] PI moderates the link between PE and PS, that is, the effect of PE on PS is 
conditioned by PI 
This chapter tests the above hypotheses on the same sample of 1,476 Australians 
which were discussed in Chapter Three. Please refer to that chapter for more details 
regarding data collection, the survey instrument, and construct measures. The 
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following section will introduce the empirical tests; thereafter discussions and 
marketing implications are provided. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
This chapter applies measures of the variables in question developed in Chapter 
Three. All the required empirical tests were conducted using the PROCESS macro 
installed on SPSS statistical software (Hayes 2012). The PROCESS macro provides 
mediating and moderating effects tests based on the multiple Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regression method. The testing procedures are as follows. 
4.3.1 Testing the mediating effect hypotheses 
The PROCESS macro tested the mediating effects through three steps, to identify 
direct and indirect effects of the independent variable (PI), on the dependent variable 
(PS), through the mediator (PE) (Hayes 2012) (Figure 6).  
Figure 6: Mediating effect testing framework 
 
 
Perceived Effectiveness of 
climate change mitigation 
policies - PE 
 
Perceived adverse Impacts 
of climate change - PI 
Climate change mitigation 
Policy Support - PS 
a b 
c 
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First, path a was identified by a single regression analysis in which PE was the 
dependent variable, and PI was the independent variable. Second, a multiple 
regression analysis, in which PS was explained by PI and PE, was conducted to 
examine direct effects of PI and PE on PS (paths b, c). The mediating effect was 
concluded if paths a and b were statistically significant (MacKinnon, Fairchild & 
Fritz 2007). PE fully mediated the PI – PS link if the path c was statistically 
insignificant, otherwise a partial-mediating effect was detected. A full-mediating 
effect implies that the independent variable cannot affect the dependent variable 
without the mediator’s presence. A partial-mediating effect means that the 
independent variable affects the dependent variable in both ways: directly (without 
the mediator) and indirectly (through the mediator). Finally, if the mediating effect is 
concluded, then the indirect effect of PI on PS would be identified by the bias-
corrected bootstrap approach with 10,000 bootstrap samples (Hayes 2013, p. 111; 
Hayes & Scharkow 2013).  
The mediating effect of PE on the PI – PS link was examined in two cases: support 
for behavioural and for structural climate change mitigation policies. Chapter Three 
found that the participants were likely to support behavioural policies if they 
perceived low-critical PI (PI-LOCR) and that the policies were effective. Therefore, 
the PE of behavioural policies was examined as the mediator of the link between PI-
LOCR and support for the behavioural policies (PS-BEH). In the case of structural 
policies, the participants tended to support the policies if they perceived both low-
critical and high-critical PI, and that the policies were effective. Hence, the PE of the 
structural policies was tested as a mediator to the relationship between low-critical PI 
(PI-LOCR) and support for structural policies (PS-STR); and between high-critical 
 82 
PI (PI-HICR) and PS-STR. Thus, there were three empirical tests for the mediating 
effect hypothesis. 
 Case One: Behavioural policy effectiveness (PE-BEH) and the 
relationship between perceived low-critical adverse impacts of 
climate change (PI-LOCR) and support for behavioural policies (PS-
BEH). 
 Case Two: Structural policy effectiveness (PE-STR) and the 
relationship between perceived low-critical adverse impacts of 
climate change (PI-LOCR) and support for structural policies (PS-
STR). 
 Case Three: Structural policy effectiveness (PE-STR) and the 
relationship between perceived high-critical adverse impacts of 
climate change (PI-HICR) and support for structural policies (PS-
STR). 
4.3.2 Testing the moderating effect hypothesis 
Testing of the moderating effect hypothesis was also conducted by multiple OLS 
regression method using the PROCESS macro (Hayes 2012). The test consisted of 
two steps. First, the independent (PE) and moderating (PI) variables were introduced 
to explain the dependent variable (PS). Second, the interaction term of PE and PI was 
included, with PE and PI to predict PS. To conclude that the moderating effect exists, 
the coefficient of the interaction term and R-square change are required to be 
statistically significant. Independent and moderating variables were mean-centred 
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before regression analyses for the ease of later interpretation (Dalal & Zickar 2012). 
Similarly to the empirical tests for the mediating effect hypothesis, the moderating 
effect was also tested in the three cases described above.  
4.4 Results 
The mediating and moderating hypotheses were tested through the earlier mentioned 
three cases. The following section will describe results of mediating effect tests. 
4.4.1 Mediating effects 
4.4.1.1 Case One: Behavioural policy effectiveness (PE-BEH) and the relationship 
between low-critical PI (PI-LOCR) and support for behavioural policies 
(PS-BEH). 
The results show that perceived low-critical climate change adverse impacts 
significantly explain the perceived policy effectiveness of behavioural policies (a = 
.15***, R-square = .50, F (19, 1456) = 77.86, p <. 001) (Figure 7).  
Figure 7: Mediating effect of behavioural policy effectiveness on the link 
between perceived low-critical adverse impacts of climate change and the policy 
support. 
 
Perceived Effectiveness – 
Behavioural policies  
(PE-BEH) 
Perceived adverse Impacts of 
climate change – Low-critical 
(PI-LOCR) 
 
Policy Support – 
Behavioural policies 
(PS-BEH) 
 
a = .15*** b = .30*** 
c = .11*** 
 (All displayed coefficients are unstandardised; ***p <. 001) 
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This aspect of perceived adverse impacts of climate change is also statistically 
significant in explaining individuals’ support for behavioural policies, when 
controlling for the effectiveness of those policies (b = .30***, c = direct effect = 
.11***, R-square = .30, F (20, 1455) = 31.25, p <. 001). This indicates that the 
construct of perceived policy effectiveness partially mediates the relationship 
between perceived low-critical adverse impacts of climate change and support for 
behavioural climate change mitigation policies. The bias-corrected bootstrap 
confidence interval yielded a statistically significant indirect effect of PI on PS 
(indirect effect = .04, SE = .01, Lower level confidence interval = .02, Upper level 
confidence interval = .07). 
4.4.1.2 Case Two: Structural policy effectiveness (PE-STR) and the relationship 
between low-critical PI (PI-LOCR) and support for structural policies (PS-
STR). 
Case One reveals a partial mediating effect of PE on the link between PI and PS, 
however testing in Case Two results in a full-mediating effect of PE on the 
relationship. The construct of perceived low-critical adverse impacts of climate 
change still statistically significant in explaining perceived policy effectiveness (a = 
.14***, R-square = .57, F (19, 1456) = 102.80, p < .001) (Figure 8). Contrary to Case 
One, PI-LOCR is not statistically significant in explaining PS-STR when controlling 
for perceived policy effectiveness (b = .73***, c = .03 (insignificant), R-square = .61, 
F (20, 1455) = 115.86, p <. 001). This implies that PI-LOCR has no direct effect on 
PS-STR. Consequently the data suggests that perceived policy effectiveness fully 
mediates the link between perceived low-critical adverse impacts of climate change 
and support for structural policies. The bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval 
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yielded a statistically significant indirect effect of PI on PS (indirect effect = .10, SE 
= .03, Lower level confidence interval = .05, Upper level confidence interval = .15). 
Figure 8: Mediating effect of structural policy effectiveness on the link between 
perceived low-critical adverse impacts of climate change and the policy support. 
 
4.4.1.3 Case Three:  Structural policy effectiveness (PE-STR) and the relationship 
between high-critical PI (PI-HICR) and support for structural policies (PS-
STR). 
Similarly to Case Two, the construct of perceived effectiveness is found to have a 
full-mediating effect on the PI – PS relationship (Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Mediating effect of structural policy effectiveness on the link between 
perceived high-critical adverse impacts of climate change and the policy 
support. 
 
Perceived Effectiveness – 
Structural policies  
(PE-STR) 
Perceived adverse Impacts of 
climate change – Low-critical 
(PI-LOCR) 
 
Policy Support –  
Structural policies 
(PS-STR) 
 
a = .14*** b = .73*** 
c = .03 
(insignificant) 
 (All displayed coefficients are unstandardised; ***p <. 001) 
Perceived Effectiveness – 
Structural policies  
(PE-STR) 
Perceived adverse Impacts of 
climate change – High-critical 
(PI-HICR) 
 
Policy Support –  
Structural Policies 
(PS-STR) 
 
a = .12*** b = .73*** 
c = .04 
 (All displayed coefficients are unstandardized; ***p < .001) 
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Specifically, the relationship between PI-HICR and PE-STR is statistically 
significant (a = .12***, R-square = .57, F (19, 1456) = 102.80, p < .001). PI-HICR 
has no direct effect on PS-STR (b = .73***, c = .04 (insignificant), R-square = .61, F 
(20, 1455) = 115.86, p < .001). The bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval 
results in a statistically significant indirect effect of PI on PS (indirect effect = .09, 
SE = .02, Lower level confidence interval = .05, Upper level confidence interval = 
.13). 
In summary, all tests for the three cases support hypothesis H6, that perceived policy 
effectiveness mediates the relationship between perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change and individuals’ policy support behaviour. Specifically, it was found that a 
partial-mediating effect was found when examining public support for behavioural 
climate change mitigation policies. Furthermore, full-mediating effects were detected 
when examining individuals’ support behaviour for structural policies. 
4.4.2 Moderating effects 
Table 7 illustrates results of moderating effect tests. It was found that the construct of 
low-critical adverse impacts of climate change was found to be statistically 
insignificant in moderating the link between the perceived effectiveness of 
behavioural policies and policy support behaviour (∆R-square = .00, ∆F (1, 1454) = 
1.19, p = .28) (Table 7, Model 9).  However moderating effects of PI on the link 
between PE and PS were detected in the case of structural policy support behaviour. 
Specifically, the null-hypothesis of the moderating effect of low-critical PI to the link 
between PE-STR and PS-STR can be rejected (∆R-square = .01, ∆F (1, 1454) = 
40.67, p <. 001). Similarly, that of high-critical PI on the link between PE-STR and 
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PS-STR can also be rejected (∆R-square = .01, ∆F (1, 1454) = 38.36, p < .001) 
(Table 7, Model 10, 11). 
To understand the moderating effects of perceived high-critical and low-critical 
adverse impacts of climate change in detail, this study examined the simple slopes of 
the PE-STR – PS-STR relationship on different percentiles of those moderators (PI-
LOCR and PI-HICR). The slope coefficient of the PE-STR – PS-STR linear 
relationship at the low PI-LOCR group (10th percentile value) is .89 (SE = .03, p < 
.001), and at the moderate PI-LOCR group (50th percentile value) is reduced to .75 
(SE = .02, p < .001). The slope coefficient is further reduced to .63 at the high PI-
LOCR group (90th percentile value) (SE= .03, p < .001). This indicates that the 
perceived low-critical adverse impacts of climate change negatively moderate the 
link between structural policies’ perceived effectiveness and support for those 
policies. 
A similar pattern was found when conducting simple slope analyses for the 
identification of the high-critical adverse impacts of climate change as the moderator 
of the PE-STR – PS-STR link. PI-HICR weakens the link between the perceived 
effectiveness of structural policies and support for them. The slope coefficient of the 
linear relationship at the low PI-HICR group (10th percentile value) is .89 (SE = .03, 
p < .001), and is reduced to .76 (SE = .02, p < .001) at the 50th percentile value of PI-
HICR. At the 90th percentile value of the moderator, the slope coefficient remains at 
.64 (SE = .03, p < .001). 
The results indicate that the H5 hypothesis of the moderating effect is partially 
supported. Specifically, the moderating effect cannot be concluded during 
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examination of support for behavioural policies. However the moderating effects 
were found to be statistically significant in examples of structural policies.  
4.5 Discussion 
This study suggests that the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) and the Risk 
Perception Attitude (RPA) framework are applicable to the context of climate change 
mitigation policy support behaviour. The full-mediating effects of policy 
effectiveness support the fundamental propositions of EPPM. That is, perceived risk 
is necessary because it provides individuals with a rationale through which to 
consider the process of risk amelioration. However, the effectiveness of proposed 
risk ameliorating solutions is critical in persuading individuals to engage in 
behavioural change. Should one remove policy effectiveness from the framework the 
motivating effect of the perceived adverse impacts of climate change on policy 
support will not be forthcoming. The full-mediating effects of perceived policy 
effectiveness (PE) on the relationship between perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change (PI) and mitigation policy support (PS) is implied in this scenario.  
Furthermore, this study detects a partial-moderating effect of PE on the link between 
PI and PS when examining behavioural policies. The partial-mediating effect 
indicates that the PI construct does affect PS with or without the presence of the PE 
construct. Does this evidence undermine the EPPM? This study postulates that it 
does not, but instead, that the evidence of the partial-moderating effect enhances the 
RPA and therefore the EPPM. 
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Table 7: Moderating effect results (The general public sample) 
 
Dependent variable:  
Support for Behav. policies
 
Dependent variable:  
Support for Structural policies
 
 
Model 9 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
Model 10 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
Model 11 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
(Constant) 3.30*** (.11) 2.22*** (.14) 2 .34*** ( .14 ) 
Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change – Low-critical 
(PI-LOCR) .10*** (.03) .00 (.03) .01 (.03) 
Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change – High-critical 
(PI-HICR) -.09*** (.02) .05 (.02) .05 (.02) 
Perceived anthropogenic causes 
of climate change (PA) .02 (.01) .06*** (.02)  .06*** (.02) 
Perceived Effectiveness –  
Behavioural policies (PE-BEH) .30*** (.02) -.20*** (.02) -.20*** (.02) 
Perceived Feasibility –  
Behavioural policies (PF-BEH) .04* (.02)  .02 (.02) .02 (.02) 
Perceived Effectiveness –  
Structural policies (PE-STR) -.08*** (.02)  .76*** (.02) .76*** (.02) 
Perceived Feasibility –     
Structural policies (PF-STR) .03 (.02)  .07*** (.02)  .06*** (.02) 
PE-BEH x PI-LOCR -.02 (.02)    
PE-STR x PI-LOCR   -.14*** (.02)  
PE-STR x PI-HICR   -.12*** (.02) 
 
Demographics 
    
 Gender (female=1) -.02 (.02) .02 (.03) .02 (.03) 
 Age .08*** (.01) .04*** (.01) .04*** (.01) 
 Education .02 (.01) .02* (.01) .02 (.01) 
 Income -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01) 
 Full-time -.07 (.05) .00 (.05) .00 (.05) 
 Part-time -.11* (.05) -.06 (.06) -.06 (.06) 
 Unpaid jobs -.06 (.05) -.01 (.06) .00 (.06) 
 Retired   -.09 (.05) -.02 (.06) -.01 (.06) 
 Labour Party .06 (.04) .13*** (.04) .14*** (.04) 
 Liberal Party -.04 (.04) -.07 (.04) -.06 (.04) 
 National Party -.09 (.08) -.12 (.09) -.10 (.09) 
 Green Party .11* (.05) .15* (.05) .14* (.05) 
 Independent Party .02 (.05) -.01 (.06) -.01 (.06) 
F (df1,df2) 29.82 *** 
(21,1454) 
115.29*** 
(21,1454) 
115.06*** 
(22,1454) 
R-square .30 .62 .62 
Adjusted R-square .29 .61 .61 
Change statistics c
    
 R-square change .00 .04 .01 
 F change (df1,df2) 
1.19 (1, 1454) 
40.67*** 
(1,1454) 
38.86*** 
(1,1454) 
a Unstandardised coefficients, independent and moderating variables were mean-centred, n = 1,476  
b *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, all are two-tailed tests 
c Compared to the model without the interaction terms; S.E.= Standard Error 
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The EPPM does not take into account the behavioural or structural nature of the 
proposed responsive solutions for example, whether or not individuals need to make 
sacrifices. Moreover, empirical studies of the EPPM, mostly in the field of health 
communication, have presented solutions that require individuals to sacrifice to some 
extent. Examples are safe sex practices to reduce the risk of HIV (Witte 1994), use of 
sunscreen to reduce the risk of skin cancer (Rimal & Real 2003), and use of hearing 
protection (Smith et al. 2008). The cost of condoms, sunscreen or hearing protection 
devices are examples of the financial sacrifice individuals need to make. 
Furthermore, there could be other inconvenient measures that individuals need to 
take to guarantee as far as possible, protective solutions. In those self-sacrificing 
examples, individuals need to consider the effectiveness of the proposed solutions as 
part of their decision-making. 
The critical role of response effectiveness when examining self-sacrificing solutions 
was found when examining public support for structural policies. In the context of 
climate change, structural policies require individuals to sacrifice, as with carbon 
taxes. Through applying cost-benefit analysis, individuals are likely to sacrifice and 
support structural policies once they believe in the initiatives’ effectiveness in 
mitigating the impacts of climate change. Furthermore, the lack of effectiveness of 
structural policies will not trigger behavioural change even if individuals are already 
aware of some adverse impacts of climate change. Conversely, behavioural policies 
do not require the individual to sacrifice. Occasionally, those policies provide 
incentives to individuals for example, subsidies for solar energy systems. As an 
outcome, some individuals may support behavioural policies because they believe in 
the adverse impacts of climate change, even if they do not believe the policies are 
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sufficiently effective. This could explain the partial mediating effect found by the 
study.  
Therefore, this study enhances the RPA framework and the original EPPM by 
including a description of responsive solutions. That is, responsive efficacy fully 
mediates the link between perceived risk and behavioural intention or behavioural 
change, if the proposed responsive solutions require individuals to sacrifice. 
Conversely, if the responsive solutions are behavioural, then the mediating effect 
could be partial. 
This study only partially endorses the moderating effect proposal. The adverse 
impacts of climate change were found to moderate the relationship between the 
effectiveness of structural mitigation policies and support for them. However, the 
moderating effect was not found in the case of behavioural policies. Furthermore, the 
identified moderating effects contradicted EPPM propositions. That is, climate 
change adverse impacts weaken the link between policy effectiveness and support 
behaviour, while the EPPM proposes the opposite (Witte 1992). 
Perceived risks from climate change are different to anticipated health problems, as 
the former is believed to impact not only individuals, but also entire communities 
(Linden & Sander 2014). Consequently, individuals may believe that governments 
and other stakeholders such as business and industry are also responsible for 
mitigating climate change (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh 2007, p. 451). 
This fundamental difference could help explain contradictory findings regarding the 
moderating effects. It is suggested that a high level of perceived risk encourages 
individuals to direct responsibility for climate change mitigation onto stakeholders 
such as business and industry. Furthermore, the belief in the effectiveness of climate 
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change mitigation policy may reflect the individual’s belief in the extent to which 
government is responsible for those initiatives. Consequently, it could explain the 
reason that the adverse consequences of climate change reduce the impact of policy 
effectiveness on public support. If the public perceives climate change could cause 
catastrophic effects, it is likely to believe government actions are inadequate and that 
other stakeholders should be involved. 
It is important to remember that the moderating effects are only found with regard to 
structural policies and not behavioural policies. This study asserts that the 
fundamental difference between the two domains of climate change mitigation 
policies combined with the individuals’ cost-benefit analysis might explain this 
contradiction. A negative cost-benefit result might eventuate should individuals 
choose to support structural policies. It is possible that a “pass the buck” reaction 
might occur should individuals believe that the risk from climate change is high. This 
informs the moderating effect of adverse climate change impacts that is apparent in 
relation to structural policies. On the contrary, support for behavioural policies could 
lead to a positive result regarding a cost-benefit comparison because individuals are 
not asked to sacrifice. Therefore, “passing the buck” behaviour may not occur and 
consequently, the relationship between policy effectiveness and support behaviour 
will be unencumbered by the adverse impacts of climate change.   
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4.6 General Discussion and Marketing Implications from Chapter Three 
and Chapter Four 
Chapter Three suggested that policy effectiveness plays a dominant role in 
explaining public support for climate change mitigation policies. This however raises 
important questions regarding the manner through which this mechanism occurs 
(Bostrom et al. 2012). Chapter Four’s findings regarding the mediating effect offer 
some explanations to these questions. 
Chapter Four suggests that policy effectiveness mediates the relationship between the 
adverse impacts of climate change and public support for the relevant policies. This 
again highlights the important role of policy effectiveness in encouraging public 
support for mitigation policies. The construct of policy effectiveness has full-
mediating effects in the example of structural climate change mitigation policies. 
This implies that policy effectiveness is key to encouraging people to sacrifice to 
mitigate climate change. Consequently, policymakers should focus on this important 
construct if they want to inspire the public to support structural solutions such as the 
carbon tax. 
In summary, the findings gained from Chapter Three and Chapter Four suggest that 
the dominance of perceived policy effectiveness is two-fold. The first is the direct 
effect of the determinant on individuals’ support for mitigation policies. The second 
through the mediating effect it has on the link between perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change and policy support. It is important to note that this study examined a 
sample of climate change believers (CCBs) who are likely to have a high awareness 
of human-induced climate change and its adverse impacts. Therefore, it is suspected 
that the roles of PI and PA may be saturated once individuals are CCBs. In other 
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words, given the high levels of PI and PA of CCBs examined in this study, it is 
possible that further increasing their perception of climate change risks may not 
significantly enhance these CCBs’ support for mitigation policies. Instead, Hine et al. 
(2013) recommend that communicating effectiveness of mitigation actions should be 
the key to encouraging “alarmed” audiences (the group that mostly accept the 
existence of climate change and perceived its adverse impacts) to support mitigation 
initiatives. Chapter Four’s findings may offer empirical support for this 
recommendation. It therefore argued that once individuals perceive sufficient levels 
of adverse impacts of climate change, and believe in the anthropogenic causes of 
climate change (e.g., being CCBs), PE should be more emphasised to further garner 
public support for mitigation policies. 
However, should we dismiss the role of the adverse impacts of climate change in 
persuasive discourse given the dominant role of policy effectiveness? The answer is 
that we should not. Risk perception is important as it captures the public’s attention 
about climate change issues (Linden & Sander 2014). Individuals tend to support 
regulations once they believe that risk is high (Slovic 1987). This study therefore 
asserts that the influences of PI and PA are still critical when examining the general 
public’s support for mitigation policies, and therefore the two drivers should not be 
disregarded. Previous climate change audience segmentation research consistently 
found that individuals who are most supportive of mitigation policies also possess 
strong beliefs in the existence of climate change, its human causality and adverse 
impacts. For instance, Hine et al. (2013) in their study of 3,096 Australian 
participants, found that a majority of climate change believers (88% of them, which 
was 64.9% of the whole sample) expressed above-average levels of perceived risks 
of climate change, and are also likely to show significantly higher levels of support 
 95  
for mitigation initiatives than climate change sceptics. Similarly, a study by Maibach 
et al. (2011) found that the two most supportive groups (51% of 2,164 American 
participants) for mitigation policies held substantially higher levels of belief in the 
existence of human-induced climate change and in the perceived risks from it.  
Policy effectiveness is a dominant driver. However, there are cases whereby the 
adverse impacts of climate change might directly affect public support for mitigation 
policies. This is apparent once policy effectiveness partially mediates the link 
between adverse impacts of climate change and support for mitigation policies. In 
fact, the indirect effect of the adverse impacts of climate change on support for 
behavioural policy is considerably less than the construct’s direct effect on the 
dependent variable (indirect effect = .04, SE = .01; direct effect = .11, SE = .02).  
Given the important role of perceived adverse impacts of climate change, this study 
urges for continued efforts in increasing the general public’s awareness of climate 
change and of its adverse impacts. Climate change believers (CCBs), who believe in 
the existence of human-induced climate change and its adverse impacts, are the 
individuals who are most willing to take active mitigation actions, it is therefore 
important to encourage individuals to join this segment of the climate change 
audience (Hine et al. 2013) by raising the broader public’s awareness of climate 
change issues. 
This study nevertheless found that scaring people, the “fear appeal” communicative 
approach, could result in failure (Linden & Sander 2014), even if risk ameliorating 
solutions are promoted. Shome et al. (2009) argued that excessive communication of 
factors such as fear or worry leads to emotional numbing; individuals no longer 
emotionally react to climate change issues as risks, which may limit responsive 
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behaviour. Moreover, from the current study’s example of structural climate change 
mitigation policies, the high level of adverse impacts is found to weaken the 
relationship between policy effectiveness and public support. Although this is not 
found when examining behavioural policies, policymakers should be cautious in 
using the “fear appeal” approach when seeking public support for structural policies 
such as the carbon tax. High levels of perceived risks could harm the positive impact 
of policy effectiveness on public support for structural policies. 
In conclusion, perceived policy effectiveness and adverse impacts of climate change 
are important in encouraging public support for mitigation policies. However, further 
attention is needed on policy effectiveness because its role is critical in driving 
public support. Moreover, it cannot be denied that communicating the adverse 
impacts of climate change is necessary because it captures public attention. 
Nevertheless, directing the public towards the impacts of adverse climate change 
could also have negative implications. This may include reducing the positive effect 
of policy effectiveness on public support. Furthermore, it is important to state that a 
trade-off between public support for structural policies and for behavioural policies 
may eventuate if the sole focus is on the high-critical aspects of climate change 
impacts. Chapter Three found the high-critical aspect of the adverse impacts of 
climate change could enhance public support for structural policies, and at the same 
time, decrease support for behavioural policies. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PUTTING EXPERTS INTO LAY PEOPLE’S SHOES – 
WHAT DRIVES CLIMATE SCIENTISTS TO SUPPORT 
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION POLICIES? 
 
5.1 Overview 
Climate change is one of our major contemporary challenges, and we rely on our 
scientists’ knowledge and recommendations to tackle it. However, the role of 
scientists’ voices in mitigating climate change is curbed because of the nonlinearity 
of climate change communication. The literature has targeted a consequence of this 
problem, “knowledge gaps” between climate scientists and lay people, to improve 
public engagement in climate change issues. However, other important gaps between 
the two groups should also be examined. This study endeavours to look beyond the 
knowledge gap to attitudinal differences between the two samples. Comparing a 
sample of 1,476 lay participants to a group of 140 climate scientists, all Australian, 
this chapter describes major differences in their perceptions of adverse impacts of 
climate change; evaluations of mitigation policies; and policy preferences. Drawing 
on the analytical framework developed in Chapter Two, this chapter studies the 
drivers of support for mitigation policies of assumed “bias-free” individuals such as 
the scientists. This chapter offers a number of suggestions for more effective climate 
change communication. For instance, focusing on the adverse impacts of climate 
change on human wellbeing, and on policy effectiveness, might enhance public 
 98 
support for both mandatory and voluntary mitigation initiatives. The data also 
suggest that from the perspective of climate scientists, to mitigate severe adverse 
impacts of climate change such as sea-level rises, sacrifice-requiring mitigation 
initiatives should be implemented. Marketing implications also are discussed. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
We rely on psychological factors, such as feelings, to cope with risks that we have 
previously experienced. However, in the case of risks posed by climate change, with 
many uncertainties, we count on cognitive or rational elements to know and 
thereafter respond to the risks (Slovic et al. 2004, 2005). Scientists supply the 
knowledge and therefore play a critical role in guiding us through the not-fully 
known risks. Most of society’s movements towards tackling climate change, which 
include the general public’s attitudes and political initiatives, are initiated by 
scientific facts and recommendations. The carbon tax and Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) in Australia and similar schemes in many other nations were based on 
rationales from influencing literature such as the Stern Review (Stern 2006) and the 
Garnaut Report (Garnaut 2008). Studies of consumer perceptions of the issue suggest 
that the general public considers climate scientists to be the most trusted source of 
climate change information (Buys et al. 2012; Leviston & Walker 2011b). However, 
the Australian general public seems not to fully favour their scientists’ advice on 
climate change mitigation. Australian experts such as Garnaut (2008) recommend 
carbon pricing as a solution to mitigate climate change, based on the general 
agreement that carbon pricing is amongst the most effective market-based tools to 
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curb carbon emissions (Elkins & Baker 2001; Stern 2006). Nevertheless, more than 
half of the Australian public did not want the government to maintain carbon pricing 
(Connor & Stefanova 2013). This is possibly a sign that the general public and 
climate scientists may not agree on what climate change mitigation actions to 
support. 
There is a general agreement in the literature that there are knowledge and attitudinal 
gaps between lay audiences and climate scientists (Bostrom et al. 1994; Sterman & 
Sweeney 2007; Sundblad, Biel & Gärling 2009) due to the nonlinearity in climate 
change communication (Sundblad, Biel & Gärling 2009; Weingart, Engels & 
Pansegrau 2000), with the results that these gaps might lead to divergences between 
the two samples in mitigation behaviours (Kollmuss & Agyeman 2002). However, 
very little is known about the extent to which these gaps explain disagreements 
between the two groups about their attitudes towards mitigation policies and their 
policy preferences. Therefore one objective of this chapter is to examine the 
knowledge and attitudinal gaps between the two groups.  
5.2.1 The “knowledge gap” between the general public and scientists 
The general public’s perceptions about climate change and mitigation actions are 
formed by multiple sources of information. Weingart et al. (2000) identify the three 
most important stakeholders in climate change communication: scientists, politicians, 
and journalists. The authors argue that climate change information is imperfectly 
transferred through these three “spheres” of influences, with the tendency amongst 
policy makers to simplify climate science findings, and the media to only report 
newsworthy information. Consequently, the original climate change related scientific 
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information is distorted through communication by the time it reaches the general 
public (Stoutenborough & Vedlitz, 2014; Weingart et al., 2000). It can therefore be 
argued that lay audiences probably conceptualise climate change differently from 
climate scientists, and consequently, the two groups are likely to differ in climate 
change knowledge, attitudes about climate change, and preferred responsive actions. 
The literature has reported “knowledge gaps” between the general public and 
scientists. Kempton (1991) found many differences in knowledge and understanding 
of climate change between the US lay people and scientists. Whilst the scientists 
clearly believed CO2 emissions were one of the causes of the greenhouse effect, lay 
people did not recognise this fact. The US public at that time believed that aerosol 
spray cans, the ozone hole, cutting trees and air pollution were associated with 
climate change when scientists did not. Bostrom et al. (1994) found a similar pattern. 
Their study of 177 well-educated participants revealed that the participants 
associated the ozone layer with global warming, and did not recognise that fossil fuel 
consumptions are the most significant source of carbon emissions. Instead, 38% of 
the sample believed the use of aerosol cans contributed to climate change.  
These knowledge gaps are critical as they affect responding behaviours towards 
climate change (Kempton, 1993). Inadequate understanding about the causes and 
mechanisms of climate change is reflected in 28% of the participants in Bostrom et 
al. (1994) suggesting that CFCs restriction was among the most effective way to 
mitigate global warming. Nine years later, 46% of Americans still avoided 
purchasing aerosol spray cans if they were concerned about climate change 
(Leiserowitz 2007). The differences in climate change knowledge can also lead to 
gaps in policy preferences between the general public and scientists. Kempton (1991) 
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found that in the US, lay people believed that energy efficiency was irrelevant to 
carbon emission reductions.  
In conclusion, the imperfect flow of climate change information from climate 
scientists to the general public has created many barriers in resolving one of our 
contemporary challenges—climate change. The knowledge gaps discussed above can 
impede the communication of scientific facts and recommendations for improving 
our mitigation efforts (Sterman 2011). It is therefore essential to reduce climate 
change “knowledge gaps” between lay people and experts. Consequently, many 
studies have contrasted the general public and climate scientists to explore 
differences in climate change knowledge and understanding between the two 
samples (Fransson & Gärling 1999; Kempton 1993; Kollmuss & Agyeman 2002; 
O’Connor et al. 2002; Sterman & Sweeney 2007; Viscusi & Zeckhauser 2006). 
5.2.2 What about the other gaps? 
It is inadequate, however, to only focus on climate change knowledge differences 
when seeking to explain the behavioural gaps between scientists and lay people 
(Linden & Sander 2014).  Kollmuss and Agyeman's (2002) Knowledge-Attitude-
Behaviour (KAB) model demonstrates that knowledge does not directly influence 
behaviour, but that the effect is mediated by an attitudinal factor. Similarly, the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour also emphasises the role of attitude in determining 
behavioural intentions and thereafter behavioural changes (Ajzen 1991). 
Consequently, detecting differences in other factors such as attitude, rather than only 
knowledge, is equally important for developing better climate change 
communication modes (Maibach, Roser-Renouf & Leiserowitz 2008; Shome, D. et 
 102 
al. 2009). This study fills this gap by contrasting the attitudes of the two groups, lay 
audiences and climate scientists, regarding climate change issues such as the 
perception of adverse impacts of climate change, and evaluations of climate change 
mitigation policies. Furthermore, this study examines a behavioural gap between the 
two samples by comparing their mitigation policy preferences. Examining these 
divergences in policy evaluations and policy preferences will provide evidence of the 
nonlinearity in climate change communication, and therefore is valuable in 
evaluating and enhancing our so-far climate change communication efforts.  
This chapter aims to investigate differences between lay people and climate scientists 
in their attitudes towards climate change and mitigation policies, and their support 
level for these initiatives. This is to examine the Research Question Four of this 
thesis (see Chapter One): 
 What are the differences between the general public and climate scientists in 
 attitudes towards climate change, evaluation of climate change mitigation 
 policies, and support for them? 
The above research question consists of the following sub-research questions: 
(i) What are the differences in perceived adverse impacts of climate change, 
and in the evaluations of climate change mitigation policies between the 
general public and climate scientists? 
(ii) What are the differences in mitigation policy preferences between the 
general public and climate scientists? 
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5.2.3 Why does this study put experts into lay people’s shoes? 
The literature suggests that the barriers of self-interest preservation behaviour, and 
inadequate knowledge, might most significantly refrain individuals from engaging in 
appropriate climate change mitigation actions. Aitken et al. (2011) found that the 
perception of common dilemma is the most significant factor weakening New 
Zealanders’ willingness to take mitigation actions. Individuals are less likely to 
sacrifice to mitigate climate change if they believe that others will not make similar 
efforts, as individuals tend to maximise their personal interest (Wiener & Doescher, 
1991). Climate change adversely affects every member of the society, however, only 
those who choose to take mitigation actions bear the cost of doing so (such as 
financial cost for solar energy systems, inconveniences of using public transport). 
Therefore, choosing not to voluntarily act towards climate change may be a preferred 
strategy to maximise personal interest. Lorenzoni et al. (2007) identified the same 
barrier in the “free-rider effect” which refrained the UK public from taking 
mitigation actions. These findings suggest that self-interest prioritising behaviour 
may significantly curb the effects of mitigation behaviour’s determinants. The other 
reason cited for not taking voluntary action to support climate change mitigation is a 
lack of knowledge about the issue, which can act as a barrier to individuals taking 
appropriate mitigation actions (Bostrom et al., 1994; Kempton, 1991; Leiserowitz, 
2007; O’Connor et al., 2002; J. Sterman & Sweeney, 2007). Individuals may 
sometimes take irrelevant actions to mitigate climate change such as boycotting 
spray-cans if they believe aerosols contribute to climate change (Bostrom et al., 
1994; Leiserowitz, 2007). 
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Climate scientists are good candidates who may satisfy the assumption of bias-free 
individuals in areas such as political and personal interests. Moreover, they are 
possibly the most knowledgeable group regarding climate change that we can 
examine. Understanding the drivers that influence this group’s policy preferences is 
valuable. Examining this sample may offer insights into mitigation behaviour in a 
rare case where the two common barriers of the behaviour – inadequate climate 
change knowledge, and personal-interest preservation – are likely to be minimised. 
Moreover, this study expects suggestions from the scientists to most effectively 
mitigate climate change via policy instruments when studying their mitigation 
behaviour. 
This chapter therefore applies the analytical framework developed in Chapter Two to 
study the impacts of four factors on the scientists’ climate change mitigation policy 
support behaviour: perceived adverse impacts of climate change; perceived 
anthropogenic causes of climate change; perceived policy effectiveness; and 
feasibility. The direct influences of the four drivers on the scientists’ policy support 
are backed by the Risk Perception theory(Slovic 1987; Slovic et al. 2005), the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1991), and Social Dilemma literature (e.g., 
Wiener & Doescher 1991). Drawing on the Extended Parallel Process Model 
(EPPM) (Witte 1992) and the Risk Perception Attitude framework (Rimal & Real 
2003), this chapter investigates the mediating and moderating mechanisms through 
which the perceived adverse impacts of climate change, and perceived policy 
effectiveness drive policy support. This is to investigate the Research Question Five 
of this thesis (see Chapter One): 
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 What drives climate scientists’ support for climate change mitigation 
 policies? 
This research question consists of the following sub-research questions: 
(iii) Which of the four drivers most greatly influences mitigation policy 
support? 
(iv) Is perceived policy effectiveness a mediator of the link between perceived 
adverse impacts of climate change and mitigation policy support? 
(v) Is perceived adverse impacts of climate change a moderator of the link 
between perceived policy effectiveness and mitigation policy support? 
Similarly to Chapter Three and Four, this chapter also examines the extent to which 
the basic characteristics of mitigation policies, as suggested by the Social Dilemma 
literature (Wiener & Doescher 1991), influences the four drivers’ impacts on the 
scientists’ policy preferences. 
The contribution of this study is twofold. Firstly, this study offers insights that can 
improve climate change communication. These insights result from examining 
important differences in attitudinal factors and policy preferences, rather than the 
common knowledge gaps, between the general public and climate scientists. 
Secondly, considering climate scientists are bias-free individuals, lessons learned 
from them may help us more efficiently encourage policy support and therefore 
better mitigate climate change impacts.  
The following section describes the methodology and data collection. This chapter 
then contrasts survey data from the general public and climate scientists to 
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investigate the differences in attitudes towards climate change, and mitigation 
policies. Empirical tests are provided to examine the direct effects, and moderating 
and mediating hypotheses. Theoretical and practical implications of this study are 
also discussed. 
 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Participants 
A web-based survey instrument was developed to collect the data for this study. The 
main content of the questionnaire is similar to the survey instrument developed for 
the sample of the general public (please refer to the methodology section of Chapter 
Three). The major difference between the two questionnaires is in the demographics 
that were collected.  
Using an internet search engine with relevant keywords, email addresses of climate 
scientists from Australian universities and research institutes were collected. The link 
to the web-based questionnaire was then sent to the collected email addresses. 
Between May to July 2012, 144 responses from the sample of climate scientists were 
received. In this sample there were three “non-believers” who did not believe that 
climate change had or will happen in the previous or the next five years. One 
response was classified as “part-believer”, as this climate scientist believed in the 
existence of climate change in the past five years, but did not think that climate 
change will happen in the next five years. Given that the numbers of “non-believers” 
and “part-believers” of climate change in the sample are low, this study excluded 
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these two types of responses. Consequently, this study analysed a final sample of 140 
participants. Among them 72.1% were male, 34.3% aged from 40 to 59, 71.4% based 
in the three most populous states of Australia: New South Wales, Victoria, and 
Queensland. 42.1% and 29.3% had expertise in physical sciences and social sciences, 
respectively (Appendix 4). 
5.3.2 Measures 
This study measures perceived adverse impacts of climate change by using a scale of 
nine items. These items were adopted from Bostrom et al. (2012), and O’Connor et 
al. (1999, 2000) but were subsequently modified for relevancy to the Australian 
context (e.g., Kevin 2011; Preston & Jones 2006) (Table 8). The participants were 
asked to evaluate their beliefs in the adverse impacts of climate change over two time 
frames: the last five years and the next five years. This study also gauged the climate 
scientists’ belief in the anthropogenic causes of climate change.  
Climate scientist participants were also asked to give their opinion on ten climate 
change mitigation policies in two facets: policy effectiveness and feasibility (Table 9 
and 10). Finally, this study asked the participants to rate each of the policies. The 
above four scales were all measured using five-point Likert scales. Ones anchor the 
lowest level whilst fives indicate the highest level of beliefs (in the adverse impacts 
of climate change, anthropogenic causes of climate change, policy effectiveness, 
policy feasibility) and policy support. 
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5.3.3 Data analysis  
This chapter firstly compared the survey data of the two groups, the general public 
and climate scientists, to examine differences in their attitudes towards climate 
change and mitigation policies. Specifically, this chapter contrasted the two groups 
for differences in their perceptions of adverse impacts of climate change, mitigation 
policy evaluations, and policy preferences. In order to directly compare the two 
samples’ survey results, similar survey questions were drafted for both surveys. 
The next step of data analysis was reducing the complexity of the multiple-item 
scales by employing factor analyses. From this step, sub-scales were established and 
checked for internal validity. Items in those sub-scales were thereafter aggregated to 
form single scores. This study then employed the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression method to investigate direct impacts of the four determinants on policy 
support. The OLS based PROCESS macro (Hayes 2012, 2013) was employed to test 
the hypotheses of moderating and mediating effects. This study conducted all the 
regressions with SPSS statistical software version 21 (IBM Corp. 2011).  
This study tested the mediating effects by three steps to identify direct and indirect 
effects of the independent variable (PI) on the dependent variable (PS) through the 
mediator (PE) (Hayes 2012) (Figure 10). First, path a was identified by a single 
regression analysis in which PE was the dependent variable and PI was the 
independent variable. Second, a multiple regression analysis in which PS was 
explained by PI and PE was conducted to examine direct effects of PI and PE on PS 
(paths b, c). 
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Figure 10: Mediating effect testing framework 
 
The mediating effect was proven if path a and b were statistically significant 
(MacKinnon, Fairchild & Fritz 2007). PE fully mediated the PI – PS link if the path c 
was statistically insignificant otherwise a partial-mediation effect was detected. A 
full-mediating effect implies that the independent variable cannot affect the 
dependent variable without the mediator’s presence. A partial-mediating effect 
means that the independent variable affects the dependent variable in both ways: 
direct (without the mediator) and indirect (through the mediator). Finally, if the 
mediating effect was proven, then the indirect effect of PI on PS was identified by 
the bias-corrected bootstrap approach with 10,000 bootstrap samples (Hayes 2013, p. 
111; Hayes & Scharkow 2013).  
Testing the moderating effect of the hypothesis was conducted by the OLS-based 
multiple regression method using the PROCESS macro (Hayes 2012). The test 
consisted of two steps. First, the independent (PE) and moderating (PI) variables 
were introduced to explain the dependent variable (PS). Second, the interaction term 
of PE and PI was included with PE and PI to predict PS. To conclude that the 
moderating effect exists, the coefficient of the interaction term and R-square change 
are required to be statistically significant. Independent and moderating variables 
Perceived Effectiveness of 
climate change mitigation 
policies - PE 
 
Perceived adverse Impacts 
of climate change - PI 
Climate change mitigation 
Policy Support - PS 
a b 
c 
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were mean-centred before the regression analyses for ease of  later interpretation 
(Dalal & Zickar 2012). 
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Descriptive analyses 
This section considers overall differences in responses from climate scientists and 
the general public. It draws on the survey outlined above, as well as earlier work 
applying a similar survey to 1,476 members of the general public. This section 
focuses on the differences in perceptions of adverse impacts of climate change, 
policy evaluations, and policy preferences between these two groups. 
5.4.1.1 Differences in the perceptions of adverse impacts of climate change 
The graph below (Figure 11) contrasts the beliefs of the general public and of climate 
scientists regarding nine adverse impacts of climate change in two time frames: the 
last five years and the next five years. The survey questions read ‘To what extent do 
you think climate change has been a cause of the following possible outcomes over 
the past five years?’, and ‘To what extent do you think climate change has been a 
cause of the following possible outcomes over the next five years?’ Ones indicate the 
lowest and fives anchor the highest level of agreement with the statements (1 = ‘Not 
at all’; 3 = ‘Moderately’; 5 = ‘Totally’). 
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Figure 11: Differences in perceptions of adverse impacts of climate change 
 
The results show that the general public have consistently higher mean scores for 
their perceptions of the adverse impacts of climate change in relation to both time 
frames (Figure 11). The only exception to this pattern is the sea-level rise impact 
where the general public under-estimate the risk of climate change in terms of sea-
level rises compared to climate scientists. The biggest differences between the two 
samples’ perceptions of the adverse impacts are found in the high-critical and direct 
destructive influences of climate change on human wellbeing such as health, income, 
and food and water availability. The general public are more concerned about these 
impacts than scientists are. 
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5.4.1.2 Differences in evaluations of climate change mitigation policies 
This study also compares the general public and climate scientists for differences in 
their evaluations of climate change mitigation policies in two aspects: policy 
effectiveness, and feasibility. The survey questions and anchors were similar in the 
two surveys: ‘How effective do you think that the actions and policies below could 
be in helping to prevent global climate change?’ (1 = ‘Not at all effective’; 3 = 
‘Moderately effective’; 5 = ‘Totally effective’); and ‘How difficult do you think it 
would be to get action undertaken on each of the following possible activities?’ The 
survey results of this question were reverse-coded for ease of later interpretation 
(final anchors are: 1 = ‘Not at all feasible’; 3 = ‘Moderately feasible; 5 = ‘Totally 
feasible’).  
Policy effectiveness As demonstrated in Figure 12, both samples perceive renewable 
energy investment as the most efficient action to mitigate climate change. The three 
most effective policies from the perspective of the general public are renewable 
energy investment, investment in fuel efficient vehicles, and international energy 
efficiency standards. On the other hand, the three most effective policies ranked by 
climate scientists are renewable energy investment, international energy efficiency 
standards and the carbon tax. However, the carbon tax is perceived as the least 
effective initiative for mitigating climate change from the lay perspective. 
Meanwhile, the least effective mitigation action from the perspective of scientists is a 
business-managed carbon scheme. 
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Figure 12: Differences in evaluations of climate change mitigation policies 
 
Policy feasibility There are many similarities in the perceptions of policy feasibility 
between the two samples. The general public consider education, the carbon tax, and 
subsidies for more energy efficient household appliances to be the three most 
feasible policies. They also believe that the least perceived feasible policy is 
international standard for energy efficiency. The scientists believe that education 
initiatives, subsidies for households, and for businesses are the three most feasible 
policies. The emissions trading scheme is believed to be the most difficult policy to 
implement, whilst the international energy standard is second, and the carbon tax the 
third least feasible mitigation initiative (see Figure 12). 
Both samples agree then that the two least feasible actions are international energy 
efficiency standards and the emissions trading scheme. The biggest difference in the 
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feasibility aspect is the evaluation of the carbon tax. Whilst lay people believe the 
carbon tax is among the easiest mitigation initiatives to implement, the scientists 
rank it as the seventh out of the ten policies in question.  
5.4.1.3 Differences in mitigation policy preferences 
This study found differences between the general public and climate scientists in 
their evaluations of mitigation policies in term of policy effectiveness and feasibility, 
especially in relation to the particular policy of the carbon tax. Is a similar pattern 
observed when examining the two groups’ policy preferences? This section 
compares the general public and climate scientist samples for differences in their 
mitigation initiative preferences. In both the surveys, the questions read ‘We are 
interested in your level of support for possible actions proposed to combat climate 
change. To what extent do you support the following activities?’ (1 = ‘Totally 
oppose’; 3 = ‘Neither oppose nor support’; 5 = ‘Totally support’). 
The results show many similarities in the mitigation policy preferences between lay 
people and climate scientists (Figure 13). Both the samples support investments in 
renewable energy, public transport and fuel efficient vehicles as mitigation 
initiatives. This is aligned with results of the Climate Institute’s public opinion poll 
which was conducted in the same year as this research survey. The Climate of The 
Nation 2012 report stated that 81% of Australians selected solar power as their most 
preferred source of energy, 59% of the participant voted for wind, whilst only 14% 
selected coal (Connor & Stefanova 2012). Similarly, the 2014 Climate of The Nation 
report recorded that 76% of the general public support government efforts in 
developing renewable energy, with solar, wind and hydro power alternatives the 
most preferred (Stefanova 2014, p. 19).  
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Figure 13: Differences in mitigation policy preferences 
 
However, the largest difference in the level of policy support of the two samples 
relate to carbon-related initiatives such as the carbon tax, emissions trading scheme, 
and business managed carbon scheme. Among these, the gap in the carbon tax 
preferences is the most significant. The general public’s support level for the carbon 
tax policy is below the neutral anchor, which reads ‘Neither oppose nor support’ 
(mean = 2.84, SD = 1.53, max = 5.0, min = 1.0). However scientists’ support for this 
initiative is between the ‘Somewhat support’ and ‘Totally support’ indicators (mean 
= 4.41, SD = .99, max = 5.0, min = 1.0). The survey from the Climate Institute 
indicates that in 2012, the majority of the public (52%) disagreed with the assertion 
‘I support the carbon pricing laws’, with only 28% of the participants agreeing that 
they support the carbon pricing initiatives  (Stefanova 2014, p. 15). This finding 
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endorses the results of this study regarding the general public’s support for the 
carbon tax. 
5.4.2 Exploratory analyses 
Exploratory factor analysis was employed to not only to reduce the complexity of the 
multi-item scales, but also explore the factorial structures of this study’s measures. 
This analysis provides insights into the ways climate scientists conceptualise the 
adverse impacts of climate change (PI). Examining factorial structures of the policy-
related constructs: perceived policy effectiveness (PE); perceived policy feasibility 
(PF); and policy support (PS), also helps verify the proposition that mitigation 
policies, from the perspective of climate scientists, can be grouped into two domains 
as suggested by the Social Dilemma literature (Wiener & Doescher 1991) (see 
Chapter Two).  
5.4.2.1 Perceived adverse impacts of climate change 
A factor analysis of the items measuring scientists’ beliefs in adverse impacts of 
climate change yielded three factors. Factor 1 includes impacts that directly influence 
human’s wellbeing in terms of basic needs such as health, food or drinking water. 
This study labels the factor as Wellbeing (PI-WEB). Factor 2 summaries impacts in 
the form of destructive weather incidences, such as floods or drought. This factor is 
labelled as Weather (PI-WEA). Factor 3 includes only sea-level rises, and therefore 
is categorised as Sea-level (PI-SEA). Those three sub-scales have good internal 
validity as their Cronbach’s Alphas are above the .90 level (Table 8). 
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5.4.2.2  Attitudes towards climate change mitigation policies 
Factor analysis of the ten items measuring perceived policy effectiveness yielded a 
two-factor result, which is supported by both the scree-plot and Eigen values (Table 
9). Analysing the items that measure perceived policy feasibility and policy support, 
gives a four-factor result as determined by the Eigen values (larger than 1.0) (Table 
10, 11). However, the scree-plots suggest that two-factor results are more appropriate 
representations of the data. Furthermore, factor analyses of PF and PS reveal that the 
policy of ‘A self-regulatory carbon usage scheme managed by business groups’ has 
relatively weak factor loadings (smaller than .30). Consequently, the item was 
removed from the scales as recommended by Hair (2010). 
It is noteworthy that although factor analyses of the PE, PF and PS constructs yielded 
two-factor results, factors’ item memberships are different between the constructs. 
For the ease of interpretation of later analyses, this study applied the factor-loading 
pattern that was obtained from the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the 
dependent variable (PS construct) to both PE and PF variables. This approach has 
been applied in previous studies, such as Bostrom et al. (2012).  
Factor 1, which was yielded from the PS’s EFA, includes incentivising policies, such 
as subsidies for more energy efficient household and business equipment, and an 
education policy to help increase awareness of actions to reduce climate change. 
Factor 2 summarises policies that require individuals to switch to lifestyles that 
generate lower carbon emissions, such as the carbon tax, carbon trading scheme and 
using public transport. The policy of ‘International standards for more energy 
efficient products’ has similar factor loadings to both these two factors, therefore it 
was removed from further analysis due to the cross-loading issue (Hair 2010).  
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According to the Social Dilemma literature (e.g., Wiener & Doescher 1991), climate 
change mitigation can be considered a social dilemma, and thus the examined 
policies can be considered as solutions to that social dilemma. Therefore, they can be 
classified into two domains: behavioural and structural policies. The former 
encourages voluntary actions from community members, whilst the latter are 
mandatory and tend to reduce individuals’ freedom of choice with regard to solving 
social dilemmas (Wiener & Doescher 1991).  
Factor 1 of the PS construct captures the domain of behavioural policies, as they do 
not require individuals to sacrifice their interests to mitigate climate change, but 
instead provide incentives to do so. Factor 2 summarises mandatory carbon-related 
policies, which reduce individuals’ freedom of choice, in this case to consume fossil 
fuels as these policies increase fuel costs. The other policies captured by this factor 
ultimately direct individuals to lower carbon emission modes of transport. Therefore, 
factor 2 captures the domain of structural policies as postulated by the Social 
Dilemma literature.  
Testing internal validity of the two sub-scales of the policy support construct shows 
that the above interpretation is valid (Cronbach’s Alphas of policy support for 
behavioural policies – PS-BEH and for structural policies – PS-STR are .75 and .65 
respectively). Sub-scales of PE and PF following the same interpretation of PS also 
have adequate internal validity. Cronbach’s Alphas of perceived structural policy 
effectiveness (PE-STR), behavioural policy effectiveness (PE-BEH), perceived 
structural policy feasibility (PF-STR), and perceived behavioural policy feasibility 
(PF-BEH) are .82, .85, .72, and .74 respectively (Hair 2010).  
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Table 8: Exploratory Factor Analysis Results – Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change (PI) (The climate scientist sample) 
   
PCA factor loadings
 
Items (n=140)
 
Mean
 
Std. Err
 
Wellbeing
 
Weather
 
Sea-level
 
Perceived adverse impacts 
of climate change in the past 
five years 
     
1. Changing weather 
patterns 
3.33 0.09 0.20 0.84 0.13 
2. Floods 3.11 0.08 0.37 0.84 0.13 
3. Drought 3.14 0.09 0.33 0.87 0.16 
4. Biodiversity decreases 2.86 0.09 0.66 0.42 -0.02 
5. Community health 
problems 
2.31 0.07 0.75 0.35 0.08 
6. Reduced personal 
income 
1.91 0.07 0.78 0.09 0.20 
7. Reduced food 
production 
2.39 0.07 0.78 0.24 0.02 
8. Rise in sea levels 3.46 0.09 0.19 0.24 0.90 
9. Reduced availability of 
fresh water for drinking 
and farming 
2.68 0.09 0.68 0.43 0.29 
Perceived adverse impacts 
of climate change in the next 
five years      
1. Changing weather 
patterns 
3.25 0.08 0.29 0.83 0.23 
2. Floods 3.12 0.09 0.36 0.81 0.27 
3. Drought 3.16 0.08 0.41 0.84 0.18 
4. Biodiversity decreases 2.98 0.09 0.63 0.54 0.05 
5. Community health 
problems 
2.57 0.09 0.76 0.36 0.20 
6. Reduced personal 
income 
2.17 0.08 0.84 0.21 0.12 
7. Reduced food 
production 
2.69 0.08 0.82 0.34 0.20 
8. Rise in sea levels 3.38 0.09 0.15 0.22 0.92 
9. Reduced availability of 
fresh water for drinking 
and farming 
2.82 0.08 0.70 0.44 0.21 
Cronbach’s Alpha –  
Full-scale .96   
Cronbach’s Alpha –  
Sub-scale   .95 .97 .91 
% of variance explained – 
each factor   59.94% 10.08 % 7.73 % 
% of variance explained – all 
factors 77.75%   
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) .80 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity p < .001(df = 153) 
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Table 9: Exploratory Factor Analysis Results – Perceived effectiveness of 
climate change mitigation policies (PE) (The climate scientist sample) 
   
PCA factor loadings
 
Items (n=140)
 
Mean
 
Std. Err
 
Factor 1
 
Factor 2
 
1. Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient household equipment 2.87 0.09 0.65 0.51 
2. Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient business equipment 2.95 0.09 0.65 0.50 
3. Government support for a Cap and 
Trade or Emissions Trading Scheme 3.29 0.09 0.19 0.73 
4. Increased investment in renewable 
energy  3.99 0.08 0.43 0.68 
5. International standards for more 
energy efficient products 3.50 0.09 0.57 0.51 
6. Introduction of a carbon tax 3.46 0.09 0.09 0.84 
7. Education about actions to reduce 
climate change 3.19 0.09 0.58 0.37 
8. A self-regulatory carbon usage scheme 
managed by business groups 1.82 0.07 0.69 -0.35 
9. Improvements in public transport 3.37 0.09 0.71 0.38 
10. Investment in fuel efficient vehicles 3.24 0.09 0.74 0.26 
Cronbach’s Alpha – Full-scale .88   
% of variance explained – each factor   50.17% 12.06% 
% of variance explained – all factors 62.23%   
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) .79 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity p < .001(df = 45) 
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Table 10: Exploratory Factor Analysis Results – Perceived feasibility of climate 
change mitigation policies (PF) (The climate scientist sample) 
   
PCA factor loadings
 
Items (n=140)
 
Mean
 
Std. Err
 
Factor 1
 
Factor 2
 
1. Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient household equipment 3.77 0.07 .85 -.04 
2. Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient business equipment 3.71 0.07 .83 .06 
3. Government support for a Cap and 
Trade or Emissions Trading Scheme 2.81 0.08 .16 .76 
4. Increased investment in renewable 
energy  3.32 0.09 .52 .55 
5. International standards for more energy 
efficient products 2.89 0.09 .49 .26 
6. Introduction of a carbon tax 2.98 0.09 -.19 .74 
7. Education about actions to reduce 
climate change 4.25 0.07 .49 .11 
8. A self-regulatory carbon usage scheme 
managed by business groups 2.95 0.10 .14 .22 
9. Improvements in public transport 3.11 0.09 .45 .42 
10.Investment in fuel efficient vehicles 3.32 0.09 .57 .54 
Cronbach’s Alpha – Full-scale .75   
% of variance explained – each factor   34.78% 13.49% 
% of variance explained – all factors 48.27%   
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) .69 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity p < .001(df = 45) 
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Table 11: Exploratory Factor Analysis Results – Support for climate change 
mitigation policies (PS) (The climate scientist sample) 
   
PCA factor loadings
 
Items (n=140)
 
Mean
 
Std. Err
 
Behavioural 
policies
 
Structural  
policies
 
1. Government subsidies for more 
energy efficient household 
equipment 4.38 0.07 .86 .15 
2. Government subsidies for more 
energy efficient business 
equipment 4.26 0.07 .83 .14 
3. Government support for a Cap 
and Trade or Emission Trading 
System 4.31 0.08 -.01 .72 
4. Increased investment in 
renewable energy  4.83 0.04 .28 .64 
5. International standards for more 
energy efficient products 4.64 0.05 .44 .40 
6. Introduction of a carbon tax 4.41 0.08 -.21 .74 
7. Education about actions to reduce 
climate change 4.76 0.05 .57 .11 
8. A self-regulatory carbon usage 
scheme managed by business 
groups 2.78 0.10 .29 -.01 
9. Improvements in public transport 4.85 0.04 .23 .62 
10. Investment in fuel efficient 
vehicles 4.64 0.06 .31 .55 
Cronbach’s Alpha – Full-scale .68   
Cronbach’s Alpha – Sub-scale   .73 .65 
% of variance explained –  
each factor   31.43% 15.20% 
% of variance explained – all factors 46.63%   
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) .70 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity p < .001(df = 45) 
  
 123  
5.4.3 Regression results 
Sub-scales were gained from the above exploratory factor analyses (EFA). Single 
scores for each of these sub-scales were then aggregated from their items. This 
section draws on the EFA results and investigates the direct impacts of the 
determinants in question on climate scientists’ support for mitigation policies. 
Thereafter, the hypotheses of mediating and moderating effects are tested. 
5.4.3.1 Effects of perceived adverse impacts of climate change (PI) and 
anthropogenic causes of climate change (PA) on support for behavioural 
policies (PS-BEH) 
This study firstly examined the effects of perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change (PI), and perceived anthropogenic causes of climate change (PA) on climate 
scientists’ support for behavioural mitigation policies (PS-BEH) (Model 1, Table 
12). Among the four included variables, only adverse impacts of climate change on 
human wellbeing was found to be statistically significant in explaining support 
behaviour towards behavioural policies (standardised coefficient = .54, p < .001, 
Adjusted R-square = 18%). This suggests that when examining adverse impacts of 
climate change and its anthropogenic causes alone, the more that climate scientists 
perceive that climate change is likely to have impacts on human wellbeing, such as 
through food production or health, the more they tend to support behavioural 
policies.  
However, when including variables that measure perceptions of policy effectiveness 
and feasibility into the model, adverse impacts of climate change in the form of 
destructive weather incidences, wellbeing-related impacts, and anthropogenic causes 
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of climate change significantly explain scientists’ support for behavioural policies 
(Model 2, Table 12). Specifically, the more the scientists believe in adverse impacts 
of climate change on human wellbeing and the more they perceive that humans are 
responsible for causing climate change, the more they support these policies. 
However, the belief in the effects of climate change in the form of destructive 
weather incidences is negatively correlated with level of support for behavioural 
policies (standardised coefficient = -.24, p < .05). 
Noticeably, the perceptions of policy effectiveness are dominant (compared to PI and 
PA variables) in explaining support for behavioural policies. The more scientists 
believe in the effectiveness of behavioural policies, the more they are likely to 
support the policies (standardised coefficient = .63, p < .001). On the contrary, 
scientists are less likely to support behavioural policies if they believe in the 
effectiveness of structural initiatives (standardised coefficient = -.25, p < .05). 
Among the two facets of perceived policy feasibility, only behavioural policies’ 
feasibility is statistically significant (standardised coefficient = .19, p < .05) whilst 
structural policies’ feasibility is not. The inclusion of policy-related attitudes such as 
policy effectiveness and feasibility helps increase the explained sample variation to 
35%. Demographics such as gender, age, working location (state), and field of 
expertise do not have statistically significant impacts on the scientists’ support for 
behavioural policies (F-change = .40, p = .81). 
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Table 12: Main effect results – Dependent variable: Support for Behavioural 
policies (The climate scientist sample) 
 
Dependent variable: Support for Behavioural 
policies (PS-BEH)
 
 
Model 1 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
Model 2 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
Model 3 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
(Constant)    
Perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change – Wellbeing (PI-WEB) .54*** (.08) .41*** (.07) .42*** (.08) 
Perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change – Weather (PI-WEA) -.14 (.07) -.24* (.06) -.25* (.07) 
Perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change – Sea-level rises (PI-SEA) -.14 (.05) -.10 (.04) -.11 (.05) 
Perceived anthropogenic causes of climate 
change (PA) .13 (.06) .17* (.06) .18* (.06) 
Perceived Effectiveness –  
Behavioural policies (PE-BEH)  .63*** (.07) .60*** (.07) 
Perceived Feasibility –  
Behavioural policies (PF-BEH)  .19* (.07) .18* (.07) 
Perceived Effectiveness –  
Structural policies (PE-STR)  -.25* (.08) -.22 (.08) 
Perceived Feasibility –  
Structural policies (PF-STR)  -.15 (.06) -.14 (.06) 
Demographics
    
 Gender (female=1)   -.05 (.09) 
 Age   -.04 (.04) 
 State   .06 (.02) 
 Field of expertise   -.03 (.05) 
F (df) 
8.40*** (139) 10.31** (139) 6.88*** 
(139) 
R-square .20 .39 .39 
Adjusted R-square .18 .35 .34 
Change statistics 
    
 R-square change .20 .19 .01 
 F change (df1, df2) 8.40***  
(4, 135) 
9.99*** 
(4, 131) 
0.40 
(4, 127) 
a Standardised coefficients  
b *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, all are two-tailed tests, n = 140 
S.E. = Standard Error 
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5.4.3.2 Effects of perceived adverse impacts of climate change (PI) and 
anthropogenic causes of climate change (PA) on support for structural 
policies (PS-STR) 
The variables that measure perceived adverse impacts of climate change, and the 
anthropogenic causes of it, are statistically significant in explaining the scientists’ 
support for structural policies (Model 4, Table 13). The more scientists perceive that 
climate change is likely to impact human’s wellbeing, to increase sea levels, and that 
human beings are responsible, the more they support structural policies (respectively, 
standardised coefficients = .32, p <.01; .18, p < .05; .2, p < .05). On the contrary, 
climate scientists are less likely to support structural policies once they believe that 
climate change induces destructive weather incidences (standardised coefficient = -
.27, p < .05). 
As with the case of behavioural policies, once introducing policy-related attitude 
variables such as perceived policy effectiveness and feasibility, the influences of PI 
and PA variables on policy support are changed (Model 5, Table 13). Only wellbeing 
and weather incidence induced climate change impacts are statistically significant 
(respectively, standardised coefficients = .25, p <.05; -.31, p < .01). The inclusion of 
policy effectiveness and feasibility helps increase the explained sample variation 
from 10% to 35%. 
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Table 13: Main effect results – Dependent variable: Support for Structural 
policies (The climate scientist sample) 
 
Dependent variable: Support for Structural 
policies (PS-STR)
 
 
Model 4 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
Model 5 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
Model 6 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
(Constant)    
Perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change  – Wellbeing (PI-WEB) .32** (.07) .25* (.07) .29* (.07) 
Perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change – Weather (PI-WEA) -.27* (.07) -.31** (.06) -.34** (.06) 
Perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change – Sea-level (PI-SEA) .18* (.04) .07 (.04) .06 (.04) 
Perceived anthropogenic causes of climate 
change (PA) .21* (.06) .06 (.05) .03 (.06) 
Perceived Effectiveness – 
Behavioural policies (PE-BEH)  -.25* (.07) -.26* (.07) 
Perceived Feasibility –  
Behavioural policies (PF-BEH)  .01 (.06) -.01 (.06) 
Perceived Effectiveness –  
Structural policies (PE-STR)  .71*** (.07) .75*** (.07) 
Perceived Feasibility –  
Structural policies (PF-STR)  .00 (.06) .01 (.06) 
Demographics
    
 Gender (female=1)   -.11 (.08) 
 Age   -.01 (.04) 
 State   .01 (.02) 
 Field of expertise   .13 (.04) 
F (df) 5.06*** (139) 9.65*** (139) 6.85*** (139) 
R-square .13 .37 .39 
Adjusted R-square .10 .33 .34 
Change statistics 
    
 R-square change .13 .24 .02 
 F change (df1, df2) 
5.06*** 
(4, 135) 
12.51*** 
(4, 131) 
1.16 
(4, 127) 
a Standardised coefficients  
b *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, all are two-tailed tests, n = 140 
S.E. = Standard Error 
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The influences of policy-related attitude variables on the level of policy support 
found in the case of behavioural policies were mostly repeated when the study 
examined structural ones. The variable of perceived policy effectiveness has the 
greatest impact on the scientists’ support for structural policies. The more they 
believe in the effectiveness of structural policies, the more they are likely to support 
the policies (standardised coefficient = .71, p < .001).  
The belief in the effectiveness of behavioural policies is negatively correlated with 
the level of support for structural policies (standardised coefficient = -.25 p < .05). 
Nevertheless, policy feasibility does not impact policy support in the case of 
structural policies, although it does in the case of behavioural policies. Regarding 
demographics, this study could not conclude any influence on the climate scientists’ 
support for structural policies (F-change = 1.16, p = .33). 
5.4.3.3 Mediating effect results 
This study examined the mediating effects of perceived policy effectiveness (PE) on 
the links between adverse impacts of climate change on human wellbeing (PI-WEB) 
and policy support for two reasons. First, the Extended Parallel Process Model 
(EPPM) (Witte 1992) and the Risk Attitude Perception (RAP) framework lend 
support to this approach (please see more detail in Chapter Two – the analytical 
framework). Second, among the examined variables, only the PE and PI-WEB 
positively and consistently drive support for both behavioural and structural policies, 
as also found in the earlier investigations. Therefore, this study more closely 
investigated these mediating effects through the following two case studies. 
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Case One: Behavioural policy effectiveness (PE-BEH) mediates the link 
between perceived adverse impacts of climate change on human wellbeing 
(PI-WEB) and behavioural policy support (PS-BEH). 
The results show that behavioural policy effectiveness partially mediates the link 
between perceived adverse impacts of climate change on human wellbeing and 
support for those policies (Figure 14).  
 
Figure 14: Mediating effect of behavioural policy effectiveness on the link 
between perceived adverse impacts of climate change on human wellbeing and 
policy support. 
 
 
PI-WEB significantly explains PE-BEH (a = .54***, R-square = .25, F (1, 138) = 
45.48, p <. 001). PI-WEB is also statistically significant in explaining the scientists 
support for behavioural policies when controlling for those policies’ effectiveness (b 
= .27***, c = direct effect = .13*, R-square = .30, F (2, 137) = 29.06, p <. 001). The 
bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval yields a statistically significant indirect 
effect of PI-WEB on PS-BEH (indirect effect = .15, SE = .06, Lower level confidence 
interval = .09, Upper level confidence interval = .22). 
 
Perceived Effectiveness – 
Behavioural policies  
(PE-BEH) 
Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change - Wellbeing 
(PI-WEB) 
Policy Support –  
Behavioural Policies 
(PS-BEH) 
 
a = .54 *** b = .27*** 
c = .13* 
All displayed coefficients are unstandardised; *p <. 05; **p <. 01; ***p <. 001 
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Case Two: Structural policy effectiveness (PE-STR) mediates the link 
between perceived adverse impacts of climate change on human wellbeing 
(PI-WEB) and structural policy support (PS-STR). 
Whilst this study detects a partial mediating role of policy effectiveness in the case of 
behavioural policies, examining the structural policies reveals that their effectiveness 
fully mediates the link between perceived adverse impacts of climate change on 
human wellbeing and support for those policies. This is concluded because paths a 
and b are statistically significant whereas the path c is not (Figure 15).  
Figure 15: Mediating effect of structural policy effectiveness on the link between 
perceived adverse impacts of climate change on human wellbeing and policy 
support. 
 
PI-WEB significantly explains PE-STR (a = .41***, R-square = .16, F (1, 138) = 
27.02, p <. 001). However, it is not statistically significant when PI-WEB and PE-
STR were included to explain PS-STR (b = .34***, c = direct effect = .01, R-square 
= .30, F (2, 137) = 28.77, p <. 001). The indirect effect of PI-WEB to PS-STR is 
statistically significant as determined by the bias-corrected bootstrap confidence 
Perceived Effectiveness – 
Structural policies  
(PE-STR) 
Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change - Wellbeing 
(PI-WEB) 
Policy Support –  
Structural Policies 
(PS-STR) 
 
a = .41 *** b = .34*** 
c = .01 
(insignificant) 
All displayed coefficients are unstandardised; *p <. 05; **p <. 01; ***p <. 001 
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(indirect effect = .14, SE=.04, Lower level confidence interval = .08, Upper level 
confidence interval = .23). 
5.4.3.4 Moderating effect results 
For the same reasons for examining the mediating effects described above, this study 
also investigated the following two cases of moderating effects. 
Case Three: Perceived adverse impacts of climate change on human 
wellbeing (PI-WEB) moderates the link between behavioural policy 
effectiveness (PE-BEH) and behavioural policy support (PS-BEH). 
The results reveal that PI-WEB moderates the relationship between perceived 
behavioural policy effectiveness and support for the policies (∆R-square = .05,             
∆F (1,126) = 10.14, p < .001) (Model 7, Table 14). The interaction term of PI-WEB 
and PE-BEH is statistically significant in explaining the support for behavioural 
policies (unstandardised coefficient = -.18, p < .001). To understand in more detail 
the confirmed moderating effect, this study further examined simple slopes of the 
PE-BEH – PS-BEH relationship. 
The slope coefficient of the PE-BEH – PS-BEH linear relationship at the low PI-
WEB group (10th percentile value) is .57 (SE = .09, p < .001), and at the moderate 
PI-WEB group (50th percentile value) is reduced to .38 (SE = .07, p < .001). 
However, the slope coefficient is not statistically significant at the high PI-WEB 
group (90th percentile value) (SE= .10, p = .097), although the slope coefficient at the 
75th percentile value of PI-WEB is significant (coefficient = .28, SE= .08, p < .001). 
This indicates that the perceived adverse impacts of climate change on human 
wellbeing negatively moderates the link between perceived effectiveness of 
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behavioural policies and support for those policies. However, this claim does not 
hold at the high PI-WEB group (90th percentile value). 
Case Four: Perceived adverse impacts of climate change on human 
wellbeing (PI-WEB) moderates the link between structural policy 
effectiveness (PE-STR) and structural policy support (PS-STR).  
This study also found a statistically significant moderating effect of PI-WEB on the 
link between policy effectiveness and policy support when examining structural 
policies (∆R-square = .03, ∆F (1,126) = 6.98, p < .001) (Model 8, Table 14). The 
interaction term of PI-WEB and PE-STR is statistically significant in explaining 
structural policy support (unstandardised coefficient = -.15, p < .001). Examining 
simple slopes suggests that perceived adverse impacts of climate change on human 
wellbeing also negatively moderates the link between structural policy effectiveness 
and support for those policies. This claim holds for all the examined points of PE-
WEB (10th, 50th, 90th percentile values). The slope coefficient of the relationship is 
.61 at the low PI-WEB group (10th percentile value) (SE = .09, p < .001). It is 
reduced to .44 (SE = .07, p < .001) at the moderate PI-WEB group (50th percentile 
value). The slope coefficient further declines to .27 (SE = .10, p < .001) at the high 
group of PE-WEB (90th percentile value). 
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Table 14: Moderating effect results (The climate scientist sample) 
 
Dependent variable: 
Support for 
Behavioural policies
 
Dependent variable: 
Support for  
Structural policies
 
 
Model 7 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
Model 8 
Betaa, b (S.E.)
 
(Constant)   
Perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change – Wellbeing (PI-WEB) .29*** (.08) .18* (.07)  
Perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change – Weather (PI-WEA) -.16* (.06) -.20** (.06) 
Perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change – Sea level (PI-SEA) -.03 (.04) .05 (.04) 
Perceived anthropogenic causes of 
climate change (PA) .14* (.06) .03 (.06) 
Perceived Effectiveness –  
Behavioural policies (PE-BEH) .37*** (.07) -.11 (.07) 
Perceived Feasibility –  
Behavioural policies (PF-BEH) .16* (.06) .00 (.06) 
Perceived Effectiveness –  
Structural policies (PE-STR) -.12 (.08) .44*** (.07) 
Perceived Feasibility –  
Structural policies (PF-STR) -.11 (.06) .01 (.06) 
PI-WEB x PE-BEH -.18*** (.06)  
PI-WEB x PE-STR  -.15** (.06)  
Demographics
   
 Gender (female=1) -.05 (.09) -.10 (.08) 
 Age .00 (.04) .00 (.04) 
 State .01 (.02) -.01 (.02) 
 Field of expertise -.02 (.05) .07 (.04) 
F (df1, df2) 7.59*** (13, 126) 7.16*** (13, 126) 
R-square .44 .42 
Adjusted R-square   
Change statistics c
   
 R-square change .05 .03 
 F change (df1, df2) 10.14*** (1, 126) 6.98** (1, 126) 
a Unstandardised coefficients, independent and moderating variables were mean-centred, n = 140  
b *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, all are two-tailed tests 
c Compared to the model without the interaction term; S.E.= Standard Error  
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5.5 Discussion 
The descriptive analyses revealed differences between the general public and climate 
scientists in their attitudes towards adverse impacts of climate change, evaluations of 
mitigation policies, and policy preferences. The following section will provide 
insights into these differences and discuss their relevance to the literature.   
5.5.1 Contrasting the general public and climate scientists 
5.5.1.1 The differences in the perceived adverse impacts of climate change  
A noticeable pattern was found when comparing lay people and climate scientists’ 
perceptions of adverse impacts of climate change, in that the former tended to more 
concerned about most impacts than the latter. The only exception was that climate 
scientists expressed more concern regarding sea-level rises compared to the general 
public. Moreover, a more profound difference in attitudes towards adverse impacts 
was found between lay people and climate experts when contrasting the PI 
constructs’ EFA structures. 
Factor analyses from the sample of the Australian general public found a structure of 
two factors of PI, which are labelled as high-critical and low-critical impacts. The 
difference between the two factors is that the high-critical impacts touch on more 
critical and explicit damage from climate change on human wellbeing, such as on 
food and water availabilities, health and personal income. Whereas the low-critical 
impacts include effects that may be indirect and/or only recognised in the long-run, 
such as impacts on biodiversity. On the other hand, a similar procedure using the 
sample of climate scientists yielded a three-factor result. Climate scientists classified 
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the impacts into three facets: effects on human wellbeing; extreme weather; and sea-
level rises. 
These differences imply that lay individuals are concerned as to whether or not 
climate change will impact their basic livelihood, and therefore perceived the 
impacts as either high or low critical ones. This “personal concern” emotional aspect 
is probably embedded into the public’s perception of adverse impacts of climate 
change (Linden & Sander 2014). Conversely, climate scientists’ categorisation of the 
impacts may be emotion-free. This chapter found that the climate scientists’ 
classification of the adverse impacts of climate change endorses findings of scientific 
reports such as from the CSIRO (Hennessy 2011). This report structured the adverse 
impacts into climate extremes and health, whilst sea-level rise is predicted to have 
significant impacts on almost every important facet of Australia’s development, 
including the economy, infrastructure and biodiversity (Department of the 
Environment and Heritage 2003; Hennessy 2011). 
5.5.1.2 The differences in mitigation policy evaluations and preferences 
Regarding evaluations of mitigation initiatives, the most noticeable difference 
between the general public and climate scientists is related to carbon-related 
structural policies such as the carbon tax. There are significant gaps in perceptions of 
the carbon tax’s effectiveness and feasibility between these two groups. Lay people 
consider the carbon tax least effective in mitigating climate change, whilst the 
scientists rank its effectiveness as second, just after the renewable energy initiative. 
The general public believe the carbon tax is the most feasible policy with regard to 
implementation, however, the scientists consider it the third least feasible mitigation 
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action. These divergences are associated with the differences found in the two 
samples’ support level towards the carbon tax. 
These differences probably reflect the imperfect flow of climate change information 
from the “knowledge pool” of climate scientists, to the end-users of the information, 
lay people (Weingart, Engels & Pansegrau 2000). Scientists believe carbon taxes are 
among the most effective market-based tools to reduce carbon emissions (Elkins & 
Baker 2001). The economic foundation is that pricing carbon emissions, such as 
through the implementation of a carbon tax, will encourage polluters to reduce their 
carbon footprint because their efforts in curbing emissions are rewarded financially.  
However, the ways the Australian Federal Government designed and implemented 
the carbon tax, Emissions Trading Scheme, and earlier the Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme departed from scientists’ recommendations, including those of 
Garnaut (2008) and Stern (2006). Instead of directing the economy to reduce the 
overall carbon footprint, the government’s generous subsidies for industries, freely 
allocated carbon emission permits, and fixed carbon price gave incentives for big 
polluters not to cut carbon emissions while transferring the carbon-tax-induced costs 
to consumers (Spash & Lo 2012). The Clean Energy Program used government 
funds to support industry in closing high carbon emitting plants instead of 
encouraging investments in renewable energy (Lo & Spash 2012). These 
observations suggest that recommendations regarding carbon pricing from scientists 
were only partially applied (Burgmann & Baer 2012), and that consequently 
Australia was implementing a watered-down carbon pricing tool. The media helped 
spread this picture (Hannam 2014) and partially contributes to a public perception of 
low effectiveness of the carbon tax in reducing carbon emissions.  
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Moreover, the differences between climate scientists and the general publics’ 
perceptions of the feasibility of the carbon tax are probably related to the different 
aspects of the policy they focus on. The general public may gauge the policy’s 
feasibility in administrations term. In fact, administering a carbon tax is easy and not 
costly (Elkins & Baker 2001). However, the experts may consider other aspects. 
They may believe that social reaction to the carbon tax is a significant barrier to the 
carbon tax implementation, especially when the general public only focus on their 
personal interests rather than climate change mitigations. This perspective is 
supported by the Social Dilemma literature, which predicts that individuals who 
consider their personal interests most will not sacrifice (e.g., pay higher electric bills) 
to protect the common goods (e.g., to reduce carbon emissions) (Wiener & Doescher 
1991). 
5.5.2 The influences of perceived adverse impacts and anthropogenic causes 
of climate change on policy support from the perspective of climate 
scientists 
Influences of the perceived adverse impacts of climate change on policy support vary 
along the two domains of climate change mitigation policies. Climate scientists 
perceive adverse impacts of climate change in three facets: on human wellbeing such 
as food and water availability, income and health; through destructive weather 
incidences; and sea-level rises. Among the three domains, only the factor of adverse 
impacts on human wellbeing consistently relates to scientists' support for both 
behavioural and structural policies. The influences of the other two factors of climate 
change adverse impacts only become statistically significant when examining 
structural policy support. The fundamental difference between the two domains of 
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policies as suggested by the Social Dilemma literature, that is, mandatory (structural 
policies) versus voluntary (behavioural policies), could clarify the variation in the 
effects of the perceived adverse impacts of climate change on mitigation policy 
support. 
According to the Social Dilemma literature, behavioural policies do not require 
individuals to sacrifice their personal interest to resolve the social dilemma of 
climate change mitigation. On the contrary, structural policies are usually mandatory 
which require all society members to sacrifice (such as the carbon tax does) to 
mitigate climate change (Wiener & Doescher 1991). Therefore, behavioural policies 
could be more easily accepted by society than structural ones, once individuals 
consider a cost-benefit analysis. Individuals may also not support structural policies 
should they perceive that their personal interests will not be directly affected if the 
social dilemma fails to be resolved. However, one disadvantage of behavioural 
policies compared to structural ones is that they are less likely to ensure the social 
dilemma will be resolved. Individuals may or may not take voluntary actions even if 
behavioural policies are in place. One of the barriers causing this reluctance is 
‘mistrust’ (Wiener & Doescher 1991, p. 42). That is, individuals who voluntarily 
sacrifice to mitigate climate change might not believe that other society members 
will also cooperate. Thus, structural policies are needed if all of a society members’ 
participation is required to resolve a social dilemma, and when not all society 
members are affected if the dilemma fails to be resolved. 
The adverse impacts of climate change will continue if we fail to resolve the social 
dilemma of climate change. Different attitudes towards these adverse impacts could 
determine the preference for behavioural or structural policies to resolve the social 
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dilemma. Climate scientists believe that direct influences of climate change, such as 
on human wellbeing, are enough to trigger both behavioural and structural policy 
support. Individuals would act promptly to adverse impacts of climate change on 
their livelihood. However, as discussed earlier, to mitigate impacts which are longer 
term, and that have less direct impacts on individuals, structural policies are needed. 
Sea-level rises, for instance, is an impact which would be less likely to directly affect 
all individuals, but mostly those living in low areas. Consequently, for people who 
are not residents of coastal areas, sea-level rises resulting from climate change may 
not harm their livelihood. Therefore, these individuals are less likely to sacrifice, that 
is support structural policies, to mitigate this adverse impact of climate change. 
However, from the perspective of climate scientists, sea-level rises are among the 
most serious adverse impacts of climate change, and will affect many important 
facets such as biodiversity, the economy and infrastructure (Department of the 
Environment and Heritage 2003; Kevin 2011; Parry 2007; Preston & Jones 2006).  
The potential for the general public to privilege personal benefits may explain why 
the sample of climate scientists did not indicate that behavioural policies would be 
successful in mitigating sea-level rise as an impact of climate change. Instead, the 
data indicates that they believe only structural policies will be successful in ensuring 
all society members make sufficient sacrifices. This could explain why the results 
reveal that climate scientists consider sea level rise as a trigger for structural policy 
support. Only mandatory actions such as structural policies can resolve perceived 
prolonged and indirect adverse impacts, such as sea-level rises.  
Interestingly, the sample of climate scientists considered extreme weather to be a 
discouraging factor in their support for structural policies. Perhaps they are still 
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unsure about the correlation between climate change and extreme weather events. 
Many climate scientists believe that further long-term observations are needed to 
examine this correlation (Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 2011). 
Consequently, the scientists may not be confident enough to communicate 
destructive weather incidences as a means of stimulating public support for structural 
policies. 
It is noticeable that the variable of perceived anthropogenic causes of climate change 
is also statistically significant in explaining the support for structural policies. This 
implies that the scientists consider moral responsibility a useful driver for 
encouraging individuals to sacrifice to mitigate climate change. This endorses earlier 
research which confirms that the belief in the anthropogenic causes of climate 
change positively drives individuals’ engagement in climate change mitigation 
activities (Aitken, Chapman & McClure 2011; O’Connor, Bord & Fisher 1999; 
Sibley & Kurz 2013). 
5.5.3 The influences of perceived policy effectiveness on policy support  
The results show that the policy effectiveness variables are salient in explaining 
policy support. Noticeably, their influence on the dependent variables varies 
according to the policy domains. In the cases of both behavioural and structural 
policies, the regression coefficients of the policy effectiveness variables are larger 
compared to those of the other variables, such as perceived adverse impacts and 
anthropogenic causes. Once the scientists believe in the effectiveness of one domain 
of the policies, they are likely to support that policy domain and oppose the other. 
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The above results confirm that scientists recognise the importance of policy 
effectiveness in encouraging support for climate change mitigation policies. The data 
from the sample of climate scientists also suggests that over-stressing a particular 
domain of policies in terms of effectiveness may harm support for other types of 
policies. This finding is important for policymakers who are trying to stimulate 
public support for structural policies, which are less likely to gain public acceptance 
than behavioural policies. Moreover, this chapter’s findings of mediating and 
moderating effects help further understand the mechanism through which policy 
effectiveness drives policy support, and the interaction effect between perceived 
adverse impacts of climate change and policy effectiveness. 
Examining the mediating effects shows a complex dynamic through which policy 
effectiveness drives policy support. Policy effectiveness fully mediates the 
relationship between the adverse impacts of climate change and support for structural 
policies. This implies that from the perspective of the climate scientists, individuals 
will only translate the perception of adverse impacts of climate change into support 
for structural policies once they consider the policies’ effectiveness. On the contrary, 
policy effectiveness only partially mediates the link between climate change impacts 
and support for behavioural policies. This implies that the adverse impacts of climate 
change have both direct and indirect influences on support for non-sacrifice-
requiring policies. The climate scientists believe individuals will only sacrifice to 
ameliorate climate change risks (support structural policies) once they are persuaded 
that their sacrifice can resolve issues. The scientists also believe that individuals 
would take voluntary actions to mitigate adverse impacts of climate change (support 
behavioural policies) with or without considering these initiatives’ effectiveness.  
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The moderating effect results suggest that excessive communication of the adverse 
impacts of climate change could harm the positive effect of policy effectiveness on 
policy support, although this factor can also be translated into policy support. 
Moreover, it is important to remember the confirmed dominance of policy 
effectiveness in explaining public support for climate change mitigation policies. 
Consequently, the climate scientists may believe that the inclusion of information 
about climate change impacts is necessary in early stages of climate change 
communication. It helps attract the public’s attention to the need for climate change 
mitigation. However, the effectiveness of policy should be more empathised to 
stimulate support for climate change mitigation policies. 
5.5.4 Suggestions for bridging the gaps in attitudes towards climate change 
and mitigation engagement between lay audiences and experts 
If one pictures climate change communication as a stream of climate change 
knowledge, then climate scientists are upstream. They find evidence of human-
induced climate change, predict possible adverse impacts of it on human wellbeing, 
and guide our mitigation efforts. Nevertheless, the flow of climate change 
information is nonlinear. Many other stakeholders are involved in climate change 
conversations, such as politicians and journalists, whose interpretations of 
knowledge may depart from its scientific meanings (Weingart, Engels & Pansegrau 
2000). Consequently, the end-users of the information, lay people, who are 
downstream in the communication flow, are likely to receive distorted information. 
This imperfect communication has created divergences in climate change knowledge 
(e.g., causes of climate change) between lay people and scientists (Fransson & 
Gärling 1999; Kempton 1993; O’Connor et al. 2002; Viscusi & Zeckhauser 2006), 
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which is slowing down responsive actions (Sterman & Sweeney 2007). However, it 
is not only the “knowledge gaps” that have delayed our mitigation actions, but also 
attitudinal differences. This study contributes to the literature by offering empirical 
evidence for this assertion. 
Although Australians consider climate scientists as the most trusted source of climate 
change information (Buys et al. 2012; Leviston & Walker 2011b), this study found 
that the two samples have different perceptions regarding climate change’s adverse 
impacts and mitigation policies. These differences perhaps result from the way 
climate change information is produced (by the scientists) and consumed (by the 
general public). 
It is assumed that scientists would most value and strive for scientific clarity (e.g., 
evidence-based and emotion-free) in any information they give and receive. On the 
other hand, the general public’s ultimate interpretations of information are influenced 
by psychological factors, such as “personal concern” (Linden & Sander 2014). 
Taking the difference in the concern of sea-level rises as an example, this study 
found that the general public perceive the impact to be less of a concern than the 
climate scientists. However, lay people are more concerned about other impacts 
considered in this study, such as on health, food and water availability, and personal 
incomes. This is perhaps because not all of the lay participants could relate sea-level 
rises to their personal interests. What should climate scientists do to resolve the 
issue? 
This study also found that educational initiatives are perceived by both the samples 
as effective in mitigating climate change. Education may be also helpful in 
calibrating attitudinal gaps, such as differences in the perceptions of adverse impacts 
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of climate change. For this reason, scientists are encouraged to translate scientific 
facts into ‘concrete experiences’ from which lay audiences can connect their 
personal concerns into the emotionless facts (Shome, D. et al. 2009, p. 14). Scientists 
may want to further explain the extent to which the impact of sea-level rises will 
affect a general audience’s personal interests, rather than only those who are 
residents of coastal areas. However, whilst the “knowledge gaps” or this study’s 
“attitudinal gaps” may be recalibrated by reframing scientific facts (Shome, D. et al. 
2009), blurring the differences in attitudes towards mitigation policies between the 
two samples requires more than the efforts of scientists, but also input from other 
important communicators such as politicians and the media (Weingart, Engels & 
Pansegrau 2000). 
Considering climate scientists as “bias-free” individuals (whose ultimate desires are 
not to preserve personal interests but mitigate climate change), this investigation into 
factors driving their support for mitigation policies provides suggestions for 
improving the effectiveness of climate change mitigation communication. It is 
concluded that policy effectiveness is a salient factor in driving support for climate 
change mitigation policies, although the perceived adverse impacts of climate change 
is also important from the perspectives of climate scientists. Perceived policy 
effectiveness is the “gatekeeper” for the influence of perceived adverse impacts on 
policy support, especially on sacrifice-requiring mitigation initiatives. This implies, 
according to the scientists, that to encourage the public’s engagement with policies 
such as the carbon tax or Emissions Trading Scheme, policymakers should 
communicate the adverse impacts of climate change to raise the public’s awareness 
of the issue. On the other hand, the extent to which policies help to effectively reduce 
carbon emissions should also be conveyed. Otherwise, the heightened awareness 
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would be less likely to be translated into public support for the policies. Moreover, 
this study found interaction effects between policy effectiveness and perceived 
adverse impacts, in which the latter curbs the stimulating effect of the former on 
policy support. This again cautions against the overuse of the “fear appeal” 
communication approach (Linden & Sander 2014; Shome, D. et al. 2009; Witte 
1992).  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Overview 
The global scientific community agrees that climate change is a reality. It is also 
generally agreed that human activities contribute to this climate change 
(Ramaswamy et al. 2006; Santer et al. 2003; Santer, Taylor & Penner 1995), and that 
the cost of ignoring this risk is higher than the cost of mitigating it (Garnaut 2008; 
Preston & Jones 2006). Therefore, we may not have the luxury of further delaying 
taking action against climate change. Unfortunately, Australia, and many other 
nations, are still struggling to garner public support for mitigation policies which is 
essential for any climate action to be successful. What drives public support for 
mitigation initiatives? This has been an important, challenging, yet inadequately 
studied question in the literature. The current thesis aims to contribute to this body of 
knowledge. 
The literature has shown that beliefs in anthropogenic causes of climate change, and 
in its adverse impacts, are among important factors driving public support for 
mitigation policies. However, these two factors alone seem to be insufficient to 
encourage public support for tough and effective mitigation policies. The carbon tax 
in Australia illustrates this argument. A majority of the Australian public are climate 
change believers who demonstrate a high awareness of the anthropogenic causes of 
climate change, and perceive the risks from climate change (Australian Research 
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Group 2007; Burgmann & Baer 2012; Climate Institute 2014; Connor & Stefanova 
2012; Stefanova 2013). However, only 36% of Australians indicated that they were 
willing to support the carbon tax (Hanson 2012), partially leading to the withdrawal 
of this initiative. It has been argued that one of the reasons for this inadequate public 
support may have been the perception of limited effectiveness of the carbon tax in 
curbing carbon emissions (Hannam 2014; Lo & Spash 2012; Spash & Lo 2012). 
However, the literature has largely ignored the role of this determinant of public 
support for mitigation policies in academic discussions. 
This thesis therefore incorporated the role of perceived policy effectiveness in 
existing models of policy support behaviour based solely on the influence of 
perceived adverse impacts of climate change. It also considered other determinants 
such as perceived anthropogenic causes of climate change, and perceived feasibility 
of climate change mitigation policies. The aim of the thesis was to investigate public 
support for mitigation policies, especially in cases where the general public seems to 
have a high awareness of climate change issues, yet public support for tough 
mitigation policies is limited. 
Chapter Two built an analytical framework which provided the theoretical rationale 
for the direct influences of the determinants in question on public support for 
mitigation policies. The analytical framework also argued for four drivers of public 
support for mitigation policies, perceived adverse impacts of climate change, 
perceived anthropogenic causes of climate change, perceived effectiveness of 
mitigation policies, and perceived feasibility of the policies, proposing mediating and 
moderating mechanisms. Chapter Three and Chapter Four of the thesis tested the 
analytical framework with a survey sample of Australian climate change believers. 
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The data supported most of the analytical framework’s hypothesises, but the 
influences of perceived policy feasibility on individuals’ support for mitigation 
policies seemed weak and inconsistent. Notably, the chapters highlighted the role of 
perceived policy effectiveness, which is more significant than previously thought. 
Taking into account factorial structures of the constructs in question, Chapter Three 
and Chapter Four reveal a complex dynamic through which the determinants in 
question drive public support for mitigation policies. This study also found evidence 
for the hypothesised mediating and moderating effects. This helps provide important 
suggestions for better utilising the determinants in question to stimulate public 
support for mitigation policies. The empirical findings also endorse and extend the 
Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) to be more applicable in the context of 
climate change communication. Chapters Two, Three, and Chapter Four examined 
the first three research questions of the thesis: 
 Research Question One: What drives public support for climate change 
mitigation policies? 
 Research Question Two: Compared to perceived adverse impacts of climate 
change, what role does perceived policy effectiveness play in driving 
mitigation policy support behaviour? 
 Research Question Three: To what extent do the determinants of the 
support behaviour influence each other when explaining the identified 
behaviour? 
 
The thesis also sought to take into account possible attitudinal differences between 
two important stakeholders in climate change communications, the general public 
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and climate scientists, with the view to determining obstructions in climate change 
communications regarding the adverse impacts of climate change and mitigation 
policies. Chapter Five contrasted data from the Australian general public sample with 
that from a sample of climate scientists to examine these attitudinal gaps. The 
identified gaps help partially explain the reluctance of Australian climate change 
believers to support mitigation policies. Chapter Five also tested the analytical 
framework from Chapter Two through the climate scientist sample, highlighting 
ways to improve climate change communication, and to better encourage individuals 
to support mitigation policies. The findings from Chapter Five provide answers to 
the fourth and fifth research questions.  
 Research Question Four: What are the differences between the general 
public and climate scientists in attitudes towards climate change, evaluation 
of climate change mitigation policies, and support for them? 
 Research Question Five: What drives climate scientists’ support for climate 
change mitigation policies? 
Table 15 summarises the individual chapter’s conclusions according to the research 
questions. The remainder of this concluding chapter further elaborates on the 
findings and contributions of the thesis, and highlights suggestions for future 
research. 
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Table 15. A summary of the thesis’s conclusions 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
CONTRIBUTING CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Research Question One: 
What drives public support for 
climate change mitigation policies? 
 Contributing chapter: Chapter 
Two 
- Perceived adverse impacts of climate change (PI) and perceived anthropogenic causes of climate 
change (PA) are among common and well-evidenced determinants of public support for mitigation 
policies (PS).  
- Perceived policy effectiveness (PE) and feasibility (PF) are important but not adequately examined 
drivers of public support for mitigation policies. The roles of these two determinants are supported 
by the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1991) and the Social Dilemma literature (e.g., Wiener 
& Doescher 1991). 
- The thesis focuses on four determinants to explain PS: PI, PA, PE, and PF. 
- PI moderates the link between PE, PF and PS. It is also proposed that PE and PF are mediators of 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
CONTRIBUTING CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSIONS 
the link between PI and PS. These hypotheses are built upon the Extended Parallel Process Model 
(Witte 1994), and the Risk Perception Attitude framework (Rimal & Juon 2010). 
- Individuals’ support for mitigation policies also depends on the basic characteristics of mitigation 
initiatives, e.g., voluntary (behavioural) or mandatory (structural) aspects. The influences of the 
determinants of PS were examined across these two aspects of mitigation policies. 
- An analytical framework was developed to explain public support for climate change mitigation 
policies. 
 Research Question Two: 
Compared to perceived adverse 
impacts of climate change, what 
role does perceived policy 
- The analytical framework developed in Chapter Two was tested through a sample of 1,476 
Australian adults. 
-  The data suggest that PI, PA, and PE positively drive PS. However, the effect of PF on PS seems 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
CONTRIBUTING CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSIONS 
effectiveness play in driving 
mitigation policy support 
behaviour? 
 Contributing chapter: Chapter 
Three 
to be weak and inconsistent. 
- PE was found to be dominant over other determinants including PI. PE showed the largest 
regression coefficients in models predicting the four determinants’ influences on PS. This suggests 
that PE is among key drivers of public support for mitigation policies. 
- Participants’ support for mitigation policies varies according to the aspect from which the 
individuals perceived the adverse impacts of climate change (high-critical versus low-critical 
adverse impacts). Further, the influences of the determinants in question on PS were different 
across the two domains of mitigation policies (structural or behavioural initiatives). Therefore, the 
factorial structure of PI, and basic characteristics of mitigation policies should be taken into 
account when one studies public support for the initiatives. 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
CONTRIBUTING CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Research Question Three: 
To what extent do the determinants 
of the support behaviour influence 
each other when explaining the 
identified behaviour? 
 Contributing chapter: Chapter 
Four 
- Besides the independent effects of PI and PE on PS, the thesis concludes that the two determinants 
may influence each other when driving PS.  
- The impact of PF on PS is conditioned by PI. The PF – PS linkage may be weakened if PI gets 
stronger. In other words, the more participants believe in the adverse impacts of climate change, 
the weaker the PE – PS link would become. 
- PE is a mediator of the relationship between PI and PS. Thus, while PI is important in raising 
awareness of climate change issues, policy effectiveness is the key to individuals’ support for 
mitigation policies, especially structural ones such as the carbon tax.  
- The Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM), and the Risk Perception Attitude (RPA) framework 
were applicable in the context of climate change communication. This research expanded the 
EPPM and RPA by suggesting that the nature of risk ameliorating solutions should be indicated. 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
CONTRIBUTING CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Research Question Four:  
What are the differences between 
the general public and climate 
scientists in attitudes towards 
climate change, evaluation of 
climate change mitigation policies, 
and support for them? 
 Contributing chapter: Chapter 
Five 
- Evidence of non-linearity in climate change communication was detected. There were significant 
gaps between the Australian general public and climate scientists in their perceptions of the 
adverse impacts of climate change, evaluations of mitigation policies, and level of support for 
initiatives. 
- Lay audiences’ perception of the adverse impacts of climate change seem to be more influenced by 
“personal concern”, whilst climate experts are likely to perceive impacts free of emotion and based 
on scientific evidence. This suggests why the general public are more concerned about livelihood-
relevant adverse impacts such as health, food and water availability, whilst the scientists are more 
concerned by sea-level rises.   
- There are significant gaps in perceptions of the carbon tax’s effectiveness and feasibility between 
these two groups. Lay people consider the carbon tax least effective, and most feasible of 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
CONTRIBUTING CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSIONS 
mitigation policies. On the contrary, scientists believe that tax as effective but not easily 
implemented. 
- These variations help explain the differences between the two groups’ support of mitigation 
policies such as the carbon tax. 
 Research Question Five:  
What drives climate scientists’ 
support for climate change 
mitigation policies?  
 Contributing chapter: Chapter 
Five 
- Testing Chapter Two’s analytical framework with the climate scientists sample found that PI, PA, 
PE are significant drivers of their support for mitigation policies. However, compared to the 
conclusions gained from the general public sample, there are important differences in the 
influences of the determinants on the climate scientists’ PS. 
- Climate scientists believe that direct influences of climate change, such as on human wellbeing, 
are enough to trigger both behavioural and structural policy support. However, to mitigate longer 
term impacts that have less direct effects on individuals, such as sea-level rises, structural policies 
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
CONTRIBUTING CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSIONS 
are needed.  
- The scientists consider policy effectiveness as key to stimulating support for mitigation policies, 
and that the influences of policy effectiveness on the dependent variables vary with the policy 
domains. The moderating and mediating patterns found in the sample of lay people were also 
found when examining the scientist group. 
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6.2 Examined Drivers of Public Support for Climate Change Mitigation 
Policies and How They Work 
This thesis examined four drivers of public support for mitigation policies: perceived 
adverse impacts of climate change, perceived policy effectiveness, perceived 
anthropogenic causes of climate change, and perceived policy feasibility. Amongst 
these results of the first two determinants provide the most notable conclusions. 
The thesis found an important role for perceived adverse impacts of climate change 
(PI) in explaining public support for mitigation policies and extends our 
understanding of this determinant. Chapter Three found evidence of the 
simplification of the perceived adverse impacts by the general public, which 
contradicts previous suggested factorial-structures of the variable such as in the well-
established Value – Belief – Norm (VBN) model (Stern et al. 1995). Exploratory 
analysis results revealed that the general public perceive adverse impacts in two 
categories high-critical and low-critical, with category attribution depending on the 
perceived likelihood that the impacts affect their wellbeing. On the other hand, the 
VBN model suggests that the PI construct may include three domains: altruistic 
(impacts on the others), egoistic (impacts on the individual), and biospheric (impacts 
on the non-human species). This thesis argues that perhaps because of the 
complexity of climate change and its impacts, lay individuals may classify these 
impacts into these two domains instead of the three suggested by the VBN model. 
Secondly, the proposed bi-factorial structure of the PI construct also provides insight 
into the effects of this construct on mitigation policy preferences. The analysis of the 
 158 
general public sample in Chapter Three suggests that impacts which are more likely 
to affect human wellbeing stimulate stronger support for sacrifice-requiring 
mitigation initiatives. This again highlights the role of personal interests in 
explaining support for structural policies, which is backed by the Social Dilemma 
literature. That is, individuals are willing to accept mandatory mitigation policies 
which require all of the community to sacrifice, in order to protect their personal 
interests. However individuals may want to ensure no “free-riders” can enjoy the 
benefits of climate change mitigation, while avoiding engaging in mitigation actions. 
This preference for structural policies might also reflect the general public’s desire 
for society-scaled collective actions to ameliorate high-critical adverse impacts of 
climate change on their wellbeing. 
Whilst the PI construct is well-documented in the literature, perceived policy 
effectiveness (PE) has not been adequately examined as a driver of public support for 
mitigation policies. This thesis draws some conclusions that help further 
understanding of the role of this construct. Among the determinants, perceived 
policy effectiveness was found to be the most salient factor in driving support 
behaviour, as concluded in Chapters Three and Four. The dominance of this 
construct is two-fold. First, the variable has robust regression coefficients compared 
to other determinants in question (Chapter Three’s findings), and second, it mediates 
the link between perceived adverse impacts of climate change and structural policy 
support behaviour (Chapter Four’s findings).  
These findings are surprising because there has been a general agreement that 
perceived adverse impacts of climate change (PI) is the most influential driver of 
public support for mitigation policies, and therefore the use of this construct in 
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stimulating public support is common (Linden & Sander 2014). However, the 
thesis’s findings suggest that an excessive focus on the risks of climate change in 
general, without also detailing risk ameliorating strategies, should be avoided 
(Shome, Debika et al. 2009). 
Of course determinants of support behaviour towards mitigation policies are not 
limited to the behavioural determinants that this thesis employed, however, the 
findings imply that policy effectiveness plays a more important role than previously 
thought. Perceived policy effectiveness is salient in transforming the general public’s 
high awareness of climate change issues into support for mitigation policies, 
including tough ones such as the carbon tax. The found mediating effect of policy 
effectiveness on the linkage between the general public’s perceived adverse impacts 
of climate change, and their support for mitigation policy, implies that policy 
effectiveness may be the key to encouraging people to make climate change 
mitigation related sacrifices. Consequently, policymakers may want to focus on this 
important construct if they are seeking to inspire the public to support structural 
solutions such as the carbon tax. Given that Australian Governments’ design and 
implementation process for the carbon tax, Emissions Trading Scheme, and the 
earlier Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, may have resulted in poor public 
perception of the policies’ effectiveness (Hannam 2014; Lo & Spash 2012; Spash & 
Lo 2012), it is imperative that government agencies should seek to more clearly 
communicate policy effectiveness parameters. By designing public information 
campaigns that emphasise policy effectiveness, this research suggests governments 
could increase public support for, and engagement with, climate change mitigation 
policies. 
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The research findings also highlight negative implications of the over-use of fear-
appeal approaches in climate change communication. This is demonstrated by the 
interaction effects between perceived adverse impacts of climate change and 
perceived policy effectiveness, especially when examining structural policies 
(Chapter Four’s findings). In cases where the effect was empirically proven, it was 
found that perceived adverse impacts of climate change weakens the link between 
perceived policy effectiveness and policy support. This again encourages a re-
focusing from adverse impacts of climate change to policy effectiveness in 
explaining public support for mitigation policies. 
 
6.3 The Influences of Fundamental Characteristics of Climate Change 
Mitigation Policies on Policy Preferences 
One important conclusion of this thesis is that the fundamental characteristics of 
climate change mitigation policies should be considered when explaining public 
support for the policies. Chapter Three’s exploratory factor analyses suggest that the 
general public may classify policies into two domains when making policy 
evaluations and determining preferences: structural policies and behavioural policies. 
Structural policies, such as the carbon tax, are sacrifice-requiring and mandatory. 
Behavioural mitigation policies are often incentivised to encourage voluntary 
actions. Government subsidies for renewable energy alternatives are an example of 
behavioural initiatives.  
The influences of the fundamental characteristics of mitigation policies imply that 
the general public considers their personal self-interests when deciding whether to 
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support policy initiatives. This is well supported by the Social Dilemma literature. 
According to this literature, taking into account the role of personal interest is 
important when encouraging individuals’ cooperation in social dilemma cases such 
as climate change mitigation (Wiener & Doescher 1991). Mitigating climate change 
requires collective efforts from every member of the society, whilst climate change 
may adversely impact them unequally. People whose livelihoods depend heavily on 
coastal areas might be more severely affected by sea-level rises than others. 
Consequently, individuals who are less likely to be adversely affected by climate 
change may be less motivated to engage in mitigation actions (which may be costly) 
on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, individuals who are likely to be 
adversely impacted by climate change still may not want to engage in mitigation 
actions as they might perceive their sacrifices through supporting structural policies 
are insufficient to ameliorate the risks of climate change, if others do not cooperate at 
the same level (Wiener & Doescher 1991).  
The Social Dilemma literature suggests ways to overcome these barriers depending 
on the characteristics of the cooperative solutions, which in this case are mitigation 
policies. For instance, to resolve the “sucker avoid” barrier the effectiveness of 
mitigation initiatives should be emphasised (Wiener & Doescher 1991). This thesis 
therefore urges for further applications of the Social Dilemma literature in studying 
public support for mitigation policies.  
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6.4 The Differences between Lay People and Climate Scientists 
This thesis found several important differences when contrasting the two samples of 
lay individuals and climate scientists. Chapter Five demonstrated that the two 
samples have different perceptions of the adverse impacts of climate change, 
especially in the way they conceptualise the impacts. For instance, lay individuals 
perceive the adverse impact of sea-level rises as less severe than climate experts do. 
Lay individuals may not categorise this impact as one likely to affect their wellbeing, 
whilst scientists believe sea-level rises are likely to have substantial adverse impacts, 
including on health and economic development (Hennessy 2011). 
The above mentioned differences between lay audience and scientist groups, through 
the direct linkage between perceived adverse impacts of climate change and 
mitigation policy support behaviour, may partially lead to divergences in mitigation 
policy preferences between the two groups. The general public may support 
structural policies (mandatory and sacrifice-requiring) as a means of addressing 
perceived high-critical adverse impacts of climate change (such as on food and water 
availability, health, and income). On the other hand, climate scientists may believe 
that these structural initiatives should be implemented to ameliorate more implicit 
and prolonged (from a lay perspective) adverse impacts such as sea-level rises.  
Therefore, this thesis argues there is a need to reduce the gap between the 
perceptions of the general public and climate scientists regarding the adverse impacts 
of climate change. This recommendation is based on the assumption that climate 
scientists’ ultimate purpose is to mitigate climate change, and as such their 
suggestions should be taken seriously. However, lay individuals may still prioritise 
their personal self-interests when considering which mitigation policies to support. 
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The challenge therefore is to clarify and connect implicit and prolonged adverse 
impacts of climate change, such as sea-level rises, to lay people’s personal interest 
domain (Shome, Debika et al. 2009). By doing this, we might be able to better direct 
public support to effective mitigation strategies.  
Chapter Five also found significant gaps between lay people and climate scientists in 
their perceptions of the effectiveness and feasibility of carbon-related mitigation 
initiatives such as the carbon tax. Direct links between perceived policy 
effectiveness, feasibility and policy support also seem to partially contribute to 
divergences in the two groups’ mitigation policy preferences. For instance, the 
general public is less likely to support carbon-related mitigation initiatives than 
climate scientists. These misalignments may also result from the nonlinearity of 
climate change communication, in which media, politicians, and business sectors are 
likely to distort climate change scientific information when it is transferred from 
climate scientists to lay audiences (Weingart, Engels & Pansegrau 2000).  
Addressing these varied policy evaluations and preferences requires the efforts of 
policymakers, rather than climate scientists. Scientists are still considered by lay 
people to be the most trusted source of climate change knowledge (Buys et al. 2012; 
Leviston & Walker 2011b). However, when it comes to mitigation policy 
implementation, lay individuals’ perceptions might be also heavily influenced by 
policymakers. The general public might evaluate the potential effectiveness of 
mitigation initiatives according to the ways governments design and implement 
them, and therefore a government’s climate change mitigation performance is likely 
to affect lay people’s policy preferences (Lubell 2003). As outlined in the 
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introduction, the history of Australia’s climatic movements lends support to this 
assertion (see Chapter One).  
It is clear then that policymakers have an important role in stimulating the general 
public’s support for mitigation initiatives, or dampening it. Australian Governments 
have to date mostly been unable to take the advantage of the general public’s high 
awareness of climate change issues to further mitigation actions through policy 
(Burgmann & Baer 2012). However, it has been observed that there is likely to be 
another “green wave”, as the proportion of Australians who want their nation take 
leadership in climate change action is again increasing (Jackson 2014; Koser 2014; 
Stefanova 2014). Should governments want to further increase public support for 
mitigation policies, then understanding the drivers of climate change mitigation 
support behaviour is essential. The following sections draw on these findings to 
highlight the contributions of this thesis.  
 
6.5 Contributions 
This thesis contributes both academic and practical knowledge to understanding 
support for climate change policy. It is among first pieces of research to examine the 
extent to which the fundamental characteristics of mitigation policies affects policy 
preferences. This research has demonstrated that important drivers of public support 
for the policies, such as perceived adverse impact of climate change and perceived 
policy effectiveness, should be utilised wisely depending on the policy domain.  
Second, this thesis provides empirical evidence for warnings against “fear appeal” 
over-use in climate change communication (Linden & Sander 2014; Shome, D. et al. 
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2009). This contribution may be more critical, especially given the ways the media 
has reported on the subject of climate change. Hart and Feldman (2014) warned that 
the US television networks have conveyed the risks of climate change without also 
significantly addressing risk ameliorating solutions. Even when risk ameliorating 
solutions are discussed, it seems to be independently communicated to the risks. 
Also, these authors found that network television stories paid little attention to the 
concept of policy effectiveness. This thesis suggests that this approach to 
communication is not effective in encouraging public support for mitigation policies. 
Firstly, because it may lead to “emotional numbing”, which reduces individuals’ 
emotional reactions to the risks of climate change (Shome, D. et al. 2009). Second, a 
lack of communication of the effectiveness’ in addressing climate change may 
discourage public support for the initiatives, as this thesis found. 
In addition, this thesis is among early attempts to apply the Extended Parallel Process 
Model to a new field – climate change mitigation behaviour. Despite many calls for 
the application of the model to the field of climate change related policy research 
(e.g., Hart & Feldman 2014; Linden & Sander 2014), there have been, until now, 
limited or no research responses. Through this application of the EPPM model, this 
thesis has highlighted the role of an inadequately examined driver of mitigation 
policy support behaviour: policy effectiveness. Not only does this thesis prove the 
salience of the variable in stimulating public support for mitigation initiatives, it also 
examines and offers empirical evidence for a mechanism through which policy 
effectiveness drives policy support behaviour. In doing so, this thesis responds to 
research calls of Bostrom et al. (2012) and Wan et al. (2013).  
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Further, by exploring the role of perceived policy effectiveness this thesis contributes 
to broader research on pro-environmental behaviour (PEB). Besides the direct 
influence that perceived policy effectiveness has on PEB (Wan, Shen & Yu 2014b), 
and the moderating effects on the link between common attitudinal determinants 
such as subjective norms (Wan, Shen & Yu 2014a), this thesis demonstrates that PE 
has mediating effects on the relationship between perceived risks and PEB. This 
finding therefore suggests a need for further consideration of this important 
determinant of PEB. 
Finally, the thesis contributes to the literature by looking beyond the common 
“knowledge gaps” between lay individuals and scientists, by contrasting the two 
samples for differences in attitudes towards climate change adverse impacts and 
mitigation policies. Identifying these important gaps offers meaningful suggestions 
for enhancing climate change communication which currently suffers from 
constrains that impede the role of scientific expertise in mitigation efforts (Sterman 
2011). Taking sea-level rises for instance, it is perceived by lay people to implicitly 
affect human wellbeing; however, it is one of the adverse impacts that is of most 
concern to climate scientists. This thesis suggests then that policymakers and other 
stakeholders in climate change communication should direct their efforts into 
reducing the differences in the perceptions of adverse impacts, in particular those 
which are not seen by the general public to explicitly affect human wellbeing. 
Moreover, examining the drivers that affect policy support behaviour of the “bias-
free” individuals, such as climate scientists, reveals many insights into a better model 
for directing public support towards effective climate change mitigation.  
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6.6 Future Research Directions 
This thesis also suggests some future research opportunities. Among the 
determinants in question, perceived policy feasibility seems to have an inconsistent 
effect on policy support behaviour. It is postulated that the construct may be too 
complicated to be captured by a single questionnaire item. Individuals may perceive 
the feasibility of mitigation initiatives in many different ways, including 
technological, economic, and political ones. Further investigation into this construct 
is therefore required.  
It is also suggested that the construct of perceived adverse impacts of climate change 
deserves further consideration. Future research may explore different aspects of this 
perceived risk construct, such as rational and emotional perceptions of risk (Slovic et 
al. 2004). If one conceptualises perceived risk as a domain of knowledge, then the 
mediating hypothesis examined in this study may be better examined through the 
Knowledge-Attitude-Behaviour framework of Kollmuss & Agyeman (2002).  
Finally, it is acknowledged that there may be concerns with the internal validity of 
the constructs as they relate to structural policies (PE-STR, PF-STR, PS-STR) 
(Alphas < .7). Although the Alpha levels were valid for statistical analysis, further 
research could focus on improving the measure of these constructs in order to 
enhance their internal validity. It is moreover acknowledged that this thesis examined 
one-off survey datasets. This may have limited the examination of variation in the 
effect of policy effectiveness. Although the thesis’s empirical studies controlled for 
some external variables such as political affiliations, changes in government or 
policy communication and implementation may potentially influence the perception 
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of policy effectiveness. Therefore, it is proposed that the future research consider a 
longitudinal research approach to be able to observe this possible variation. 
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APPENDIXES 
 
 
Appendix 1: Multi-colinearity test results (the General public sample) 
 
Dependent variable:  
Support for Behavioural 
policies
 
Dependent variable:  
Support for Structural 
policies
 
 
Betaa
 
tb
 
VIFs
 
Betaa
 
tb
 
VIFs
 
(Constant)  33.94***   11.51***  
Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change  –  
Low critical (PI-LOCR) 
.15 3.71*** 3.07 .05 1.63 3.07 
Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change  –  
High critical (PI-HICR) 
-.18 -4.82*** 2.66 -.01 -.21 2.66 
Perceived Anthropogenic 
cause of climate change (PA) 
.08 2.86** 1.40 .12 6.00*** 1.40 
Perceived Effectiveness – 
Behavioural policies  
(PE-BEH) 
.50 15.21*** 2.10 -.14 -5.51*** 2.10 
Perceived Feasibility – 
Behavioural policies  
(PF-BEH) 
-.01 -.43 1.32 .00 .04 1.32 
Perceived Effectiveness – 
Structural policies (PE-STR) 
-.05 1.60 2.22 .77 30.39*** 2.22 
Perceived Feasibility –   
Structural policies (PF-STR) 
-.04 -1.56 1.32 -.04 -1.85 1.32 
a Standardised coefficients  
b *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, all are two-tailed tests 
(VIFs below 5.0 indicate insignificant multi-colinearity issues (Hair 2010)) 
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Appendix 2: Multi-colinearity test results (the Climate scientist sample) 
 
Dependent variable:  
Support for Behavioural 
policies
 
Dependent variable:  
Support for Structural 
policies
 
 
Betaa
 
tb
 
VIFs
 
Betaa
 
tb
 
VIFs
 
(Constant) 
 8.82***   10.28***  
Perceived Anthropogenic causes 
of climate change (PA) 
.17 2.23* 1.23 .06 .76 1.23 
Perceived of climate change – 
Wellbeing (PI-WEB) 
.41 3.82*** 2.44 .25 2.30* 2.44 
Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change –  
Weather (PI-WEA) 
-.24 -2.23* 2.52 -.31 -2.82** 2.52 
Perceived adverse impacts of 
climate change –  
Sea-level rises (PI-SEA) 
-.10 -1.22 1.45 .07 .90 1.45 
Perceived Effectiveness – 
Behavioural policies (PE-BEH) 
.63 5.55*** 2.72 -.25 -2.18* 2.72 
Perceived Effectiveness – 
Structural policies (PE-STR) 
-.25 -2.26* 2.67 .71 6.30*** 2.67 
Perceived Feasibility – 
Behavioural policies (PF-BEH) 
.19 2.30* 1.40 .01 .09 1.40 
Perceived Feasibility – 
Structural policies (PF-STR) 
-.15 -1.89 1.43 .00 .02 1.43 
a Standardised coefficients  
b *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, all are two-tailed tests 
 (VIFs under 5.0 indicate insignificant multi-colinearity issues (Hair 2010)) 
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 Appendix 3: Demographics - The general public sample 
 
Age
 
Frequency
 
Percent
 
Cumulative Percent
 
Under 19 9 .6 .6 
From 20 to 29 115 7.8 8.4 
From 30 to 39 257 17.4 25.8 
From 40 to 49 278 18.8 44.6 
From 50 to 59 391 26.5 71.1 
From 60 to 69 321 21.7 92.9 
Above 70 105 7.1 100.0 
Total 1,476 100.0  
 
 
 
Gender
 
Frequency
 
Percent
 
Cumulative Percent
 
Male 882 59.8 59.8 
Female 594 40.2 100.0 
Total 1,476 100.0  
Education
 
Frequency
 
Percent
 
Cumulative Percent
 
Primary school 17 1.2 1.2 
Undergraduate 196 13.3 14.4 
Secondary school 513 34.8 49.2 
Postgraduate and 
higher 
451 30.6 79.7 
Vocational training 236 16.0 95.7 
Other  63 4.3 100.0 
Total 1,476 100.0  
Political Affiliation
 
Frequency
 
Percent
 
Cumulative Percent
 
Labor Party 611 41.4 41.4 
Liberal Party 424 28.7 70.1 
National Party 32 2.2 72.3 
Green Party 141 9.6 81.8 
Independent 107 7.2 89.1 
Other  161 10.9 100.0 
Total 1,476 100.0  
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Income
 
Frequency
 
Percent
 
Cumulative Percent
 
Less than $50,000 per 
year 
531 36.0 36.0 
Between $50,000 and 
$99,999 per year 
454 30.8 66.7 
Between $100,000 and 
$149,999 per year 
210 14.2 81.0 
Between $150,000 and 
$199,999 per year 
62 4.2 85.2 
More than $200,000 
per year 
34 2.3 87.5 
Prefer not to say 185 12.5 100.0 
Total 1,476 100.0  
 
  
Employment
 
Frequency
 
Percent
 
Cumulative Percent
 
Paid full time 
employment 
534 36.2 36.2 
Paid part time 
employment 
240 16.3 52.4 
Not in paid workforce 237 16.1 68.5 
Retired 366 24.8 93.3 
Other  99 6.7 100.0 
Total 1,476 100.0  
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Appendix 4: Demographics - The climate scientist sample 
 
Age
 
Frequency
 
Percent
 
Cumulative Percent
 
From 30 to 39 28 20.0 20.0 
From 40 to 49 47 33.6 53.6 
From 50 to 59 43 30.7 84.3 
From 60 to 69 20 14.3 98.6 
Above 70 2 1.4 100.0 
Total 140 100.0  
 
State
 
Frequency
 
Percent
 
Cumulative Percent
 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
15 10.7 10.7 
New South Wales 36 25.7 36.4 
Victoria 29 20.7 57.1 
Queensland 35 25.0 82.1 
South Australia 7 5.0 87.1 
Western Australia 11 7.9 95.0 
Tasmania 7 5.0 100.0 
Total 140 100.0  
 
Field of Expertise
 
Frequency
 
Percent
 
Cumulative Percent
 
Physical sciences 59 42.1 42.1 
Social sciences 41 29.3 71.4 
Other (Please specify) 40 28.6 100.0 
Total 140 100.0  
 
 
 
Gender
 
Frequency
 
Percent
 
Cumulative Percent
 
Male 101 72.1 72.1 
Female 39 27.9 100.0 
Total 140 100.0  
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Appendix 5: Questionnaire’s main content 
 
 
Q1. Do you think that global climate change has occurred over the past five years?  
 
 
 
 
 
Q2. Do you think global climate change is likely to occur over the next five years? 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3.  To what extent do you think the climate change that occurred over the past five years has been 
induced by human activities, and to what extent is it a factor of natural causes? 
  
 
 
Q4. To what extent do you think climate change has been a cause of the following possible outcomes 
over the past five years? 
 
  
 
  
Yes No 
    
Yes No 
    
Exclusively due 
to natural causes 
Mainly due to 
natural causes 
Fairly equal 
combination of 
both 
Mainly due to 
human activities 
Exclusively due 
to human 
activities 
I have no idea 
            
 
Not at all Slightly Moderately 
Considerab
ly 
Totally 
I have no 
idea 
Changing weather 
patterns 
            
Floods             
Drought             
Biodiversity decreases             
Community health 
problems 
            
Reduced personal 
income 
            
Reduced food 
production 
            
Rise in sea levels             
Reduced availability of 
fresh water for 
drinking and farming 
            
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Q5. Given current trends, to what extent do you think that climate change will be a cause of any of the 
following possible outcomes over the next five years? 
 
    
 
Q6. How effective do you think that the actions and policies below could be in helping to prevent 
global climate change? 
 
 
 
  
 Not at all Slightly Moderately 
Considerab
ly 
Totally 
I have no 
idea 
Changing weather 
patterns 
            
Floods             
Drought             
Biodiversity decreases             
Community health 
problems 
            
Reduced personal 
income 
            
Reduced food 
production 
            
Rise in sea levels             
Reduced availability of 
fresh water for 
drinking and farming 
            
 Not at all 
effective 
Slightly 
effective 
Moderate
ly 
effective 
Very 
effective 
Totally 
effective 
I have no 
idea 
Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient household equipment 
            
Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient business equipment 
            
Government Support for a Cap and Trade 
or Emissions Trading system 
            
Increased investment in renewable energy              
International standards for more energy 
efficient products 
            
Introduction of a carbon tax             
Education about actions to reduce climate 
change 
            
A self regulatory carbon usage scheme 
managed by business groups 
            
Improvements in public transport             
Investment in fuel efficient vehicles             
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Q7. How difficult do you think it would be to get action undertaken on each of the following possible 
activities?   
 
 
 
Q8. We are interested in your level of support for possible actions proposed to combat climate 
change. To what extent do you support the following activities? 
 
 
 
Q9. What is you residential postcode? ________________________ 
 
 
Q10. What age group do you belong to? 
 
 Under 19  From 20 to 29  From 30 to 39  From 40 to 49 
 From 50 to 59  From 60 to 69  Above 70  
 
 
Q11. What is your gender?  
 
 Male  Female 
  
 Not at all 
difficult 
Slightly 
difficult 
Moderat
ely 
difficult 
Very 
difficult 
Totally 
difficult 
Don’t 
know 
Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient household equipment 
            
Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient business equipment 
            
Government Support for a Cap and Trade or 
Emissions Trading system 
            
Increased investment in renewable energy              
International standard for more energy 
efficient products 
            
Introduction of a carbon tax             
Education about actions to reduce climate 
change 
            
A self regulatory carbon usage scheme 
managed by business groups 
            
Improvements in public transport 
 
             
Investment in fuel efficient vehicles             
 
Totally 
oppose 
Somewha
t oppose 
Neither 
oppose 
nor 
support 
Somewha
t support 
Totally 
support 
Don’t 
know 
Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient household equipment 
            
Government subsidies for more energy 
efficient business equipment 
            
Government Support for a Cap and Trade or 
Emissions Trading system 
            
Increased investment in renewable energy              
International standard for more energy 
efficient products 
            
Introduction of a carbon tax             
Education about actions to reduce climate 
change 
            
self regulatory carbon usage scheme 
managed by business groups 
            
Improvements in public transport 
 
            
Investment in more fuel efficient vehicles             
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Q12. What is your current employment status? 
 Paid full time employment 
 Paid part time employment 
 Not in paid workforce 
 Retired 
 Other 
 
Q13. What is the highest level of education you have achieved? 
 
 Primary school  Undergraduate 
 Secondary school  Postgraduate and higher 
 Vocational training  Other:__________________________________ 
 
 
Q14. What party did you vote for in the last Federal election?  
 
 
 
Q15. Which group best describes your household income per year? 
 
 Less than $50,000 per year 
 Between $50,000 and $99,999 per year 
 Between $100,000 and $149,999 per year 
 Between $150,000 and $199,999 per year 
 More than $200,000 per year 
 Prefer not to say 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
If you would like to receive a copy of the survey results please click on the following email 
address link (or copy and paste into your email program) and provide your email address.  
Thank you for participating in our survey! 
 Labour Party  Liberal Party  National Party 
 Green Party  Independent  Other: 
__________________ 
